| Message ID | 20250123192058.2558-1-tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | Handled Elsewhere |
| Headers | show |
| Series | apparmor: fix typos and spelling errors | expand |
Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> On Thu, Jan 23, 2025 at 11:30 AM Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com> wrote: > > From: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com> > > Fix typos and spelling errors in apparmor module comments that were > identified using the codespell tool. > No functional changes - documentation only. > > Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com> > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> > --- > This patch set is split into individual patches for each LSM > to facilitate easier review by respective maintainers. > > Original discussion: > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250112072925.1774-1-tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com > > security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 6 +++--- > security/apparmor/domain.c | 4 ++-- > security/apparmor/label.c | 2 +- > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +- > security/apparmor/policy.c | 4 ++-- > 5 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c > index 2c0185ebc900..0c2f248d31bf 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c > @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ > * The interface is split into two main components based on their function > * a securityfs component: > * used for static files that are always available, and which allows > - * userspace to specificy the location of the security filesystem. > + * userspace to specify the location of the security filesystem. > * > * fns and data are prefixed with > * aa_sfs_ > @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static struct file_system_type aafs_ops = { > /** > * __aafs_setup_d_inode - basic inode setup for apparmorfs > * @dir: parent directory for the dentry > - * @dentry: dentry we are seting the inode up for > + * @dentry: dentry we are setting the inode up for > * @mode: permissions the file should have > * @data: data to store on inode.i_private, available in open() > * @link: if symlink, symlink target string > @@ -2244,7 +2244,7 @@ static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos) > /** > * p_stop - stop depth first traversal > * @f: seq_file we are filling > - * @p: the last profile writen > + * @p: the last profile written > * > * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree > */ > diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c > index 5939bd9a9b9b..d959931eac28 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c > @@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred, > /* change_profile on exec already granted */ > /* > * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed > - * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results > + * even when no_new_privs is set because this always results > * in a further reduction of permissions. > */ > return 0; > @@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > * > * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stacked > * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this > - * aways results in a further reduction of permissions. > + * always results in a further reduction of permissions. > */ > if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) && > !unconfined(label) && > diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c > index 91483ecacc16..8bcff51becb8 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/label.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/label.c > @@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ bool aa_update_label_name(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp) > > /* > * cached label name is present and visible > - * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierachical > + * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierarchical > */ > static inline bool use_label_hname(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, > int flags) > diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > index 1edc12862a7d..04bf5d2f6e00 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > @@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ static int __init alloc_buffers(void) > * two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more > * buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow. > * This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be > - * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremly high. > + * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremely high. > */ > if (num_online_cpus() > 1) > num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT; > diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c > index d0244fab0653..5cec3efc4794 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c > @@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static struct aa_policy *__lookup_parent(struct aa_ns *ns, > } > > /** > - * __create_missing_ancestors - create place holders for missing ancestores > + * __create_missing_ancestors - create place holders for missing ancestors > * @ns: namespace to lookup profile in (NOT NULL) > * @hname: hierarchical profile name to find parent of (NOT NULL) > * @gfp: type of allocation. > @@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label, > goto out; > > /* ensure that profiles are all for the same ns > - * TODO: update locking to remove this constaint. All profiles in > + * TODO: update locking to remove this constraint. All profiles in > * the load set must succeed as a set or the load will > * fail. Sort ent list and take ns locks in hierarchy order > */ > -- > 2.39.5 > >
On 1/23/25 11:21, Tanya Agarwal wrote: > From: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com> > > Fix typos and spelling errors in apparmor module comments that were > identified using the codespell tool. > No functional changes - documentation only. > > Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com> > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> I have pulled this into my tree > --- > This patch set is split into individual patches for each LSM > to facilitate easier review by respective maintainers. > > Original discussion: > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250112072925.1774-1-tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com > > security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 6 +++--- > security/apparmor/domain.c | 4 ++-- > security/apparmor/label.c | 2 +- > security/apparmor/lsm.c | 2 +- > security/apparmor/policy.c | 4 ++-- > 5 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c > index 2c0185ebc900..0c2f248d31bf 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c > @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ > * The interface is split into two main components based on their function > * a securityfs component: > * used for static files that are always available, and which allows > - * userspace to specificy the location of the security filesystem. > + * userspace to specify the location of the security filesystem. > * > * fns and data are prefixed with > * aa_sfs_ > @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static struct file_system_type aafs_ops = { > /** > * __aafs_setup_d_inode - basic inode setup for apparmorfs > * @dir: parent directory for the dentry > - * @dentry: dentry we are seting the inode up for > + * @dentry: dentry we are setting the inode up for > * @mode: permissions the file should have > * @data: data to store on inode.i_private, available in open() > * @link: if symlink, symlink target string > @@ -2244,7 +2244,7 @@ static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos) > /** > * p_stop - stop depth first traversal > * @f: seq_file we are filling > - * @p: the last profile writen > + * @p: the last profile written > * > * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree > */ > diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c > index 5939bd9a9b9b..d959931eac28 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c > @@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred, > /* change_profile on exec already granted */ > /* > * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed > - * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results > + * even when no_new_privs is set because this always results > * in a further reduction of permissions. > */ > return 0; > @@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) > * > * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stacked > * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this > - * aways results in a further reduction of permissions. > + * always results in a further reduction of permissions. > */ > if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) && > !unconfined(label) && > diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c > index 91483ecacc16..8bcff51becb8 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/label.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/label.c > @@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ bool aa_update_label_name(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp) > > /* > * cached label name is present and visible > - * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierachical > + * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierarchical > */ > static inline bool use_label_hname(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, > int flags) > diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > index 1edc12862a7d..04bf5d2f6e00 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c > @@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ static int __init alloc_buffers(void) > * two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more > * buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow. > * This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be > - * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremly high. > + * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremely high. > */ > if (num_online_cpus() > 1) > num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT; > diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c > index d0244fab0653..5cec3efc4794 100644 > --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c > +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c > @@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static struct aa_policy *__lookup_parent(struct aa_ns *ns, > } > > /** > - * __create_missing_ancestors - create place holders for missing ancestores > + * __create_missing_ancestors - create place holders for missing ancestors > * @ns: namespace to lookup profile in (NOT NULL) > * @hname: hierarchical profile name to find parent of (NOT NULL) > * @gfp: type of allocation. > @@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label, > goto out; > > /* ensure that profiles are all for the same ns > - * TODO: update locking to remove this constaint. All profiles in > + * TODO: update locking to remove this constraint. All profiles in > * the load set must succeed as a set or the load will > * fail. Sort ent list and take ns locks in hierarchy order > */
On Sat, Jan 25, 2025 at 4:34 AM John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> wrote: > > On 1/23/25 11:21, Tanya Agarwal wrote: > > From: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com> > > > > Fix typos and spelling errors in apparmor module comments that were > > identified using the codespell tool. > > No functional changes - documentation only. > > > > Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com> > > Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> > > Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> > > I have pulled this into my tree Thanks John! Regards, Tanya Agarwal
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 2c0185ebc900..0c2f248d31bf 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ * The interface is split into two main components based on their function * a securityfs component: * used for static files that are always available, and which allows - * userspace to specificy the location of the security filesystem. + * userspace to specify the location of the security filesystem. * * fns and data are prefixed with * aa_sfs_ @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static struct file_system_type aafs_ops = { /** * __aafs_setup_d_inode - basic inode setup for apparmorfs * @dir: parent directory for the dentry - * @dentry: dentry we are seting the inode up for + * @dentry: dentry we are setting the inode up for * @mode: permissions the file should have * @data: data to store on inode.i_private, available in open() * @link: if symlink, symlink target string @@ -2244,7 +2244,7 @@ static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos) /** * p_stop - stop depth first traversal * @f: seq_file we are filling - * @p: the last profile writen + * @p: the last profile written * * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index 5939bd9a9b9b..d959931eac28 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred, /* change_profile on exec already granted */ /* * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed - * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results + * even when no_new_privs is set because this always results * in a further reduction of permissions. */ return 0; @@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stacked * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this - * aways results in a further reduction of permissions. + * always results in a further reduction of permissions. */ if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) && !unconfined(label) && diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c index 91483ecacc16..8bcff51becb8 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/label.c +++ b/security/apparmor/label.c @@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ bool aa_update_label_name(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp) /* * cached label name is present and visible - * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierachical + * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierarchical */ static inline bool use_label_hname(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, int flags) diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 1edc12862a7d..04bf5d2f6e00 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ static int __init alloc_buffers(void) * two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more * buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow. * This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be - * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremly high. + * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremely high. */ if (num_online_cpus() > 1) num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT; diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index d0244fab0653..5cec3efc4794 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static struct aa_policy *__lookup_parent(struct aa_ns *ns, } /** - * __create_missing_ancestors - create place holders for missing ancestores + * __create_missing_ancestors - create place holders for missing ancestors * @ns: namespace to lookup profile in (NOT NULL) * @hname: hierarchical profile name to find parent of (NOT NULL) * @gfp: type of allocation. @@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label, goto out; /* ensure that profiles are all for the same ns - * TODO: update locking to remove this constaint. All profiles in + * TODO: update locking to remove this constraint. All profiles in * the load set must succeed as a set or the load will * fail. Sort ent list and take ns locks in hierarchy order */