Message ID | 20250220051325.340691-2-ebiggers@kernel.org (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | Under Review |
Delegated to: | Herbert Xu |
Headers | show |
Series | Eliminate the no-SIMD en/decryption fallbacks on x86 | expand |
On Thu, Feb 20, 2025 at 1:16 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote: > > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> > > Currently kernel-mode FPU is not always usable in softirq context on > x86, since softirqs can nest inside a kernel-mode FPU section in task > context, and nested use of kernel-mode FPU is not supported. > > Therefore, x86 SIMD-optimized code that can be called in softirq context > has to sometimes fall back to non-SIMD code. There are two options for > the fallback, both of which are pretty terrible: > > (a) Use a scalar fallback. This can be 10-100x slower than vectorized > code because it cannot use specialized instructions like AES, SHA, > or carryless multiplication. > > (b) Execute the request asynchronously using a kworker. In other > words, use the "crypto SIMD helper" in crypto/simd.c. > > Currently most of the x86 en/decryption code (skcipher and aead > algorithms) uses option (b), since this avoids the slow scalar fallback > and it is easier to wire up. But option (b) is still really bad for its > own reasons: > > - Punting the request to a kworker is bad for performance too. > > - It forces the algorithm to be marked as asynchronous > (CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC), preventing it from being used by crypto API > users who request a synchronous algorithm. That's another huge > performance problem, which is especially unfortunate for users who > don't even do en/decryption in softirq context. > > - It makes all en/decryption operations take a detour through > crypto/simd.c. That involves additional checks and an additional > indirect call, which slow down en/decryption for *everyone*. Thank you for the detailed information. > Fortunately, the skcipher and aead APIs are only usable in task and > softirq context in the first place, nor is it supported to call them > with hardirqs disabled. Thus, if kernel-mode FPU were to be reliably > usable in softirq context, no fallback would be needed. Indeed, other > architectures such as arm, arm64, and riscv have already done this. > > Therefore, this patch updates x86 accordingly to reliably support > kernel-mode FPU in softirqs (except when hardirqs are disabled). > > This is done by just disabling softirq processing in kernel-mode FPU > sections, as that prevents the nesting that was problematic. > > This will delay some softirqs slightly, but only ones that would have > otherwise been nested inside a task context kernel-mode FPU section. > Any such softirqs would have taken the slow fallback path before if they > tried to do any en/decryption. Now these softirqs will just run at the > end of the task context kernel-mode FPU section (since local_bh_enable() > runs pending softirqs) and will no longer take the slow fallback path. I think this will delay all softirqs, including those that don't use FPU. Will there be a performance impact? (I guess you've noticed the patch I submitted last year. And this is the main reason why it was implemented in the way you mentioned as the second alternative.)
Hi Xiao, On Fri, Feb 21, 2025 at 03:38:27PM +0800, Xiao Liang wrote: > > Therefore, this patch updates x86 accordingly to reliably support > > kernel-mode FPU in softirqs (except when hardirqs are disabled). > > > > This is done by just disabling softirq processing in kernel-mode FPU > > sections, as that prevents the nesting that was problematic. > > > > This will delay some softirqs slightly, but only ones that would have > > otherwise been nested inside a task context kernel-mode FPU section. > > Any such softirqs would have taken the slow fallback path before if they > > tried to do any en/decryption. Now these softirqs will just run at the > > end of the task context kernel-mode FPU section (since local_bh_enable() > > runs pending softirqs) and will no longer take the slow fallback path. > > I think this will delay all softirqs, including those that don't use > FPU. Will there be a performance impact? > (I guess you've noticed the patch I submitted last year. And this is > the main reason why it was implemented in the way you mentioned as > the second alternative.) Thanks for taking a look at this patch! It's true that this patch makes all softirqs on the same CPU be delayed until the end of the current kernel-mode FPU section. But, I'm a bit skeptical that it actually matters enough on x86 to go with a more complex solution that would allow nested kernel-mode FPU. Kernel-mode FPU sections are generally short; the usual cases are en/decrypting disk sectors or network packets that are 4 KiB or less. Even if a longer buffer is passed in, most of the x86 SIMD-optimized code already divides the buffer into chunks of at most 4 KiB and uses a separate kernel-mode FPU section for each chunk. This happens either explicitly, or implicitly via the skcipher_walk_* functions which never return more than PAGE_SIZE (i.e. 4 KiB on x86) in a single step. There is some code that does not do this, e.g. the CRC code, but that could easily be fixed. The commonly-used x86 SIMD-optimized code is also super fast these days, and is only getting faster. For example, on an AMD desktop processor from this year I get roughly 35 GB/s AES-256-XTS, 25 GB/s AES-256-GCM, or 80 GB/s any CRC, courtesy of VAES and VPCLMULQDQ (measuring single-threaded throughput at max frequency). That works out to 50-165 nanoseconds per 4 KiB. Increasingly these algorithms can be thought of as similar to memcpy() in speed. Of course, the worst case is probably about 100x slower -- consider a CPU that is much older, and from a low-voltage product line (e.g. Intel Atom), and not running at its max frequency, and computing a much slower crypto algorithm that lacks hardware acceleration like Serpent-XTS, or even AES-something if the CPU is so old (over 15 years) as to lack AES-NI. But, the super slow crypto algorithms are becoming increasingly rare. The crypto algorithms in use these days tend to have hardware acceleration on x86 (via AES-NI, PCLMULQDQ, or SHA extensions) or at least be fast with SSE / AVX. So while the worst case is likely about 20 microseconds on certain systems where everything lines up the wrong way, realistically the worst case on most systems based on what's actually being used is probably less than 1 microsecond. That seems probably short enough to be acceptable? Remember that preemption was already being disabled during this time. And this is only on one CPU. I think it's also important to note that when local_bh_enable() re-enables softirq processing (when called from kernel_fpu_end()), it also immediatelly runs any pending softirqs. Thus there would be no additional delay; the CPU will *immediately* run any pending softirqs. As for supporting nested kernel-mode FPU if we wanted to go that way: yes, your patch from last year https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240403140138.393825-1-shaw.leon@gmail.com/ ostensibly did that. However, I found some bugs in it; e.g., it didn't take into account that struct fpu is variable-length. So it didn't turn out as simple as that patch made it seem. Just extending fpregs_{lock,unlock}() to kernel-mode FPU is a simpler solution with fewer edge cases, and it avoids increasing the memory usage of the kernel. So I thought I'd propose that first. - Eric
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h index f86ad3335529d..f42de5f05e7eb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h @@ -14,14 +14,13 @@ #include <asm/fpu/types.h> /* * Use kernel_fpu_begin/end() if you intend to use FPU in kernel context. It - * disables preemption so be careful if you intend to use it for long periods - * of time. - * If you intend to use the FPU in irq/softirq you need to check first with - * irq_fpu_usable() if it is possible. + * disables preemption and softirq processing, so be careful if you intend to + * use it for long periods of time. Kernel-mode FPU cannot be used in all + * contexts -- see irq_fpu_usable() for details. */ /* Kernel FPU states to initialize in kernel_fpu_begin_mask() */ #define KFPU_387 _BITUL(0) /* 387 state will be initialized */ #define KFPU_MXCSR _BITUL(1) /* MXCSR will be initialized */ @@ -48,25 +47,23 @@ static inline void kernel_fpu_begin(void) kernel_fpu_begin_mask(KFPU_387 | KFPU_MXCSR); #endif } /* - * Use fpregs_lock() while editing CPU's FPU registers or fpu->fpstate. - * A context switch will (and softirq might) save CPU's FPU registers to - * fpu->fpstate.regs and set TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD leaving CPU's FPU registers in - * a random state. + * Use fpregs_lock() while editing CPU's FPU registers or fpu->fpstate, or while + * using the FPU in kernel mode. A context switch will (and softirq might) save + * CPU's FPU registers to fpu->fpstate.regs and set TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD leaving + * CPU's FPU registers in a random state. * * local_bh_disable() protects against both preemption and soft interrupts * on !RT kernels. * * On RT kernels local_bh_disable() is not sufficient because it only * serializes soft interrupt related sections via a local lock, but stays * preemptible. Disabling preemption is the right choice here as bottom * half processing is always in thread context on RT kernels so it * implicitly prevents bottom half processing as well. - * - * Disabling preemption also serializes against kernel_fpu_begin(). */ static inline void fpregs_lock(void) { if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT)) local_bh_disable(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c index 1209c7aebb211..0f7268452bf20 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c @@ -55,35 +55,22 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fpu *, fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx); * Can we use the FPU in kernel mode with the * whole "kernel_fpu_begin/end()" sequence? */ bool irq_fpu_usable(void) { - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(in_nmi())) - return false; - - /* In kernel FPU usage already active? */ - if (this_cpu_read(in_kernel_fpu)) - return false; - /* - * When not in NMI or hard interrupt context, FPU can be used in: - * - * - Task context except from within fpregs_lock()'ed critical - * regions. - * - * - Soft interrupt processing context which cannot happen - * while in a fpregs_lock()'ed critical region. + * kernel_fpu_begin() takes fpregs_lock(), which disables preemption and + * softirq processing. That prevents any other task or softirq from + * trying to use the FPU. Therefore, kernel-mode FPU can always be used + * in task and softirq context, except when hardirqs are disabled which + * is not compatible with disabling and enabling softirq processing, or + * when kernel-mode FPU is explicitly nested (which should never + * happen). Disabling/enabling softirq processing is also not allowed + * in hardirq context. Thus, we get the following condition. */ - if (!in_hardirq()) - return true; - - /* - * In hard interrupt context it's safe when soft interrupts - * are enabled, which means the interrupt did not hit in - * a fpregs_lock()'ed critical region. - */ - return !softirq_count(); + return !this_cpu_read(in_kernel_fpu) && + !in_hardirq() && !irqs_disabled() && !in_nmi(); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(irq_fpu_usable); /* * Track AVX512 state use because it is known to slow the max clock @@ -418,11 +405,11 @@ int fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, const void *buf, EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate); #endif /* CONFIG_KVM */ void kernel_fpu_begin_mask(unsigned int kfpu_mask) { - preempt_disable(); + fpregs_lock(); WARN_ON_FPU(!irq_fpu_usable()); WARN_ON_FPU(this_cpu_read(in_kernel_fpu)); this_cpu_write(in_kernel_fpu, true); @@ -446,11 +433,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_fpu_begin_mask); void kernel_fpu_end(void) { WARN_ON_FPU(!this_cpu_read(in_kernel_fpu)); this_cpu_write(in_kernel_fpu, false); - preempt_enable(); + fpregs_unlock(); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_fpu_end); /* * Sync the FPU register state to current's memory register state when the