diff mbox

[06/12] x86: Require CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL for IO port access

Message ID 1363642353-30749-6-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Delegated to: Bjorn Helgaas
Headers show

Commit Message

Matthew Garrett March 18, 2013, 9:32 p.m. UTC
IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register
space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock
it down by default.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c | 4 ++--
 drivers/char/mem.c       | 3 +++
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Comments

H. Peter Anvin March 20, 2013, 1 a.m. UTC | #1
On 03/18/2013 02:32 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> IO port access would permit users to gain access to PCI configuration
> registers, which in turn (on a lot of hardware) give access to MMIO register
> space. This would potentially permit root to trigger arbitrary DMA, so lock
> it down by default.
> 

Again, if you are going to do this, just kill bloody RAWIO.  Quite
frankly saying brainfucked SCSI drivers have abused it doesn't hold
water, because as far as you know those same commands can trigger
arbitrary DMA activity.

	-hpa

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diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
index 4ddaf66..f505995 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@  asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
 
 	if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+	if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL)))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/*
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@  SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl, unsigned int, level)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	/* Trying to gain more privileges? */
 	if (level > old) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || !capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
 			return -EPERM;
 	}
 	regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) | (level << 12);
diff --git a/drivers/char/mem.c b/drivers/char/mem.c
index 2c644af..7eee4d8 100644
--- a/drivers/char/mem.c
+++ b/drivers/char/mem.c
@@ -597,6 +597,9 @@  static ssize_t write_port(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	unsigned long i = *ppos;
 	const char __user *tmp = buf;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buf, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 	while (count-- > 0 && i < 65536) {