diff mbox

ARM: fix string functions on !MMU

Message ID 1398103808-24380-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show

Commit Message

Rabin Vincent April 21, 2014, 6:10 p.m. UTC
8c56cc8be5b38e ("ARM: 7449/1: use generic strnlen_user and
strncpy_from_user functions") apparently broken those string operations
for !MMU.  USER_DS == KERNEL_DS on !MMU, so user_addr_max() always
restricts the addresses to TASK_SIZE.

TASK_SIZE has anyway no meaning on !MMU, so make user_addr_max() not
restrict anything.

Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

Comments

Will Deacon April 22, 2014, 9:44 a.m. UTC | #1
On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 07:10:08PM +0100, Rabin Vincent wrote:
> 8c56cc8be5b38e ("ARM: 7449/1: use generic strnlen_user and
> strncpy_from_user functions") apparently broken those string operations
> for !MMU.  USER_DS == KERNEL_DS on !MMU, so user_addr_max() always
> restricts the addresses to TASK_SIZE.
> 
> TASK_SIZE has anyway no meaning on !MMU, so make user_addr_max() not
> restrict anything.

Might be worth mentioning that this is an issue because KERNEL_DS is 0x0
(since it's a 32-bit quantity), so checks like addr < user_addr_max() will
fail. Anyway, the code looks fine to me:

  Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

Will
Rabin Vincent April 24, 2014, 3:43 p.m. UTC | #2
On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 10:44:24AM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 07:10:08PM +0100, Rabin Vincent wrote:
> > 8c56cc8be5b38e ("ARM: 7449/1: use generic strnlen_user and
> > strncpy_from_user functions") apparently broken those string operations
> > for !MMU.  USER_DS == KERNEL_DS on !MMU, so user_addr_max() always
> > restricts the addresses to TASK_SIZE.
> > 
> > TASK_SIZE has anyway no meaning on !MMU, so make user_addr_max() not
> > restrict anything.
> 
> Might be worth mentioning that this is an issue because KERNEL_DS is 0x0
> (since it's a 32-bit quantity), so checks like addr < user_addr_max() will
> fail.

Thanks for the ack, but I don't quite understand what you mean here.
You describe the state before this patch, right?  Why does it matter
that KERNEL_DS is 0x0?
Will Deacon April 25, 2014, 9:12 a.m. UTC | #3
Hi Rabin,

On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 04:43:20PM +0100, Rabin Vincent wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 10:44:24AM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> > On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 07:10:08PM +0100, Rabin Vincent wrote:
> > > 8c56cc8be5b38e ("ARM: 7449/1: use generic strnlen_user and
> > > strncpy_from_user functions") apparently broken those string operations
> > > for !MMU.  USER_DS == KERNEL_DS on !MMU, so user_addr_max() always
> > > restricts the addresses to TASK_SIZE.
> > > 
> > > TASK_SIZE has anyway no meaning on !MMU, so make user_addr_max() not
> > > restrict anything.
> > 
> > Might be worth mentioning that this is an issue because KERNEL_DS is 0x0
> > (since it's a 32-bit quantity), so checks like addr < user_addr_max() will
> > fail.
> 
> Thanks for the ack, but I don't quite understand what you mean here.
> You describe the state before this patch, right?  Why does it matter
> that KERNEL_DS is 0x0?

Apologies, I misread the code that you're patching so I guess I'll have to
revoke my ack, sorry! That's not to say I think the patch is bad, I'd just
like to discuss it with you a bit more.

Having re-read the code, the issue is because TASK_SIZE is defined as
CONFIG_DRAM_SIZE, right? Since CONFIG_DRAM_BASE may be non-zero, it means
TASK_SIZE is truly a size -- not a limit (as it would be in virtual space).
What we actually want for !MMU is END_MEM instead of TASK_SIZE.

Will
Rabin Vincent April 25, 2014, 6:45 p.m. UTC | #4
On Fri, Apr 25, 2014 at 10:12:24AM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 04:43:20PM +0100, Rabin Vincent wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 10:44:24AM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> > > On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 07:10:08PM +0100, Rabin Vincent wrote:
> > > > 8c56cc8be5b38e ("ARM: 7449/1: use generic strnlen_user and
> > > > strncpy_from_user functions") apparently broken those string operations
> > > > for !MMU.  USER_DS == KERNEL_DS on !MMU, so user_addr_max() always
> > > > restricts the addresses to TASK_SIZE.
> > > > 
> > > > TASK_SIZE has anyway no meaning on !MMU, so make user_addr_max() not
> > > > restrict anything.
> > > 
> > > Might be worth mentioning that this is an issue because KERNEL_DS is 0x0
> > > (since it's a 32-bit quantity), so checks like addr < user_addr_max() will
> > > fail.
> > 
> > Thanks for the ack, but I don't quite understand what you mean here.
> > You describe the state before this patch, right?  Why does it matter
> > that KERNEL_DS is 0x0?
> 
> Apologies, I misread the code that you're patching so I guess I'll have to
> revoke my ack, sorry! That's not to say I think the patch is bad, I'd just
> like to discuss it with you a bit more.
> 
> Having re-read the code, the issue is because TASK_SIZE is defined as
> CONFIG_DRAM_SIZE, right? Since CONFIG_DRAM_BASE may be non-zero, it means
> TASK_SIZE is truly a size -- not a limit (as it would be in virtual space).
> What we actually want for !MMU is END_MEM instead of TASK_SIZE.

I guess you mean I should #define user_addr_max() to END_MEM for !MMU?
That won't work.  For example, on a !MMU boot, the first thing that
fails because of this bug is devtmpsfs_mount() -> sys_mount() ->
copy_mount_string() -> strndup_user(), which is run in a kernel thread.
The type argument of sys_mount() points to a string in flash since we
run an XIP kernel.  This flash address has no relation to END_MEM (which
is nothing but CONFIG_DRAM_BASE + CONFIG_DRAM_SIZE) and could be higher
than END_MEM.
Will Deacon April 28, 2014, 7:10 p.m. UTC | #5
On Fri, Apr 25, 2014 at 07:45:10PM +0100, Rabin Vincent wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 25, 2014 at 10:12:24AM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> > On Thu, Apr 24, 2014 at 04:43:20PM +0100, Rabin Vincent wrote:
> > > On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 10:44:24AM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> > > > On Mon, Apr 21, 2014 at 07:10:08PM +0100, Rabin Vincent wrote:
> > > > > 8c56cc8be5b38e ("ARM: 7449/1: use generic strnlen_user and
> > > > > strncpy_from_user functions") apparently broken those string operations
> > > > > for !MMU.  USER_DS == KERNEL_DS on !MMU, so user_addr_max() always
> > > > > restricts the addresses to TASK_SIZE.
> > > > > 
> > > > > TASK_SIZE has anyway no meaning on !MMU, so make user_addr_max() not
> > > > > restrict anything.
> > > > 
> > > > Might be worth mentioning that this is an issue because KERNEL_DS is 0x0
> > > > (since it's a 32-bit quantity), so checks like addr < user_addr_max() will
> > > > fail.
> > > 
> > > Thanks for the ack, but I don't quite understand what you mean here.
> > > You describe the state before this patch, right?  Why does it matter
> > > that KERNEL_DS is 0x0?
> > 
> > Apologies, I misread the code that you're patching so I guess I'll have to
> > revoke my ack, sorry! That's not to say I think the patch is bad, I'd just
> > like to discuss it with you a bit more.
> > 
> > Having re-read the code, the issue is because TASK_SIZE is defined as
> > CONFIG_DRAM_SIZE, right? Since CONFIG_DRAM_BASE may be non-zero, it means
> > TASK_SIZE is truly a size -- not a limit (as it would be in virtual space).
> > What we actually want for !MMU is END_MEM instead of TASK_SIZE.
> 
> I guess you mean I should #define user_addr_max() to END_MEM for !MMU?
> That won't work.  For example, on a !MMU boot, the first thing that
> fails because of this bug is devtmpsfs_mount() -> sys_mount() ->
> copy_mount_string() -> strndup_user(), which is run in a kernel thread.
> The type argument of sys_mount() points to a string in flash since we
> run an XIP kernel.  This flash address has no relation to END_MEM (which
> is nothing but CONFIG_DRAM_BASE + CONFIG_DRAM_SIZE) and could be higher
> than END_MEM.

Good point, I hadn't considered XIP with flash regions. In which case, I
don't think we have any choice but to use ~0UL as the limit. It looks like
Uwe has taken a quick look at some other users of TASK_SIZE, so I'll leave
you two to complete the audit ;)

Will
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 12c3a5d..c3a65f1 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -199,6 +199,9 @@  extern int __put_user_8(void *, unsigned long long);
 		__put_user_check(x,p);					\
 	 })
 
+#define user_addr_max() \
+	(segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS) ? TASK_SIZE : ~0UL)
+
 #else /* CONFIG_MMU */
 
 /*
@@ -210,6 +213,7 @@  extern int __put_user_8(void *, unsigned long long);
 #define __addr_ok(addr)		((void)(addr),1)
 #define __range_ok(addr,size)	((void)(addr),0)
 #define get_fs()		(KERNEL_DS)
+#define user_addr_max()		(~0UL)
 
 static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
 {
@@ -222,9 +226,6 @@  static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
 
 #define access_ok(type,addr,size)	(__range_ok(addr,size) == 0)
 
-#define user_addr_max() \
-	(segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS) ? TASK_SIZE : ~0UL)
-
 /*
  * The "__xxx" versions of the user access functions do not verify the
  * address space - it must have been done previously with a separate