From patchwork Tue Aug 28 20:14:14 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Jann Horn X-Patchwork-Id: 10579163 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E3142920 for ; Tue, 28 Aug 2018 21:07:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DA7E42A7FE for ; Tue, 28 Aug 2018 21:07:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id CE1FA2A93E; Tue, 28 Aug 2018 21:07:45 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-12.8 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED, USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id C5DA02A7FE for ; Tue, 28 Aug 2018 21:07:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 19820 invoked by uid 550); 28 Aug 2018 21:07:41 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Delivered-To: moderator for kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 1379 invoked from network); 28 Aug 2018 20:14:50 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:message-id:mime-version:subject:from:to:cc; bh=DP44jcAgzuzqx7PHBEa6TDm8OXgTeIVsp9I+xoY7/bI=; b=B4UwTkHZTkeDgTmI/PpAKAdNykiSnMgeZ3uKvfRjsi5EFarAXBLfDDEAJf+L9H56gP jyDOJ5QgmXUEs8C+uPejd+E/Qet4PKfA1BIMytlmnjaI6ieklWPMO6ifqtgHYG9DllYx DMKx056VxPH5f3f/AxXb1wSq5CuHYGPqhX6To6BOSvSSu1As52Sj4zqtmiFYskZQAEhP vpEUtMMcW3mirwTgWMxzT11Du4X9qpnEw+daas6oeCn341xK7rUPNYwI/K56HOdLnAXk FqLVGakW9YXy1jvkyWSi8kzH15fGN/Wz3Sa/ZVxukr5Sz8uON7inpUdtSfiCZlKmTg1M PnUQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:message-id:mime-version:subject:from:to:cc; bh=DP44jcAgzuzqx7PHBEa6TDm8OXgTeIVsp9I+xoY7/bI=; b=FrSuFexk1plVaUXKaXvc88IWNIHOG1N+ZE4eDGYMxJYvHC6OU+9w5UmsMZsMyC4Cmx JNISBDZey72A5tlN5GT9x3zKW7OpddvsB/do/hY6IMlaZAZmfD3rqNCAu9KIYdVxeTWU 8QHOF8vr21ngCy5AHZBIWc7rDlC5xa3puBD7akW7sM4l6wHWhHIas45Fq7WiltymQTRC 9TTJJsIvR/TeBd6VGrnxdwZGXr63oik7B5e9d8Wlb61di6ZuAsThrXsKWQxoxm8eDpJf /0W976GDdzAlRCYaStZ/hGbrMTzMAYo57F9YfiOacSRquOarPN9M2fx/45La+tU1LR1W L/Yw== X-Gm-Message-State: APzg51BdcPFcqJX7x3eMt8UGnSJr42acSyIQ2Dk5CJ/Xo0i1AQ44dhtW ddXphmDgd0Qb9gNUnfynBsuey2A4Bg== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ANB0VdYRRKjW6Xy066i0t+5UAUY5Alw2DPai9CaTWVSNQtMc0GQLt2tszvXKov3cosPeKNZMSUEJpKYoXg== X-Received: by 2002:a81:4401:: with SMTP id r1-v6mr908847ywa.85.1535487278839; Tue, 28 Aug 2018 13:14:38 -0700 (PDT) Date: Tue, 28 Aug 2018 22:14:14 +0200 Message-Id: <20180828201421.157735-1-jannh@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.0.rc0.228.g281dcd1b4d0-goog Subject: [PATCH v3 0/7] x86: BUG() on #GP / kernel #PF in uaccess From: Jann Horn To: Kees Cook , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , x86@kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, jannh@google.com Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dvyukov@google.com, Masami Hiramatsu , "Naveen N. Rao" , Anil S Keshavamurthy , "David S. Miller" , Alexander Viro , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP This is the third version of "[RFC PATCH 1/2] x86: WARN() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses". Changes since v2: - patch 1: avoid unnecessary branch on return value and split up the checks (Borislav Petkov) - patch 5: really plumb the error code through to the handlers (Andy) - patch 6: whitelist exact_copy_from_user(), at least for now - the alternative would be a somewhat complicated refactor (Kees Cook) Expanding on the change in patch 6: I believe that for now, whitelisting exact_copy_from_user() is acceptable, since there aren't many places that call ksys_mount() under KERNEL_DS. I very much dislike copy_mount_options()/exact_copy_from_user() and want to do something about that code at some point - in particular because it currently silently truncates mount options, which seems like a bad idea security-wise (https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/commit/34c62ee90c69) -, but I don't want to block this series on that. I hope that exact_copy_from_user() was the only place that does this kind of thing under KERNEL_DS - if there might be more places like this, it may be necessary for now to change the "return true;" in bogus_uaccess() to "WARN(1, ...); return false;" for now, and make it a "return true" later. Does anyone have opinions on this? This time I've actually also boot-tested a build with vmapped stack, not just a KASAN build. (It's annoying that those are mutually exclusive...) Kees, I hope you can cleanly boot with this series applied now? See patch 6/7 ("x86: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses") for a description of the motivation for this series. Patches 1 and 2 are cleanups that I did while working on this series, but the series doesn't depend on them. (I first thought these cleanups were necessary for the rest of the series, then noticed that they actually aren't, but decided to keep them since cleanups are good anyway.) Patches 3, 4 and 5 are prep work; 4 and 5 are loosely based on code from the v1 patch. They've changed quite a bit though. Patch 6 is the main semantic change. Patch 7 is a small testcase for verifying that patch 6 works. Jann Horn (7): x86: refactor kprobes_fault() like kprobe_exceptions_notify() x86: inline kprobe_exceptions_notify() into do_general_protection() x86: stop calling fixup_exception() from kprobe_fault_handler() x86: introduce _ASM_EXTABLE_UA for uaccess fixups x86: plumb error code and fault address through to fault handlers x86: BUG() when uaccess helpers fault on kernel addresses lkdtm: test copy_to_user() on bad kernel pointer under KERNEL_DS arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 10 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/extable.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 22 ++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 38 +-------- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 16 +++- arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S | 4 +- arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S | 90 ++++++++++---------- arch/x86/lib/csum-copy_64.S | 8 +- arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 12 +-- arch/x86/lib/putuser.S | 10 +-- arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 126 ++++++++++++++-------------- arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c | 4 +- arch/x86/mm/extable.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++---- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 26 +++--- drivers/misc/lkdtm/core.c | 1 + drivers/misc/lkdtm/lkdtm.h | 1 + drivers/misc/lkdtm/usercopy.c | 13 +++ fs/namespace.c | 2 + include/linux/sched.h | 6 ++ mm/maccess.c | 6 ++ 24 files changed, 314 insertions(+), 210 deletions(-) Tested-by: Kees Cook