[v3,0/3] perf: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control

Message

Alexey Budankov April 30, 2020, 7:06 a.m. UTC

Changes in v3:
- mention "CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN" instead of sole CAP_PERFMON or 
  CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the docs and messages to support use case
  of newer Perf tool on kernel w/o CAP_PERFMON
- reverted double new line in "No permission to enable %s event.\n\n"
- updated security.txt content with new messages wording

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[e-mail]/

Changes in v2:
- implemented minor doc and code changes to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN
  with CAP_PERFMON capability;
- introduced Perf doc file with instructions on how to enable and use
  perf_event LSM hooks for mandatory access control to perf_event_open()
  syscall;

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[e-mail]/

repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux.git perf/core
sha1: ee097e8ee56f8867cbbf45fe2a06f6b9e660c39c


Extend Perf tool with the check of /sys/fs/selinux/enforce value and notify 
in case access to perf_event_open() syscall is restricted by the enforced 
SELinux policy settings. See new added security.txt file for exact steps
how the changes look like and how to test the patch set.

---
Alexey Budankov (3):
  perf docs: extend CAP_SYS_ADMIN with CAP_PERFMON where needed
  perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control
  perf docs: introduce security.txt file to document related issues

 tools/perf/Documentation/perf-intel-pt.txt |   2 +-
 tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt      | 237 +++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/perf/util/cloexec.c                  |   4 +-
 tools/perf/util/evsel.c                    |  39 ++--
 4 files changed, 264 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt

Comments

Alexey Budankov May 18, 2020, 8:07 a.m. UTC | #1

Hi,

Is there anything else that could be done from my side to move this forward?

Thanks,
Alexey

On 30.04.2020 10:06, Alexey Budankov wrote:
> 
> Changes in v3:
> - mention "CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN" instead of sole CAP_PERFMON or 
>   CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the docs and messages to support use case
>   of newer Perf tool on kernel w/o CAP_PERFMON
> - reverted double new line in "No permission to enable %s event.\n\n"
> - updated security.txt content with new messages wording
> 
> v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[e-mail]/
> 
> Changes in v2:
> - implemented minor doc and code changes to substitute CAP_SYS_ADMIN
>   with CAP_PERFMON capability;
> - introduced Perf doc file with instructions on how to enable and use
>   perf_event LSM hooks for mandatory access control to perf_event_open()
>   syscall;
> 
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[e-mail]/
> 
> repo: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux.git perf/core
> sha1: ee097e8ee56f8867cbbf45fe2a06f6b9e660c39c
> 
> 
> Extend Perf tool with the check of /sys/fs/selinux/enforce value and notify 
> in case access to perf_event_open() syscall is restricted by the enforced 
> SELinux policy settings. See new added security.txt file for exact steps
> how the changes look like and how to test the patch set.
> 
> ---
> Alexey Budankov (3):
>   perf docs: extend CAP_SYS_ADMIN with CAP_PERFMON where needed
>   perf tool: make Perf tool aware of SELinux access control
>   perf docs: introduce security.txt file to document related issues
> 
>  tools/perf/Documentation/perf-intel-pt.txt |   2 +-
>  tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt      | 237 +++++++++++++++++++++
>  tools/perf/util/cloexec.c                  |   4 +-
>  tools/perf/util/evsel.c                    |  39 ++--
>  4 files changed, 264 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt
>