[v4,0/5] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
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Message ID 20200622193146.2985288-1-keescook@chromium.org
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Kees Cook June 22, 2020, 7:31 p.m. UTC
v4:
- rebase to v5.8-rc2
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200406231606.37619-1-keescook@chromium.org/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200324203231.64324-1-keescook@chromium.org/
rfc: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20190329081358.30497-1-elena.reshetova@intel.com/

Hi,

This is a continuation and refactoring of Elena's earlier effort to add
kernel stack base offset randomization. In the time since the previous
discussions, two attacks[1][2] were made public that depended on stack
determinism, so we're no longer in the position of "this is a good idea
but we have no examples of attacks". :)

Earlier discussions also devolved into debates on entropy sources, which
is mostly a red herring, given the already low entropy available due
to stack size. Regardless, entropy can be changed/improved separately
from this series as needed.

Earlier discussions also got stuck debating how much syscall overhead
was too much, but this is also a red herring since the feature itself
needs to be selectable at boot with no cost for those that don't want it:
this is solved here with static branches.

So, here is an improved version, made as arch-agnostic as possible,
with usage added for x86 and arm64. It also includes some small static
branch clean ups, and addresses some surprise performance issues due to
the stack canary[3].

Note that for v5.8, this depends on this fix (due to how x86 changed its
stack protector removal for syscall entry):
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202006221201.3641ED037E@keescook/

Thanks!

-Kees

[1] https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html
[2] https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202003281520.A9BFF461@keescook/


Kees Cook (5):
  jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults
  init_on_alloc: Unpessimize default-on builds
  stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall
  x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support
  arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support

 Makefile                         |  4 ++++
 arch/Kconfig                     | 23 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/Kconfig               |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile       |  5 ++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c      | 10 ++++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                 |  1 +
 arch/x86/entry/common.c          | 11 +++++++++
 include/linux/jump_label.h       | 19 +++++++++++++++
 include/linux/mm.h               | 18 +++++---------
 include/linux/randomize_kstack.h | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 init/main.c                      | 23 ++++++++++++++++++
 mm/page_alloc.c                  | 12 ++--------
 12 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/randomize_kstack.h