Patchwork netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: Add missing permission checks

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Submitter Kevin Cernekee
Date Dec. 3, 2017, 8:12 p.m.
Message ID <1512331965-30830-1-git-send-email-cernekee@chromium.org>
Download mbox | patch
Permalink /patch/10089373/
State New
Headers show

Comments

Kevin Cernekee - Dec. 3, 2017, 8:12 p.m.
The capability check in nfnetlink_rcv() verifies that the caller
has CAP_NET_ADMIN in the namespace that "owns" the netlink socket.
However, nfnl_cthelper_list is shared by all net namespaces on the
system.  An unprivileged user can create user and net namespaces
in which he holds CAP_NET_ADMIN to bypass the netlink_net_capable()
check:

    $ nfct helper list
    nfct v1.4.4: netlink error: Operation not permitted
    $ vpnns -- nfct helper list
    {
            .name = ftp,
            .queuenum = 0,
            .l3protonum = 2,
            .l4protonum = 6,
            .priv_data_len = 24,
            .status = enabled,
    };

Add capable() checks in nfnetlink_cthelper, as this is cleaner than
trying to generalize the solution.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@chromium.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)


I think xt_osf has the same issue with respect to xt_osf_fingers.
Also, it looks like nlmon devices created in an unprivileged netns can
see netlink activity from the init namespace.
Pablo Neira Ayuso - Dec. 4, 2017, 10:32 a.m.
On Sun, Dec 03, 2017 at 12:12:45PM -0800, Kevin Cernekee wrote:
> The capability check in nfnetlink_rcv() verifies that the caller
> has CAP_NET_ADMIN in the namespace that "owns" the netlink socket.
> However, nfnl_cthelper_list is shared by all net namespaces on the
> system.

Right, we need per-netns support for nfnetlink_cthelper.

> An unprivileged user can create user and net namespaces
> in which he holds CAP_NET_ADMIN to bypass the netlink_net_capable()
> check:

Applied to nf, thanks.
[...]
> I think xt_osf has the same issue with respect to xt_osf_fingers.
> Also, it looks like nlmon devices created in an unprivileged netns can
> see netlink activity from the init namespace.

A fix that one would be good too.

Patch

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c
index 41628b393673..d33ce6d5ebce 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <net/netlink.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 
@@ -407,6 +408,9 @@  static int nfnl_cthelper_new(struct net *net, struct sock *nfnl,
 	struct nfnl_cthelper *nlcth;
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!tb[NFCTH_NAME] || !tb[NFCTH_TUPLE])
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -611,6 +615,9 @@  static int nfnl_cthelper_get(struct net *net, struct sock *nfnl,
 	struct nfnl_cthelper *nlcth;
 	bool tuple_set = false;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
 		struct netlink_dump_control c = {
 			.dump = nfnl_cthelper_dump_table,
@@ -678,6 +685,9 @@  static int nfnl_cthelper_del(struct net *net, struct sock *nfnl,
 	struct nfnl_cthelper *nlcth, *n;
 	int j = 0, ret;
 
+	if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (tb[NFCTH_NAME])
 		helper_name = nla_data(tb[NFCTH_NAME]);