diff mbox

[v2] target: Fix Fortify_panic kernel exception

Message ID 1523979202-61407-1-git-send-email-bryantly@linux.vnet.ibm.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show

Commit Message

Bryant G. Ly April 17, 2018, 3:33 p.m. UTC
The bug exists in the memcmp in which the length passed in must
be guaranteed to be 1. This bug currently exists because
the second pointer passed in, can be smaller than the
cmd->data_length, which causes a fortify_panic.

The fix is to use memchr_inv instead to find whether or not
a 0 exists instead of using memcmp. This way you dont have to
worry about buffer overflow which is the reason for the
fortify_panic.

The bug was found by running a block backstore via LIO.

[  496.212958] Call Trace:
[  496.212960] [c0000007e58e3800] [c000000000cbbefc] fortify_panic+0x24/0x38 (unreliable)
[  496.212965] [c0000007e58e3860] [d00000000f150c28] iblock_execute_write_same+0x3b8/0x3c0 [target_core_iblock]
[  496.212976] [c0000007e58e3910] [d000000006c737d4] __target_execute_cmd+0x54/0x150 [target_core_mod]
[  496.212982] [c0000007e58e3940] [d000000006d32ce4] ibmvscsis_write_pending+0x74/0xe0 [ibmvscsis]
[  496.212991] [c0000007e58e39b0] [d000000006c74fc8] transport_generic_new_cmd+0x318/0x370 [target_core_mod]
[  496.213001] [c0000007e58e3a30] [d000000006c75084] transport_handle_cdb_direct+0x64/0xd0 [target_core_mod]
[  496.213011] [c0000007e58e3aa0] [d000000006c75298] target_submit_cmd_map_sgls+0x1a8/0x320 [target_core_mod]
[  496.213021] [c0000007e58e3b30] [d000000006c75458] target_submit_cmd+0x48/0x60 [target_core_mod]
[  496.213026] [c0000007e58e3bd0] [d000000006d34c20] ibmvscsis_scheduler+0x370/0x600 [ibmvscsis]
[  496.213031] [c0000007e58e3c90] [c00000000013135c] process_one_work+0x1ec/0x580
[  496.213035] [c0000007e58e3d20] [c000000000131798] worker_thread+0xa8/0x600
[  496.213039] [c0000007e58e3dc0] [c00000000013a468] kthread+0x168/0x1b0
[  496.213044] [c0000007e58e3e30] [c00000000000b528] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0xb4

Fixes: 2237498f0b5c ("target/iblock: Convert WRITE_SAME to blkdev_issue_zeroout")
Signed-off-by: Bryant G. Ly <bryantly@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Royer <seroyer@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Taylor Jakobson <tjakobs@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
---
 drivers/target/target_core_iblock.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

Comments

Martin K. Petersen April 20, 2018, 11:09 p.m. UTC | #1
Bryant,

> The bug exists in the memcmp in which the length passed in must be
> guaranteed to be 1. This bug currently exists because the second
> pointer passed in, can be smaller than the cmd->data_length, which
> causes a fortify_panic.
>
> The fix is to use memchr_inv instead to find whether or not a 0 exists
> instead of using memcmp. This way you dont have to worry about buffer
> overflow which is the reason for the fortify_panic.

Clarified the commit description a bit and applied the patch
4.17/scsi-fixes. Thanks!
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_iblock.c b/drivers/target/target_core_iblock.c
index 07c814c..6042901 100644
--- a/drivers/target/target_core_iblock.c
+++ b/drivers/target/target_core_iblock.c
@@ -427,8 +427,8 @@  iblock_execute_zero_out(struct block_device *bdev, struct se_cmd *cmd)
 {
 	struct se_device *dev = cmd->se_dev;
 	struct scatterlist *sg = &cmd->t_data_sg[0];
-	unsigned char *buf, zero = 0x00, *p = &zero;
-	int rc, ret;
+	unsigned char *buf, *not_zero;
+	int ret;
 
 	buf = kmap(sg_page(sg)) + sg->offset;
 	if (!buf)
@@ -437,10 +437,10 @@  iblock_execute_zero_out(struct block_device *bdev, struct se_cmd *cmd)
 	 * Fall back to block_execute_write_same() slow-path if
 	 * incoming WRITE_SAME payload does not contain zeros.
 	 */
-	rc = memcmp(buf, p, cmd->data_length);
+	not_zero = memchr_inv(buf, 0x00, cmd->data_length);
 	kunmap(sg_page(sg));
 
-	if (rc)
+	if (not_zero)
 		return TCM_LOGICAL_UNIT_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE;
 
 	ret = blkdev_issue_zeroout(bdev,