From patchwork Mon Jun 11 19:01:17 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Joe Perches X-Patchwork-Id: 10458669 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B0CA56020F for ; Mon, 11 Jun 2018 19:01:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9F01D28558 for ; Mon, 11 Jun 2018 19:01:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 936F6285C7; Mon, 11 Jun 2018 19:01:29 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1F88B285A6 for ; Mon, 11 Jun 2018 19:01:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933901AbeFKTB0 (ORCPT ); Mon, 11 Jun 2018 15:01:26 -0400 Received: from smtprelay0007.hostedemail.com ([216.40.44.7]:55133 "EHLO smtprelay.hostedemail.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S934038AbeFKTBY (ORCPT ); Mon, 11 Jun 2018 15:01:24 -0400 Received: from filter.hostedemail.com (clb03-v110.bra.tucows.net [216.40.38.60]) by smtprelay04.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 551EA180A8450; Mon, 11 Jun 2018 19:01:23 +0000 (UTC) X-Session-Marker: 6A6F6540706572636865732E636F6D X-HE-Tag: grape99_630826d30ef5d X-Filterd-Recvd-Size: 19017 Received: from joe-laptop.perches.com (unknown [47.151.150.235]) (Authenticated sender: joe@perches.com) by omf08.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTPA; Mon, 11 Jun 2018 19:01:20 +0000 (UTC) From: Joe Perches To: John Johansen , Mimi Zohar , Dmitry Kasatkin , Paul Moore , Stephen Smalley , Eric Paris , Casey Schaufler , Kentaro Takeda , Tetsuo Handa Cc: James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: [-next PATCH] security: use octal not symbolic permissions Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2018 12:01:17 -0700 Message-Id: <1e91f8e10ce76d3208239b6b5899aab76d1543ff.1528743633.git.joe@perches.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.15.0 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Currently security files use a mixture of octal and symbolic styles for permissions. Using octal and not symbolic permissions is preferred by many as more readable. see: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/2/1945 Prefer the direct use of octal for permissions. Done using: $ git ls-files security | \ xargs ./scripts/checkpatch.pl -f --fix-inplace --types=symbolic_perms --strict and some typing. Before: $ git grep -P -w "0[0-7]{3,3}" security | wc -l 53 After: $ git grep -P -w "0[0-7]{3,3}" security | wc -l 136 Miscellanea: o Whitespace neatening and line wrapping around these conversions. o Remove now superfluous parentheses around direct use of 0600 Signed-off-by: Joe Perches Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa --- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 5 ++-- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 23 ++++++++--------- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 +-- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 13 +++++----- security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 +-- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 ++--- security/smack/smackfs.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++----------------- security/tomoyo/condition.c | 18 ++++++------- 9 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 949dd8a48164..c09dc0f3c3fe 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -2426,10 +2426,9 @@ static int aa_mk_null_file(struct dentry *parent) } inode->i_ino = get_next_ino(); - inode->i_mode = S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO; + inode->i_mode = S_IFCHR | 0666; inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode); - init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, - MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3)); + init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | 0666, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3)); d_instantiate(dentry, inode); aa_null.dentry = dget(dentry); aa_null.mnt = mntget(mount); diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index fbb08bc78bee..6759a70918de 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -1255,45 +1255,42 @@ static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); /* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */ enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE; module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode, - &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); + &aa_g_profile_mode, 0600); /* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */ bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH -module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); +module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, 0600); #endif /* Debug mode */ bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES); -module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); +module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, 0600); /* Audit mode */ enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; -module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, - &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); +module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, &aa_g_audit, 0600); /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running */ bool aa_g_audit_header = true; -module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, - S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); +module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, 0600); /* lock out loading/removal of policy * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to * load policy, if lock_policy is set */ bool aa_g_lock_policy; -module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, - S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); +module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, 0600); /* Syscall logging mode */ bool aa_g_logsyscall; -module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); +module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, 0600); /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */ unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX; -module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR); +module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, 0400); /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification * on the loaded policy is done. @@ -1301,11 +1298,11 @@ module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR); * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy. */ bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true; -module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO); +module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, 0444); /* Boot time disable flag */ static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; -module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO); +module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, 0444); static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 354bb5716ce3..3f7707b8aaa7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -314,9 +314,9 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */ #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY -#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS (S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR) +#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS 0600 #else -#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS S_IWUSR +#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS 0200 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */ #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_H */ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index ae9d5c766a3c..81700df83f51 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY) - inode->i_mode &= ~S_IWUSR; + inode->i_mode &= ~0200; #endif return 0; } @@ -465,28 +465,29 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) binary_runtime_measurements = securityfs_create_file("binary_runtime_measurements", - S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, + 0440, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_measurements_ops); if (IS_ERR(binary_runtime_measurements)) goto out; ascii_runtime_measurements = securityfs_create_file("ascii_runtime_measurements", - S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, + 0440, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_ascii_measurements_ops); if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements)) goto out; runtime_measurements_count = securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count", - S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, + 0440, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_measurements_count_ops); if (IS_ERR(runtime_measurements_count)) goto out; violations = - securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, - ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_violations_ops); + securityfs_create_file("violations", + 0440, ima_dir, NULL, + &ima_htable_violations_ops); if (IS_ERR(violations)) goto out; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index a85fac3345df..8ae043be8782 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -6336,9 +6336,9 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) u32 av = 0; av = 0; - if (flag & S_IRUGO) + if (flag & 0444) av |= IPC__UNIX_READ; - if (flag & S_IWUGO) + if (flag & 0222) av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE; if (av == 0) diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index f3d374d2ca04..bfecac19ba92 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -1376,7 +1376,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi) goto out; ret = -ENOMEM; - inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR); + inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | 0644); if (!inode) goto out; @@ -1582,10 +1582,10 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir) int i; static const struct tree_descr files[] = { { "cache_threshold", - &sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR }, - { "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO }, + &sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, 0644 }, + { "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, 0444 }, #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS - { "cache_stats", &sel_avc_cache_stats_ops, S_IRUGO }, + { "cache_stats", &sel_avc_cache_stats_ops, 0444 }, #endif }; @@ -1643,7 +1643,7 @@ static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir) if (!dentry) return -ENOMEM; - inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO); + inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | 0444); if (!inode) return -ENOMEM; @@ -1744,7 +1744,7 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue, goto out; rc = -ENOMEM; - inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO); + inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | 0444); if (!inode) goto out; @@ -1774,7 +1774,7 @@ static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index, if (!dentry) return -ENOMEM; - inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO); + inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | 0444); if (!inode) return -ENOMEM; @@ -1870,7 +1870,7 @@ static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name, if (!dentry) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO); + inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFDIR | 0555); if (!inode) { dput(dentry); return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); @@ -1899,25 +1899,24 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) struct inode_security_struct *isec; static const struct tree_descr selinux_files[] = { - [SEL_LOAD] = {"load", &sel_load_ops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR}, - [SEL_ENFORCE] = {"enforce", &sel_enforce_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, - [SEL_CONTEXT] = {"context", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, - [SEL_ACCESS] = {"access", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, - [SEL_CREATE] = {"create", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, - [SEL_RELABEL] = {"relabel", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, - [SEL_USER] = {"user", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, - [SEL_POLICYVERS] = {"policyvers", &sel_policyvers_ops, S_IRUGO}, - [SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS] = {"commit_pending_bools", &sel_commit_bools_ops, S_IWUSR}, - [SEL_MLS] = {"mls", &sel_mls_ops, S_IRUGO}, - [SEL_DISABLE] = {"disable", &sel_disable_ops, S_IWUSR}, - [SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, - [SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, - [SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO}, - [SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO}, - [SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, S_IRUGO}, - [SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUGO}, - [SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS] = {"validatetrans", &sel_transition_ops, - S_IWUGO}, + [SEL_LOAD] = {"load", &sel_load_ops, 0600}, + [SEL_ENFORCE] = {"enforce", &sel_enforce_ops, 0644}, + [SEL_CONTEXT] = {"context", &transaction_ops, 0666}, + [SEL_ACCESS] = {"access", &transaction_ops, 0666}, + [SEL_CREATE] = {"create", &transaction_ops, 0666}, + [SEL_RELABEL] = {"relabel", &transaction_ops, 0666}, + [SEL_USER] = {"user", &transaction_ops, 0666}, + [SEL_POLICYVERS] = {"policyvers", &sel_policyvers_ops, 0444}, + [SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS] = {"commit_pending_bools", &sel_commit_bools_ops, 0200}, + [SEL_MLS] = {"mls", &sel_mls_ops, 0444}, + [SEL_DISABLE] = {"disable", &sel_disable_ops, 0200}, + [SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, 0666}, + [SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, 0644}, + [SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, 0444}, + [SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, 0444}, + [SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, 0444}, + [SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, 0444}, + [SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS] = {"validatetrans", &sel_transition_ops, 0222}, /* last one */ {""} }; @@ -1943,7 +1942,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) goto err; ret = -ENOMEM; - inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO); + inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | 0666); if (!inode) goto err; @@ -1953,7 +1952,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; - init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3)); + init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | 0666, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3)); d_add(dentry, inode); dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &fsi->last_ino); diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index dcb976f98df2..8953440c6559 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2945,11 +2945,11 @@ static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags) { int may = 0; - if (flags & S_IRUGO) + if (flags & 0444) may |= MAY_READ; - if (flags & S_IWUGO) + if (flags & 0222) may |= MAY_WRITE; - if (flags & S_IXUGO) + if (flags & 0111) may |= MAY_EXEC; return may; diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index f6482e53d55a..270cd3a308f0 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -2857,55 +2857,53 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) static const struct tree_descr smack_files[] = { [SMK_LOAD] = { - "load", &smk_load_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + "load", &smk_load_ops, 0644}, [SMK_CIPSO] = { - "cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + "cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, 0644}, [SMK_DOI] = { - "doi", &smk_doi_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + "doi", &smk_doi_ops, 0644}, [SMK_DIRECT] = { - "direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + "direct", &smk_direct_ops, 0644}, [SMK_AMBIENT] = { - "ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + "ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, 0644}, [SMK_NET4ADDR] = { - "netlabel", &smk_net4addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + "netlabel", &smk_net4addr_ops, 0644}, [SMK_ONLYCAP] = { - "onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + "onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, 0644}, [SMK_LOGGING] = { - "logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + "logging", &smk_logging_ops, 0644}, [SMK_LOAD_SELF] = { - "load-self", &smk_load_self_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, + "load-self", &smk_load_self_ops, 0666}, [SMK_ACCESSES] = { - "access", &smk_access_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, + "access", &smk_access_ops, 0666}, [SMK_MAPPED] = { - "mapped", &smk_mapped_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + "mapped", &smk_mapped_ops, 0644}, [SMK_LOAD2] = { - "load2", &smk_load2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + "load2", &smk_load2_ops, 0644}, [SMK_LOAD_SELF2] = { - "load-self2", &smk_load_self2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, + "load-self2", &smk_load_self2_ops, 0666}, [SMK_ACCESS2] = { - "access2", &smk_access2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, + "access2", &smk_access2_ops, 0666}, [SMK_CIPSO2] = { - "cipso2", &smk_cipso2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + "cipso2", &smk_cipso2_ops, 0644}, [SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ] = { - "revoke-subject", &smk_revoke_subj_ops, - S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + "revoke-subject", &smk_revoke_subj_ops, 0644}, [SMK_CHANGE_RULE] = { - "change-rule", &smk_change_rule_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + "change-rule", &smk_change_rule_ops, 0644}, [SMK_SYSLOG] = { - "syslog", &smk_syslog_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + "syslog", &smk_syslog_ops, 0644}, [SMK_PTRACE] = { - "ptrace", &smk_ptrace_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + "ptrace", &smk_ptrace_ops, 0644}, #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP [SMK_UNCONFINED] = { - "unconfined", &smk_unconfined_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + "unconfined", &smk_unconfined_ops, 0644}, #endif #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) [SMK_NET6ADDR] = { - "ipv6host", &smk_net6addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR}, + "ipv6host", &smk_net6addr_ops, 0644}, #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */ [SMK_RELABEL_SELF] = { - "relabel-self", &smk_relabel_self_ops, - S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO}, + "relabel-self", &smk_relabel_self_ops, 0666}, /* last one */ {""} }; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/condition.c b/security/tomoyo/condition.c index 8d0e1b9c9c57..2069f5912469 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/condition.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/condition.c @@ -874,31 +874,31 @@ bool tomoyo_condition(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, value = S_ISVTX; break; case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_READ: - value = S_IRUSR; + value = 0400; break; case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_WRITE: - value = S_IWUSR; + value = 0200; break; case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_EXECUTE: - value = S_IXUSR; + value = 0100; break; case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_READ: - value = S_IRGRP; + value = 0040; break; case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_WRITE: - value = S_IWGRP; + value = 0020; break; case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_EXECUTE: - value = S_IXGRP; + value = 0010; break; case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_READ: - value = S_IROTH; + value = 0004; break; case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_WRITE: - value = S_IWOTH; + value = 0002; break; case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_EXECUTE: - value = S_IXOTH; + value = 0001; break; case TOMOYO_EXEC_ARGC: if (!bprm)