[RESEND,2/2] KVM: vmx: Inject #UD for SGX ENCLS instruction in guest
diff mbox series

Message ID 20180814163334.25724-3-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com
State New
Headers show
  • KVM: vmx: Inject #UD for SGX ENCLS instructions
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Commit Message

Sean Christopherson Aug. 14, 2018, 4:33 p.m. UTC
Virtualization of Intel SGX depends on Enclave Page Cache (EPC)
management that is not yet available in the kernel, i.e. KVM support
for exposing SGX to a guest cannot be added until basic support
for SGX is upstreamed, which is a WIP[1].

Until SGX is properly supported in KVM, ensure a guest sees expected
behavior for ENCLS, i.e. all ENCLS #UD.  Because SGX does not have a
true software enable bit, e.g. there is no CR4.SGXE bit, the ENCLS
instruction can be executed[1] by the guest if SGX is supported by the
system.  Intercept all ENCLS leafs (via the ENCLS- exiting control and
field) and unconditionally inject #UD.

[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/kvm/msg171333.html or

[2] A guest can execute ENCLS in the sense that ENCLS will not take
    an immediate #UD, but no ENCLS will ever succeed in a guest
    without explicit support from KVM (map EPC memory into the guest),
    unless KVM has a *very* egregious bug, e.g. accidentally mapped
    EPC memory into the guest SPTEs.  In other words this patch is
    needed only to prevent the guest from seeing inconsistent behavior,
    e.g. #GP (SGX not enabled in Feature Control MSR) or #PF (leaf
    operand(s) does not point at EPC memory) instead of #UD on ENCLS.
    Intercepting ENCLS is not required to prevent the guest from truly
    utilizing SGX.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff mbox series

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 16f9373c01de..76bce09f2656 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -1536,6 +1536,12 @@  static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery(void)
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit(void)
+	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
  * Comment's format: document - errata name - stepping - processor name.
  * Refer from
@@ -4382,7 +4388,8 @@  static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf)
 		if (adjust_vmx_controls(min2, opt2,
 					&_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control) < 0)
@@ -6480,6 +6487,9 @@  static void vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 		vmcs_write64(PML_ADDRESS, page_to_phys(vmx->pml_pg));
 		vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit())
+		vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, -1ull);
 static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
@@ -9145,6 +9155,17 @@  static int handle_vmfunc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return 1;
+static int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+	/*
+	 * SGX virtualization is not yet supported.  There is no software
+	 * enable bit for SGX, so we have to trap ENCLS and inject a #UD
+	 * to prevent the guest from executing ENCLS.
+	 */
+	kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+	return 1;
  * The exit handlers return 1 if the exit was handled fully and guest execution
  * may resume.  Otherwise they set the kvm_run parameter to indicate what needs
@@ -9202,6 +9223,7 @@  static int (*const kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
 	[EXIT_REASON_INVPCID]                 = handle_invpcid,
 	[EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC]                  = handle_vmfunc,
 	[EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER]	      = handle_preemption_timer,
+	[EXIT_REASON_ENCLS]		      = handle_encls,
 static const int kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers =
@@ -9572,6 +9594,9 @@  static bool nested_vmx_exit_reflected(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason)
 		/* VM functions are emulated through L2->L0 vmexits. */
 		return false;
+		/* SGX is never exposed to L1 */
+		return false;
 		return true;
@@ -11832,6 +11857,9 @@  static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
 			vmcs_write64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR, -1ull);
+		if (exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING)
+			vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, -1ull);
 		vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, exec_control);