From patchwork Fri Nov 9 22:14:02 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dave Jiang X-Patchwork-Id: 10676625 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C894A139B for ; Fri, 9 Nov 2018 22:14:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B9CCA2F1A5 for ; Fri, 9 Nov 2018 22:14:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id AE1692F317; Fri, 9 Nov 2018 22:14:04 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from ml01.01.org (ml01.01.org [198.145.21.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6B7802F1A5 for ; Fri, 9 Nov 2018 22:14:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 630D321A00AE6; Fri, 9 Nov 2018 14:14:04 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Delivered-To: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Received-SPF: Pass (sender SPF authorized) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=134.134.136.24; helo=mga09.intel.com; envelope-from=dave.jiang@intel.com; receiver=linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Received: from mga09.intel.com (mga09.intel.com [134.134.136.24]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id ED8C421184E66 for ; Fri, 9 Nov 2018 14:14:02 -0800 (PST) X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga006.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.20]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 09 Nov 2018 14:14:02 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.54,484,1534834800"; d="scan'208";a="279853444" Received: from djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com ([143.182.136.93]) by fmsmga006.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 09 Nov 2018 14:14:02 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 03/11] libnvdimm/security: add override module param for key self verification From: Dave Jiang To: dan.j.williams@intel.com, zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com Date: Fri, 09 Nov 2018 15:14:02 -0700 Message-ID: <154180164225.70506.5284765160410580627.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> In-Reply-To: <154180093865.70506.6858789591063128903.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> References: <154180093865.70506.6858789591063128903.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> User-Agent: StGit/unknown-version MIME-Version: 1.0 X-BeenThere: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: "Linux-nvdimm developer list." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Errors-To: linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Sender: "Linux-nvdimm" X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Provide the user an override via kernel module parameter for security key self verification. no_key_self_verify parameter is being added to bypass security key verify against the hardware during nvdimm unlock path. Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang --- drivers/nvdimm/security.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/security.c b/drivers/nvdimm/security.c index ee741199d623..d2831e61f3d8 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/security.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/security.c @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* Copyright(c) 2018 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. */ +#include #include #include #include @@ -14,6 +15,10 @@ #include "nd-core.h" #include "nd.h" +static bool no_key_self_verify; +module_param(no_key_self_verify, bool, 0644); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(no_key_self_verify, "Bypass security key self verify"); + /* * Retrieve user injected key */ @@ -235,6 +240,12 @@ int nvdimm_security_unlock_dimm(struct nvdimm *nvdimm) * other security operations. */ if (nvdimm->state == NVDIMM_SECURITY_UNLOCKED) { + /* bypass if user override */ + if (no_key_self_verify) { + mutex_unlock(&nvdimm->sec_mutex); + return 0; + } + key = nvdimm_self_verify_key(nvdimm); if (!key) { rc = nvdimm_security_freeze_lock(nvdimm);