diff mbox series

[7/7] ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal

Message ID 20181125151500.8298-8-nayna@linux.ibm.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series add platform/firmware keys support for kernel verification by IMA | expand

Commit Message

Nayna Jain Nov. 25, 2018, 3:15 p.m. UTC 
On secure boot enabled systems, the bootloader verifies the kernel
image and possibly the initramfs signatures based on a set of keys. A
soft reboot(kexec) of the system, with the same kernel image and
initramfs, requires access to the original keys to verify the
signatures.

This patch allows IMA-appraisal access to those original keys, now
loaded on the platform keyring, needed for verifying the kernel image
and initramfs signatures.

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 ++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

Comments

Serge Hallyn Dec. 6, 2018, 11:09 p.m. UTC | #1 
On Sun, Nov 25, 2018 at 08:45:00PM +0530, Nayna Jain wrote:
> On secure boot enabled systems, the bootloader verifies the kernel
> image and possibly the initramfs signatures based on a set of keys. A
> soft reboot(kexec) of the system, with the same kernel image and
> initramfs, requires access to the original keys to verify the
> signatures.
> 
> This patch allows IMA-appraisal access to those original keys, now
> loaded on the platform keyring, needed for verifying the kernel image
> and initramfs signatures.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>

The overall set seems sensible to me, and I see no errors here,

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>

I do think that replacing the 'rc' with xattr_len in the previous line might
help future readers save a few cycles.

> ---
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 ++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index deec1804a00a..9c13585e7d3e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -294,7 +294,16 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
>  					     iint->ima_hash->length);
>  		if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
>  			status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> -		} else if (rc) {
> +			break;
> +		}
> +		if (rc && func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
> +			rc = integrity_digsig_verify(
> +					INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM,
> +					(const char *)xattr_value,
> +					xattr_len,
> +					iint->ima_hash->digest,
> +					iint->ima_hash->length);
> +		if (rc) {
>  			cause = "invalid-signature";
>  			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
>  		} else {
> -- 
> 2.13.6
>
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index deec1804a00a..9c13585e7d3e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -294,7 +294,16 @@  int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
 					     iint->ima_hash->length);
 		if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
 			status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
-		} else if (rc) {
+			break;
+		}
+		if (rc && func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
+			rc = integrity_digsig_verify(
+					INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM,
+					(const char *)xattr_value,
+					xattr_len,
+					iint->ima_hash->digest,
+					iint->ima_hash->length);
+		if (rc) {
 			cause = "invalid-signature";
 			status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
 		} else {