From patchwork Thu Dec 13 16:49:16 2018 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Dave Jiang X-Patchwork-Id: 10729127 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0342313AF for ; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 16:49:19 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E39492C40D for ; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 16:49:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id D7E912C43E; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 16:49:18 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from ml01.01.org (ml01.01.org [198.145.21.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5C8A32C40D for ; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 16:49:18 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 54402211A2064; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 08:49:18 -0800 (PST) X-Original-To: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Delivered-To: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Received-SPF: Pass (sender SPF authorized) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=134.134.136.126; helo=mga18.intel.com; envelope-from=dave.jiang@intel.com; receiver=linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Received: from mga18.intel.com (mga18.intel.com [134.134.136.126]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B11DD211A1E5F for ; Thu, 13 Dec 2018 08:49:17 -0800 (PST) X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga002.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.26]) by orsmga106.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 13 Dec 2018 08:49:17 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.56,349,1539673200"; d="scan'208";a="125642717" Received: from djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com ([143.182.136.93]) by fmsmga002.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 13 Dec 2018 08:49:16 -0800 Subject: [PATCH v14 10/17] acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add support for issue secure erase DSM to Intel nvdimm From: Dave Jiang To: dan.j.williams@intel.com Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2018 09:49:16 -0700 Message-ID: <154471975675.55644.6140687080292265406.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> In-Reply-To: <154471935968.55644.4424661179787827497.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> References: <154471935968.55644.4424661179787827497.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com> User-Agent: StGit/unknown-version MIME-Version: 1.0 X-BeenThere: linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: "Linux-nvdimm developer list." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org Errors-To: linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Sender: "Linux-nvdimm" X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Add support to issue a secure erase DSM to the Intel nvdimm. The required passphrase is acquired from an encrypted key in the kernel user keyring. To trigger the action, "erase " is written to the "security" sysfs attribute. Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang Signed-off-by: Dan Williams --- drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c | 9 +++++++- drivers/nvdimm/nd-core.h | 1 + drivers/nvdimm/security.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/libnvdimm.h | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c b/drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c index 1c2005442122..ae1fd394caa0 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/nfit/intel.c @@ -202,6 +202,52 @@ static int intel_security_disable(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, return 0; } +static int intel_security_erase(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, + const struct nvdimm_key_data *key) +{ + int rc; + struct nfit_mem *nfit_mem = nvdimm_provider_data(nvdimm); + struct { + struct nd_cmd_pkg pkg; + struct nd_intel_secure_erase cmd; + } nd_cmd = { + .pkg = { + .nd_family = NVDIMM_FAMILY_INTEL, + .nd_size_in = ND_INTEL_PASSPHRASE_SIZE, + .nd_size_out = ND_INTEL_STATUS_SIZE, + .nd_fw_size = ND_INTEL_STATUS_SIZE, + .nd_command = NVDIMM_INTEL_SECURE_ERASE, + }, + }; + + if (!test_bit(NVDIMM_INTEL_SECURE_ERASE, &nfit_mem->dsm_mask)) + return -ENOTTY; + + /* flush all cache before we erase DIMM */ + nvdimm_invalidate_cache(); + memcpy(nd_cmd.cmd.passphrase, key->data, + sizeof(nd_cmd.cmd.passphrase)); + rc = nvdimm_ctl(nvdimm, ND_CMD_CALL, &nd_cmd, sizeof(nd_cmd), NULL); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + + switch (nd_cmd.cmd.status) { + case 0: + break; + case ND_INTEL_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED: + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + case ND_INTEL_STATUS_INVALID_PASS: + return -EINVAL; + case ND_INTEL_STATUS_INVALID_STATE: + default: + return -ENXIO; + } + + /* DIMM erased, invalidate all CPU caches before we read it */ + nvdimm_invalidate_cache(); + return 0; +} + /* * TODO: define a cross arch wbinvd equivalent when/if * NVDIMM_FAMILY_INTEL command support arrives on another arch. @@ -225,6 +271,7 @@ static const struct nvdimm_security_ops __intel_security_ops = { .disable = intel_security_disable, #ifdef CONFIG_X86 .unlock = intel_security_unlock, + .erase = intel_security_erase, #endif }; diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c b/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c index 1cc3a6af3d0e..bc432b7c17b8 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/dimm_devs.c @@ -394,7 +394,8 @@ static ssize_t security_show(struct device *dev, #define OPS \ C( OP_FREEZE, "freeze", 1), \ C( OP_DISABLE, "disable", 2), \ - C( OP_UPDATE, "update", 3) + C( OP_UPDATE, "update", 3), \ + C( OP_ERASE, "erase", 2) #undef C #define C(a, b, c) a enum nvdimmsec_op_ids { OPS }; @@ -448,6 +449,9 @@ static ssize_t __security_store(struct device *dev, const char *buf, size_t len) } else if (i == OP_UPDATE) { dev_dbg(dev, "update %u %u\n", key, newkey); rc = nvdimm_security_update(nvdimm, key, newkey); + } else if (i == OP_ERASE) { + dev_dbg(dev, "erase %u\n", key); + rc = nvdimm_security_erase(nvdimm, key); } else return -EINVAL; @@ -498,7 +502,8 @@ static umode_t nvdimm_visible(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *a, int n) return 0; /* Are there any state mutation ops? */ if (nvdimm->sec.ops->freeze || nvdimm->sec.ops->disable - || nvdimm->sec.ops->change_key) + || nvdimm->sec.ops->change_key + || nvdimm->sec.ops->erase) return a->mode; return 0444; } diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/nd-core.h b/drivers/nvdimm/nd-core.h index ca020793a419..3c8cdd40c456 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/nd-core.h +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/nd-core.h @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ int nvdimm_security_freeze(struct nvdimm *nvdimm); int nvdimm_security_disable(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, unsigned int keyid); int nvdimm_security_update(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, unsigned int keyid, unsigned int new_keyid); +int nvdimm_security_erase(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, unsigned int keyid); /** * struct blk_alloc_info - tracking info for BLK dpa scanning diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/security.c b/drivers/nvdimm/security.c index 654b64fe7e9d..4836f2fda271 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/security.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/security.c @@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ static void *key_data(struct key *key) static void nvdimm_put_key(struct key *key) { + if (!key) + return; + up_read(&key->sem); key_put(key); } @@ -259,3 +262,41 @@ int nvdimm_security_update(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, unsigned int keyid, nvdimm->sec.state = nvdimm_security_state(nvdimm); return rc; } + +int nvdimm_security_erase(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, unsigned int keyid) +{ + struct device *dev = &nvdimm->dev; + struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus = walk_to_nvdimm_bus(dev); + struct key *key; + int rc; + + /* The bus lock should be held at the top level of the call stack */ + lockdep_assert_held(&nvdimm_bus->reconfig_mutex); + + if (!nvdimm->sec.ops || !nvdimm->sec.ops->erase + || nvdimm->sec.state < 0) + return -EIO; + + if (atomic_read(&nvdimm->busy)) { + dev_warn(dev, "Unable to secure erase while DIMM active.\n"); + return -EBUSY; + } + + if (nvdimm->sec.state >= NVDIMM_SECURITY_FROZEN) { + dev_warn(dev, "Incorrect security state: %d\n", + nvdimm->sec.state); + return -EIO; + } + + key = nvdimm_lookup_user_key(nvdimm, keyid, NVDIMM_BASE_KEY); + if (!key) + return -ENOKEY; + + rc = nvdimm->sec.ops->erase(nvdimm, key_data(key)); + dev_dbg(dev, "key: %d erase: %s\n", key_serial(key), + rc == 0 ? "success" : "fail"); + + nvdimm_put_key(key); + nvdimm->sec.state = nvdimm_security_state(nvdimm); + return rc; +} diff --git a/include/linux/libnvdimm.h b/include/linux/libnvdimm.h index d0afa115356e..9a6cb7067dc7 100644 --- a/include/linux/libnvdimm.h +++ b/include/linux/libnvdimm.h @@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ struct nvdimm_security_ops { const struct nvdimm_key_data *key_data); int (*disable)(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, const struct nvdimm_key_data *key_data); + int (*erase)(struct nvdimm *nvdimm, + const struct nvdimm_key_data *key_data); }; void badrange_init(struct badrange *badrange);