[11/12] IMA: turn ima_policy_flags into __wr_after_init
diff mbox series

Message ID 20181219213338.26619-12-igor.stoppa@huawei.com
State New
Headers show
Series
  • hardening: statically allocated protected memory
Related show

Commit Message

Igor Stoppa Dec. 19, 2018, 9:33 p.m. UTC
The policy flags could be targeted by an attacker aiming at disabling IMA,
so that there would be no trace of a file system modification in the
measurement list.

Since the flags can be altered at runtime, it is not possible to make
them become fully read-only, for example with __ro_after_init.

__wr_after_init can still provide some protection, at least against
simple memory overwrite attacks

Signed-off-by: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>

CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
CC: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
CC: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
CC: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
CC: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CC: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
CC: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CC: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
CC: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
CC: linux-mm@kvack.org
CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h        | 3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c   | 5 +++--
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 9 +++++----
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

Comments

Thiago Jung Bauermann Dec. 20, 2018, 5:30 p.m. UTC | #1
Hello Igor,

Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@gmail.com> writes:

> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> index 59d834219cd6..5f4e13e671bf 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
> @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
>  #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
>  #include <linux/err.h>
> +#include <linux/prmem.h>
>
>  #include "ima.h"
>
> @@ -98,9 +99,9 @@ void __init ima_load_x509(void)
>  {
>  	int unset_flags = ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE;
>
> -	ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags;
> +	wr_assign(ima_policy_flag, ima_policy_flag & ~unset_flags);
>  	integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH);
> -	ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags;
> +	wr_assign(ima_policy_flag, ima_policy_flag | unset_flags);
>  }
>  #endif

In the cover letter, you said:

> As the name implies, the write protection kicks in only after init()
> is completed; before that moment, the data is modifiable in the usual
> way.

Given that, is it still necessary or useful to use wr_assign() in a
function marked with __init?

--
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center
Igor Stoppa Dec. 20, 2018, 5:49 p.m. UTC | #2
Hi,

On 20/12/2018 19:30, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:
> 
> Hello Igor,
> 
> Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@gmail.com> writes:
> 
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
>> index 59d834219cd6..5f4e13e671bf 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
>> @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
>>   #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
>>   #include <linux/slab.h>
>>   #include <linux/err.h>
>> +#include <linux/prmem.h>
>>
>>   #include "ima.h"
>>
>> @@ -98,9 +99,9 @@ void __init ima_load_x509(void)
>>   {
>>   	int unset_flags = ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE;
>>
>> -	ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags;
>> +	wr_assign(ima_policy_flag, ima_policy_flag & ~unset_flags);
>>   	integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH);
>> -	ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags;
>> +	wr_assign(ima_policy_flag, ima_policy_flag | unset_flags);
>>   }
>>   #endif
> 
> In the cover letter, you said:
> 
>> As the name implies, the write protection kicks in only after init()
>> is completed; before that moment, the data is modifiable in the usual
>> way.
> 
> Given that, is it still necessary or useful to use wr_assign() in a
> function marked with __init?

I might have been over enthusiastic of using the wr interface.
You are right, I can drop these two. Thank you.

--
igor

Patch
diff mbox series

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index cc12f3449a72..297c25f5122e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ 
 #include <linux/hash.h>
 #include <linux/tpm.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/prmem.h>
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 
 #include "../integrity.h"
@@ -50,7 +51,7 @@  enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
 #define IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_FMT "d|n"
 
 /* current content of the policy */
-extern int ima_policy_flag;
+extern int ima_policy_flag __wr_after_init;
 
 /* set during initialization */
 extern int ima_hash_algo;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 59d834219cd6..5f4e13e671bf 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ 
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/prmem.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -98,9 +99,9 @@  void __init ima_load_x509(void)
 {
 	int unset_flags = ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE;
 
-	ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags;
+	wr_assign(ima_policy_flag, ima_policy_flag & ~unset_flags);
 	integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH);
-	ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags;
+	wr_assign(ima_policy_flag, ima_policy_flag | unset_flags);
 }
 #endif
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 7489cb7de6dc..2004de818d92 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ 
 #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \
 	(a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
 
-int ima_policy_flag;
+int ima_policy_flag __wr_after_init;
 static int temp_ima_appraise;
 static int build_ima_appraise __ro_after_init;
 
@@ -452,12 +452,13 @@  void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
 
 	list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
 		if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
-			ima_policy_flag |= entry->action;
+			wr_assign(ima_policy_flag,
+				  ima_policy_flag | entry->action);
 	}
 
 	ima_appraise |= (build_ima_appraise | temp_ima_appraise);
 	if (!ima_appraise)
-		ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
+		wr_assign(ima_policy_flag, ima_policy_flag & ~IMA_APPRAISE);
 }
 
 static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func)
@@ -574,7 +575,7 @@  void ima_update_policy(void)
 	list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ima_temp_rules, policy, synchronize_rcu);
 
 	if (ima_rules != policy) {
-		ima_policy_flag = 0;
+		wr_assign(ima_policy_flag, 0);
 		ima_rules = policy;
 	}
 	ima_update_policy_flag();