| Message ID | 20190207150853.19347-1-idryomov@gmail.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | libceph: handle an empty authorize reply | expand |
On Thu, 7 Feb 2019, Ilya Dryomov wrote: > The authorize reply can be empty, for example when the ticket used to > build the authorizer is too old and TAG_BADAUTHORIZER is returned from > the service. Calling ->verify_authorizer_reply() results in an attempt > to decrypt and validate (somewhat) random data in au->buf (most likely > the signature block from calc_signature()), which fails and ends up in > con_fault_finish() with !con->auth_retry. The ticket isn't invalidated > and the connection is retried again and again until a new ticket is > obtained from the monitor: > > libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6809 bad authorize reply > libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6809 bad authorize reply > libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6809 bad authorize reply > libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6809 bad authorize reply > > Let TAG_BADAUTHORIZER handler kick in and increment con->auth_retry. > > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Fixes: 5c056fdc5b47 ("libceph: verify authorize reply on connect") > Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/20164 > Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com> > --- > net/ceph/messenger.c | 15 +++++++++------ > 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger.c b/net/ceph/messenger.c > index 3661cdd927f1..7e71b0df1fbc 100644 > --- a/net/ceph/messenger.c > +++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c > @@ -2058,6 +2058,8 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_connection *con) > dout("process_connect on %p tag %d\n", con, (int)con->in_tag); > > if (con->auth) { > + int len = le32_to_cpu(con->in_reply.authorizer_len); > + > /* > * Any connection that defines ->get_authorizer() > * should also define ->add_authorizer_challenge() and > @@ -2067,8 +2069,7 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_connection *con) > */ > if (con->in_reply.tag == CEPH_MSGR_TAG_CHALLENGE_AUTHORIZER) { > ret = con->ops->add_authorizer_challenge( > - con, con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf, > - le32_to_cpu(con->in_reply.authorizer_len)); > + con, con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf, len); > if (ret < 0) > return ret; > > @@ -2078,10 +2079,12 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_connection *con) > return 0; > } > > - ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con); > - if (ret < 0) { > - con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply"; > - return ret; > + if (len) { > + ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con); > + if (ret < 0) { > + con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply"; > + return ret; > + } > } > } > > -- > 2.14.4 > >
diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger.c b/net/ceph/messenger.c index 3661cdd927f1..7e71b0df1fbc 100644 --- a/net/ceph/messenger.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c @@ -2058,6 +2058,8 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_connection *con) dout("process_connect on %p tag %d\n", con, (int)con->in_tag); if (con->auth) { + int len = le32_to_cpu(con->in_reply.authorizer_len); + /* * Any connection that defines ->get_authorizer() * should also define ->add_authorizer_challenge() and @@ -2067,8 +2069,7 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_connection *con) */ if (con->in_reply.tag == CEPH_MSGR_TAG_CHALLENGE_AUTHORIZER) { ret = con->ops->add_authorizer_challenge( - con, con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf, - le32_to_cpu(con->in_reply.authorizer_len)); + con, con->auth->authorizer_reply_buf, len); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -2078,10 +2079,12 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_connection *con) return 0; } - ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con); - if (ret < 0) { - con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply"; - return ret; + if (len) { + ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con); + if (ret < 0) { + con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply"; + return ret; + } } }
The authorize reply can be empty, for example when the ticket used to build the authorizer is too old and TAG_BADAUTHORIZER is returned from the service. Calling ->verify_authorizer_reply() results in an attempt to decrypt and validate (somewhat) random data in au->buf (most likely the signature block from calc_signature()), which fails and ends up in con_fault_finish() with !con->auth_retry. The ticket isn't invalidated and the connection is retried again and again until a new ticket is obtained from the monitor: libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6809 bad authorize reply libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6809 bad authorize reply libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6809 bad authorize reply libceph: osd2 192.168.122.1:6809 bad authorize reply Let TAG_BADAUTHORIZER handler kick in and increment con->auth_retry. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5c056fdc5b47 ("libceph: verify authorize reply on connect") Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/20164 Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> --- net/ceph/messenger.c | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)