| Message ID | a5a612bff629574cf4b678e7c7a9315e0e60a27c.1552665316.git.rgb@redhat.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | audit: implement container identifier | expand |
On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 02:29:53PM -0400, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > Add audit container identifier support to ptrace and signals. In > particular, the "ref" field provides a way to label the auxiliary record > to which it is associated. > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > --- > include/linux/audit.h | 1 + > kernel/audit.c | 2 ++ > kernel/audit.h | 2 ++ > kernel/auditsc.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------ > 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > index 43438192ca2a..ebd6625ca80e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct audit_sig_info { > uid_t uid; > pid_t pid; > char ctx[0]; > + u64 cid; > }; Sorry, just noticed this. How does this work? Given that ctx[] is a variable length array, one assumes that the receiver of this message (userspace applications by the looks of it, presume that the ctx data occupies the skb from the byte following pid to the end of the transmitted buffer. How are they to know that the last byte is actually the cid value? Wouldn't it be better to move cid above ctx[0], so that the semantics of the variable length data are preserved? Or am I missing something? otherwise this looks ok to me. Neil > > struct audit_buffer; > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > index 8cc0e88d7f2a..cfa659b3f6c4 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.c > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > @@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ struct audit_net { > kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID; > pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1; > u32 audit_sig_sid = 0; > +u64 audit_sig_cid = AUDIT_CID_UNSET; > > /* Records can be lost in several ways: > 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc] > @@ -1515,6 +1516,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) > memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); > security_release_secctx(ctx, len); > } > + sig_data->cid = audit_sig_cid; > audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0, > sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len); > kfree(sig_data); > diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h > index c00e2ee3c6b3..c5ac6436317e 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.h > +++ b/kernel/audit.h > @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context { > kuid_t target_uid; > unsigned int target_sessionid; > u32 target_sid; > + u64 target_cid; > char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; > > struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees; > @@ -344,6 +345,7 @@ extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, > extern pid_t audit_sig_pid; > extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid; > extern u32 audit_sig_sid; > +extern u64 audit_sig_cid; > > extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype); > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > index a8c8b44b954d..f04e115df5dc 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids { > kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > + u64 target_cid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; > int pid_count; > }; > @@ -1514,7 +1515,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) > for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { > struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; > > - for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) > + for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) { > if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], > axs->target_auid[i], > axs->target_uid[i], > @@ -1522,14 +1523,20 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) > axs->target_sid[i], > axs->target_comm[i])) > call_panic = 1; > + audit_log_contid(context, axs->target_cid[i]); > + } > } > > - if (context->target_pid && > - audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, > - context->target_auid, context->target_uid, > - context->target_sessionid, > - context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) > + if (context->target_pid) { > + if (audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, > + context->target_auid, > + context->target_uid, > + context->target_sessionid, > + context->target_sid, > + context->target_comm)) > call_panic = 1; > + audit_log_contid(context, context->target_cid); > + } > > if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { > ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); > @@ -2360,6 +2367,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) > context->target_uid = task_uid(t); > context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); > security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); > + context->target_cid = audit_get_contid(t); > memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > } > > @@ -2387,6 +2395,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > else > audit_sig_uid = uid; > security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid); > + audit_sig_cid = audit_get_contid(current); > } > > if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) > @@ -2400,6 +2409,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > ctx->target_uid = t_uid; > ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); > security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); > + ctx->target_cid = audit_get_contid(t); > memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > return 0; > } > @@ -2421,6 +2431,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; > axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); > security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); > + axp->target_cid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_contid(t); > memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > axp->pid_count++; > > -- > 1.8.3.1 > >
On 2019-03-18 15:04, Neil Horman wrote: > On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 02:29:53PM -0400, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > Add audit container identifier support to ptrace and signals. In > > particular, the "ref" field provides a way to label the auxiliary record > > to which it is associated. > > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > > --- > > include/linux/audit.h | 1 + > > kernel/audit.c | 2 ++ > > kernel/audit.h | 2 ++ > > kernel/auditsc.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------ > > 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > > index 43438192ca2a..ebd6625ca80e 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > > @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct audit_sig_info { > > uid_t uid; > > pid_t pid; > > char ctx[0]; > > + u64 cid; > > }; > Sorry, just noticed this. How does this work? Given that ctx[] is a variable > length array, one assumes that the receiver of this message (userspace > applications by the looks of it, presume that the ctx data occupies the skb from > the byte following pid to the end of the transmitted buffer. How are they to > know that the last byte is actually the cid value? Wouldn't it be better to > move cid above ctx[0], so that the semantics of the variable length data are > preserved? > > Or am I missing something? Nope you're not missing anything, but I am! That's a bug. Thanks for spotting that! > otherwise this looks ok to me. > Neil > > > > > struct audit_buffer; > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > > index 8cc0e88d7f2a..cfa659b3f6c4 100644 > > --- a/kernel/audit.c > > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > > @@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ struct audit_net { > > kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID; > > pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1; > > u32 audit_sig_sid = 0; > > +u64 audit_sig_cid = AUDIT_CID_UNSET; > > > > /* Records can be lost in several ways: > > 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc] > > @@ -1515,6 +1516,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) > > memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); > > security_release_secctx(ctx, len); > > } > > + sig_data->cid = audit_sig_cid; > > audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0, > > sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len); > > kfree(sig_data); > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h > > index c00e2ee3c6b3..c5ac6436317e 100644 > > --- a/kernel/audit.h > > +++ b/kernel/audit.h > > @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context { > > kuid_t target_uid; > > unsigned int target_sessionid; > > u32 target_sid; > > + u64 target_cid; > > char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; > > > > struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees; > > @@ -344,6 +345,7 @@ extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, > > extern pid_t audit_sig_pid; > > extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid; > > extern u32 audit_sig_sid; > > +extern u64 audit_sig_cid; > > > > extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype); > > > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > > index a8c8b44b954d..f04e115df5dc 100644 > > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > > @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids { > > kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > > unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > > u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > > + u64 target_cid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > > char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; > > int pid_count; > > }; > > @@ -1514,7 +1515,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) > > for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { > > struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; > > > > - for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) > > + for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) { > > if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], > > axs->target_auid[i], > > axs->target_uid[i], > > @@ -1522,14 +1523,20 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) > > axs->target_sid[i], > > axs->target_comm[i])) > > call_panic = 1; > > + audit_log_contid(context, axs->target_cid[i]); > > + } > > } > > > > - if (context->target_pid && > > - audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, > > - context->target_auid, context->target_uid, > > - context->target_sessionid, > > - context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) > > + if (context->target_pid) { > > + if (audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, > > + context->target_auid, > > + context->target_uid, > > + context->target_sessionid, > > + context->target_sid, > > + context->target_comm)) > > call_panic = 1; > > + audit_log_contid(context, context->target_cid); > > + } > > > > if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { > > ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); > > @@ -2360,6 +2367,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) > > context->target_uid = task_uid(t); > > context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); > > security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); > > + context->target_cid = audit_get_contid(t); > > memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > > } > > > > @@ -2387,6 +2395,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > > else > > audit_sig_uid = uid; > > security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid); > > + audit_sig_cid = audit_get_contid(current); > > } > > > > if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) > > @@ -2400,6 +2409,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > > ctx->target_uid = t_uid; > > ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); > > security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); > > + ctx->target_cid = audit_get_contid(t); > > memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > > return 0; > > } > > @@ -2421,6 +2431,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > > axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; > > axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); > > security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); > > + axp->target_cid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_contid(t); > > memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > > axp->pid_count++; > > > > -- > > 1.8.3.1 > > > > - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 7:34 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote: > Add audit container identifier support to ptrace and signals. In > particular, the "ref" field provides a way to label the auxiliary record > to which it is associated. > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > --- > include/linux/audit.h | 1 + > kernel/audit.c | 2 ++ > kernel/audit.h | 2 ++ > kernel/auditsc.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------ > 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > index 43438192ca2a..ebd6625ca80e 100644 > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct audit_sig_info { > uid_t uid; > pid_t pid; > char ctx[0]; > + u64 cid; > }; It seems like this structure implicitly defines the format of some message that is sent to userspace... If so, how will userspace detect that a new format (including the cid) is being used? Even assuming the fixed order as pointed out by Neil, the message still seems to be variable-sized so userspace cannot even use the length to infer that. Am I missing something here? (I hope I am :) > > struct audit_buffer; > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > index 8cc0e88d7f2a..cfa659b3f6c4 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.c > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > @@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ struct audit_net { > kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID; > pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1; > u32 audit_sig_sid = 0; > +u64 audit_sig_cid = AUDIT_CID_UNSET; > > /* Records can be lost in several ways: > 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc] > @@ -1515,6 +1516,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) > memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); > security_release_secctx(ctx, len); > } > + sig_data->cid = audit_sig_cid; > audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0, > sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len); > kfree(sig_data); > diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h > index c00e2ee3c6b3..c5ac6436317e 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.h > +++ b/kernel/audit.h > @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context { > kuid_t target_uid; > unsigned int target_sessionid; > u32 target_sid; > + u64 target_cid; > char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; > > struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees; > @@ -344,6 +345,7 @@ extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, > extern pid_t audit_sig_pid; > extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid; > extern u32 audit_sig_sid; > +extern u64 audit_sig_cid; > > extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype); > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > index a8c8b44b954d..f04e115df5dc 100644 > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids { > kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > + u64 target_cid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; > int pid_count; > }; > @@ -1514,7 +1515,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) > for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { > struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; > > - for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) > + for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) { > if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], > axs->target_auid[i], > axs->target_uid[i], > @@ -1522,14 +1523,20 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) > axs->target_sid[i], > axs->target_comm[i])) > call_panic = 1; > + audit_log_contid(context, axs->target_cid[i]); > + } > } > > - if (context->target_pid && > - audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, > - context->target_auid, context->target_uid, > - context->target_sessionid, > - context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) > + if (context->target_pid) { > + if (audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, > + context->target_auid, > + context->target_uid, > + context->target_sessionid, > + context->target_sid, > + context->target_comm)) > call_panic = 1; > + audit_log_contid(context, context->target_cid); > + } > > if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { > ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); > @@ -2360,6 +2367,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) > context->target_uid = task_uid(t); > context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); > security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); > + context->target_cid = audit_get_contid(t); > memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > } > > @@ -2387,6 +2395,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > else > audit_sig_uid = uid; > security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid); > + audit_sig_cid = audit_get_contid(current); > } > > if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) > @@ -2400,6 +2409,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > ctx->target_uid = t_uid; > ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); > security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); > + ctx->target_cid = audit_get_contid(t); > memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > return 0; > } > @@ -2421,6 +2431,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; > axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); > security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); > + axp->target_cid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_contid(t); > memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > axp->pid_count++; > > -- > 1.8.3.1 >
On 2019-03-27 22:17, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote: > On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 7:34 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote: > > Add audit container identifier support to ptrace and signals. In > > particular, the "ref" field provides a way to label the auxiliary record > > to which it is associated. > > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > > --- > > include/linux/audit.h | 1 + > > kernel/audit.c | 2 ++ > > kernel/audit.h | 2 ++ > > kernel/auditsc.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------ > > 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > > index 43438192ca2a..ebd6625ca80e 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > > @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct audit_sig_info { > > uid_t uid; > > pid_t pid; > > char ctx[0]; > > + u64 cid; > > }; > > It seems like this structure implicitly defines the format of some > message that is sent to userspace... If so, how will userspace detect > that a new format (including the cid) is being used? Even assuming the > fixed order as pointed out by Neil, the message still seems to be > variable-sized so userspace cannot even use the length to infer that. > Am I missing something here? (I hope I am :) How humble of you again. No, you're not missing something. This ends up being an api change... That can be fixed in userspace by checking for AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_CONTAINERID, but how do we make a newer kernel not break an older userspace... I think this was the original rationale for adding it after the ctx but totally missing the fact that the latter is a variable-length field. This patch really should be split into audit_sig_cid changes in a patch by itself and target_cid changes which could go with the second and fourth patches. > > struct audit_buffer; > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > > index 8cc0e88d7f2a..cfa659b3f6c4 100644 > > --- a/kernel/audit.c > > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > > @@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ struct audit_net { > > kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID; > > pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1; > > u32 audit_sig_sid = 0; > > +u64 audit_sig_cid = AUDIT_CID_UNSET; > > > > /* Records can be lost in several ways: > > 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc] > > @@ -1515,6 +1516,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) > > memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); > > security_release_secctx(ctx, len); > > } > > + sig_data->cid = audit_sig_cid; > > audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0, > > sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len); > > kfree(sig_data); > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h > > index c00e2ee3c6b3..c5ac6436317e 100644 > > --- a/kernel/audit.h > > +++ b/kernel/audit.h > > @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context { > > kuid_t target_uid; > > unsigned int target_sessionid; > > u32 target_sid; > > + u64 target_cid; > > char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; > > > > struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees; > > @@ -344,6 +345,7 @@ extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, > > extern pid_t audit_sig_pid; > > extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid; > > extern u32 audit_sig_sid; > > +extern u64 audit_sig_cid; > > > > extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype); > > > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > > index a8c8b44b954d..f04e115df5dc 100644 > > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > > @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids { > > kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > > unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > > u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > > + u64 target_cid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > > char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; > > int pid_count; > > }; > > @@ -1514,7 +1515,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) > > for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { > > struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; > > > > - for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) > > + for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) { > > if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], > > axs->target_auid[i], > > axs->target_uid[i], > > @@ -1522,14 +1523,20 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) > > axs->target_sid[i], > > axs->target_comm[i])) > > call_panic = 1; > > + audit_log_contid(context, axs->target_cid[i]); > > + } > > } > > > > - if (context->target_pid && > > - audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, > > - context->target_auid, context->target_uid, > > - context->target_sessionid, > > - context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) > > + if (context->target_pid) { > > + if (audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, > > + context->target_auid, > > + context->target_uid, > > + context->target_sessionid, > > + context->target_sid, > > + context->target_comm)) > > call_panic = 1; > > + audit_log_contid(context, context->target_cid); > > + } > > > > if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { > > ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); > > @@ -2360,6 +2367,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) > > context->target_uid = task_uid(t); > > context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); > > security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); > > + context->target_cid = audit_get_contid(t); > > memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > > } > > > > @@ -2387,6 +2395,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > > else > > audit_sig_uid = uid; > > security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid); > > + audit_sig_cid = audit_get_contid(current); > > } > > > > if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) > > @@ -2400,6 +2409,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > > ctx->target_uid = t_uid; > > ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); > > security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); > > + ctx->target_cid = audit_get_contid(t); > > memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > > return 0; > > } > > @@ -2421,6 +2431,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > > axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; > > axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); > > security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); > > + axp->target_cid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_contid(t); > > memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > > axp->pid_count++; > > > > -- > > 1.8.3.1 > > > > > -- > Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com> > Software Engineer, Security Technologies > Red Hat, Inc. - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
On 2019-03-27 22:04, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > On 2019-03-27 22:17, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote: > > On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 7:34 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> wrote: > > > Add audit container identifier support to ptrace and signals. In > > > particular, the "ref" field provides a way to label the auxiliary record > > > to which it is associated. > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > > > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> > > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> > > > --- > > > include/linux/audit.h | 1 + > > > kernel/audit.c | 2 ++ > > > kernel/audit.h | 2 ++ > > > kernel/auditsc.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------ > > > 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > > > index 43438192ca2a..ebd6625ca80e 100644 > > > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > > > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > > > @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct audit_sig_info { > > > uid_t uid; > > > pid_t pid; > > > char ctx[0]; > > > + u64 cid; > > > }; > > > > It seems like this structure implicitly defines the format of some > > message that is sent to userspace... If so, how will userspace detect > > that a new format (including the cid) is being used? Even assuming the > > fixed order as pointed out by Neil, the message still seems to be > > variable-sized so userspace cannot even use the length to infer that. > > Am I missing something here? (I hope I am :) > > How humble of you again. No, you're not missing something. This ends > up being an api change... That can be fixed in userspace by checking > for AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_CONTAINERID, but how do we make a newer kernel > not break an older userspace... I think this was the original rationale > for adding it after the ctx but totally missing the fact that the latter > is a variable-length field. The way to address this on Steve Grubb's advice is to create a new message type that incorporates a new struct with the structure above, leaving the old one with the old message type deprecated. I've coded this up along with userspace support. > This patch really should be split into audit_sig_cid changes in a patch > by itself and target_cid changes which could go with the second and > fourth patches. I've also done this which Paul had already asked for, not quite in this form. I believe this addresses all the outstanding issues. > > > struct audit_buffer; > > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > > > index 8cc0e88d7f2a..cfa659b3f6c4 100644 > > > --- a/kernel/audit.c > > > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > > > @@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ struct audit_net { > > > kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID; > > > pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1; > > > u32 audit_sig_sid = 0; > > > +u64 audit_sig_cid = AUDIT_CID_UNSET; > > > > > > /* Records can be lost in several ways: > > > 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc] > > > @@ -1515,6 +1516,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) > > > memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); > > > security_release_secctx(ctx, len); > > > } > > > + sig_data->cid = audit_sig_cid; > > > audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0, > > > sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len); > > > kfree(sig_data); > > > diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h > > > index c00e2ee3c6b3..c5ac6436317e 100644 > > > --- a/kernel/audit.h > > > +++ b/kernel/audit.h > > > @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context { > > > kuid_t target_uid; > > > unsigned int target_sessionid; > > > u32 target_sid; > > > + u64 target_cid; > > > char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; > > > > > > struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees; > > > @@ -344,6 +345,7 @@ extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, > > > extern pid_t audit_sig_pid; > > > extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid; > > > extern u32 audit_sig_sid; > > > +extern u64 audit_sig_cid; > > > > > > extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype); > > > > > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > > > index a8c8b44b954d..f04e115df5dc 100644 > > > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > > > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > > > @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids { > > > kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > > > unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > > > u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > > > + u64 target_cid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; > > > char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; > > > int pid_count; > > > }; > > > @@ -1514,7 +1515,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) > > > for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { > > > struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; > > > > > > - for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) > > > + for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) { > > > if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], > > > axs->target_auid[i], > > > axs->target_uid[i], > > > @@ -1522,14 +1523,20 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) > > > axs->target_sid[i], > > > axs->target_comm[i])) > > > call_panic = 1; > > > + audit_log_contid(context, axs->target_cid[i]); > > > + } > > > } > > > > > > - if (context->target_pid && > > > - audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, > > > - context->target_auid, context->target_uid, > > > - context->target_sessionid, > > > - context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) > > > + if (context->target_pid) { > > > + if (audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, > > > + context->target_auid, > > > + context->target_uid, > > > + context->target_sessionid, > > > + context->target_sid, > > > + context->target_comm)) > > > call_panic = 1; > > > + audit_log_contid(context, context->target_cid); > > > + } > > > > > > if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { > > > ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); > > > @@ -2360,6 +2367,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) > > > context->target_uid = task_uid(t); > > > context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); > > > security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); > > > + context->target_cid = audit_get_contid(t); > > > memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > > > } > > > > > > @@ -2387,6 +2395,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > > > else > > > audit_sig_uid = uid; > > > security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid); > > > + audit_sig_cid = audit_get_contid(current); > > > } > > > > > > if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) > > > @@ -2400,6 +2409,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > > > ctx->target_uid = t_uid; > > > ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); > > > security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); > > > + ctx->target_cid = audit_get_contid(t); > > > memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > > > return 0; > > > } > > > @@ -2421,6 +2431,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > > > axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; > > > axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); > > > security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); > > > + axp->target_cid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_contid(t); > > > memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); > > > axp->pid_count++; > > > > > > > Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com> > > - RGB - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada IRC: rgb, SunRaycer Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 43438192ca2a..ebd6625ca80e 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct audit_sig_info { uid_t uid; pid_t pid; char ctx[0]; + u64 cid; }; struct audit_buffer; diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 8cc0e88d7f2a..cfa659b3f6c4 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ struct audit_net { kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID; pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1; u32 audit_sig_sid = 0; +u64 audit_sig_cid = AUDIT_CID_UNSET; /* Records can be lost in several ways: 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc] @@ -1515,6 +1516,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); security_release_secctx(ctx, len); } + sig_data->cid = audit_sig_cid; audit_send_reply(skb, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0, sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len); kfree(sig_data); diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h index c00e2ee3c6b3..c5ac6436317e 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.h +++ b/kernel/audit.h @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ struct audit_context { kuid_t target_uid; unsigned int target_sessionid; u32 target_sid; + u64 target_cid; char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN]; struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees; @@ -344,6 +345,7 @@ extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, extern pid_t audit_sig_pid; extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid; extern u32 audit_sig_sid; +extern u64 audit_sig_cid; extern int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype); diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index a8c8b44b954d..f04e115df5dc 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids { kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; + u64 target_cid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; int pid_count; }; @@ -1514,7 +1515,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; - for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) + for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) { if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], axs->target_auid[i], axs->target_uid[i], @@ -1522,14 +1523,20 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) axs->target_sid[i], axs->target_comm[i])) call_panic = 1; + audit_log_contid(context, axs->target_cid[i]); + } } - if (context->target_pid && - audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, - context->target_auid, context->target_uid, - context->target_sessionid, - context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) + if (context->target_pid) { + if (audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, + context->target_auid, + context->target_uid, + context->target_sessionid, + context->target_sid, + context->target_comm)) call_panic = 1; + audit_log_contid(context, context->target_cid); + } if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); @@ -2360,6 +2367,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) context->target_uid = task_uid(t); context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); + context->target_cid = audit_get_contid(t); memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); } @@ -2387,6 +2395,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) else audit_sig_uid = uid; security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid); + audit_sig_cid = audit_get_contid(current); } if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) @@ -2400,6 +2409,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); + ctx->target_cid = audit_get_contid(t); memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); return 0; } @@ -2421,6 +2431,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); + axp->target_cid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_contid(t); memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); axp->pid_count++;