[V32,04/27] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down
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Message ID 20190404003249.14356-5-matthewgarrett@google.com
State New
Headers show
Series
  • Lockdown patches for 5.2
Related show

Commit Message

Matthew Garrett April 4, 2019, 12:32 a.m. UTC
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>

The kexec_load() syscall permits the loading and execution of arbitrary
code in ring 0, which is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It
makes sense to disable kexec_load() in this situation.

This does not affect kexec_file_load() syscall which can check for a
signature on the image to be booted.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
---
 kernel/kexec.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

Patch
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diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index 68559808fdfa..57047acc9a36 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -207,6 +207,14 @@  static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments,
 	if (result < 0)
 		return result;
 
+	/*
+	 * kexec can be used to circumvent module loading restrictions, so
+	 * prevent loading in that case
+	 */
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down("kexec of unsigned images",
+				  LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	/*
 	 * Verify we have a legal set of flags
 	 * This leaves us room for future extensions.