diff mbox series

KVM: s390: vsie: Do not shadow CRYCB when no AP and no keys

Message ID 1556269010-22258-1-git-send-email-pmorel@linux.ibm.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series KVM: s390: vsie: Do not shadow CRYCB when no AP and no keys | expand

Commit Message

Pierre Morel April 26, 2019, 8:56 a.m. UTC
When the guest do not have AP instructions nor Key management
we should return without shadowing the CRYCB.

We did not check correctly in the past.

Fixes: b10bd9a256ae ("s390: vsie: Use effective CRYCBD.31 to check CRYCBD
validity")
Fixes: 6ee74098201b ("KVM: s390: vsie: allow CRYCB FORMAT-0")

Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
---
 arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Comments

David Hildenbrand April 26, 2019, 9:04 a.m. UTC | #1
On 26.04.19 10:56, Pierre Morel wrote:
> When the guest do not have AP instructions nor Key management
> we should return without shadowing the CRYCB.
> 
> We did not check correctly in the past.
> 
> Fixes: b10bd9a256ae ("s390: vsie: Use effective CRYCBD.31 to check CRYCBD
> validity")

We should really try to pay more attention, commit b10bd9a256ae already
was supposed to fix 6ee74098201b.

Unfortunately, I don't have access to documentation and can't verify.

Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>

> Fixes: 6ee74098201b ("KVM: s390: vsie: allow CRYCB FORMAT-0")
> 
> Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com>
> Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
> ---
>  arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 6 ++++--
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
> index c6983d9..ac411e9 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
> @@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
>  	u8 ecb3_flags;
>  	u32 ecd_flags;
>  	int apie_h;
> +	int apie_s;
>  	int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76);
>  	int fmt_o = crycbd_o & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
>  	int fmt_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
> @@ -298,7 +299,8 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
>  	scb_s->crycbd = 0;
>  
>  	apie_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->eca & ECA_APIE;
> -	if (!apie_h && (!key_msk || fmt_o == CRYCB_FORMAT0))
> +	apie_s = apie_h & scb_o->eca;
> +	if (!apie_s && (!key_msk || (fmt_o == CRYCB_FORMAT0)))
>  		return 0;
>  
>  	if (!crycb_addr)
> @@ -309,7 +311,7 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
>  		    ((crycb_addr + 128) & PAGE_MASK))
>  			return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x003CU);
>  
> -	if (apie_h && (scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE)) {
> +	if (apie_s) {
>  		ret = setup_apcb(vcpu, &vsie_page->crycb, crycb_addr,
>  				 vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.crycb,
>  				 fmt_o, fmt_h);
>
Christian Borntraeger April 26, 2019, 9:08 a.m. UTC | #2
On 26.04.19 10:56, Pierre Morel wrote:
> When the guest do not have AP instructions nor Key management
> we should return without shadowing the CRYCB.
> 
> We did not check correctly in the past.
> 
> Fixes: b10bd9a256ae ("s390: vsie: Use effective CRYCBD.31 to check CRYCBD
> validity")
> Fixes: 6ee74098201b ("KVM: s390: vsie: allow CRYCB FORMAT-0")
> 
> Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com>
> Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

> ---
>  arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 6 ++++--
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
> index c6983d9..ac411e9 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
> @@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
>  	u8 ecb3_flags;
>  	u32 ecd_flags;
>  	int apie_h;
> +	int apie_s;
>  	int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76);
>  	int fmt_o = crycbd_o & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
>  	int fmt_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
> @@ -298,7 +299,8 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
>  	scb_s->crycbd = 0;
>  
>  	apie_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->eca & ECA_APIE;
> -	if (!apie_h && (!key_msk || fmt_o == CRYCB_FORMAT0))
> +	apie_s = apie_h & scb_o->eca;
> +	if (!apie_s && (!key_msk || (fmt_o == CRYCB_FORMAT0)))
>  		return 0;
>  
>  	if (!crycb_addr)
> @@ -309,7 +311,7 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
>  		    ((crycb_addr + 128) & PAGE_MASK))
>  			return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x003CU);
>  
> -	if (apie_h && (scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE)) {
> +	if (apie_s) {
>  		ret = setup_apcb(vcpu, &vsie_page->crycb, crycb_addr,
>  				 vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.crycb,
>  				 fmt_o, fmt_h);
>
Pierre Morel April 26, 2019, 10:59 a.m. UTC | #3
On 26/04/2019 11:04, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 26.04.19 10:56, Pierre Morel wrote:
>> When the guest do not have AP instructions nor Key management
>> we should return without shadowing the CRYCB.
>>
>> We did not check correctly in the past.
>>
>> Fixes: b10bd9a256ae ("s390: vsie: Use effective CRYCBD.31 to check CRYCBD
>> validity")
> 
> We should really try to pay more attention, commit b10bd9a256ae already
> was supposed to fix 6ee74098201b.

yes, sorry for that.

> 
> Unfortunately, I don't have access to documentation and can't verify.
> 
> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>

Thanks

> 
>> Fixes: 6ee74098201b ("KVM: s390: vsie: allow CRYCB FORMAT-0")
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com>
>> Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 6 ++++--
>>   1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
>> index c6983d9..ac411e9 100644
>> --- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
>> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
>> @@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
>>   	u8 ecb3_flags;
>>   	u32 ecd_flags;
>>   	int apie_h;
>> +	int apie_s;
>>   	int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76);
>>   	int fmt_o = crycbd_o & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
>>   	int fmt_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
>> @@ -298,7 +299,8 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
>>   	scb_s->crycbd = 0;
>>   
>>   	apie_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->eca & ECA_APIE;
>> -	if (!apie_h && (!key_msk || fmt_o == CRYCB_FORMAT0))
>> +	apie_s = apie_h & scb_o->eca;
>> +	if (!apie_s && (!key_msk || (fmt_o == CRYCB_FORMAT0)))
>>   		return 0;
>>   
>>   	if (!crycb_addr)
>> @@ -309,7 +311,7 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
>>   		    ((crycb_addr + 128) & PAGE_MASK))
>>   			return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x003CU);
>>   
>> -	if (apie_h && (scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE)) {
>> +	if (apie_s) {
>>   		ret = setup_apcb(vcpu, &vsie_page->crycb, crycb_addr,
>>   				 vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.crycb,
>>   				 fmt_o, fmt_h);
>>
> 
>
Pierre Morel April 26, 2019, 11:01 a.m. UTC | #4
On 26/04/2019 11:08, Christian Borntraeger wrote:
> 
> 
> On 26.04.19 10:56, Pierre Morel wrote:
>> When the guest do not have AP instructions nor Key management
>> we should return without shadowing the CRYCB.
>>
>> We did not check correctly in the past.
>>
>> Fixes: b10bd9a256ae ("s390: vsie: Use effective CRYCBD.31 to check CRYCBD
>> validity")
>> Fixes: 6ee74098201b ("KVM: s390: vsie: allow CRYCB FORMAT-0")
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com>
>> Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
> Tested-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

Thanks,
It gives a better feeling on this patch.

Pierre

> 
>> ---
>>   arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 6 ++++--
>>   1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
>> index c6983d9..ac411e9 100644
>> --- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
>> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
>> @@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
>>   	u8 ecb3_flags;
>>   	u32 ecd_flags;
>>   	int apie_h;
>> +	int apie_s;
>>   	int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76);
>>   	int fmt_o = crycbd_o & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
>>   	int fmt_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
>> @@ -298,7 +299,8 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
>>   	scb_s->crycbd = 0;
>>   
>>   	apie_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->eca & ECA_APIE;
>> -	if (!apie_h && (!key_msk || fmt_o == CRYCB_FORMAT0))
>> +	apie_s = apie_h & scb_o->eca;
>> +	if (!apie_s && (!key_msk || (fmt_o == CRYCB_FORMAT0)))
>>   		return 0;
>>   
>>   	if (!crycb_addr)
>> @@ -309,7 +311,7 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
>>   		    ((crycb_addr + 128) & PAGE_MASK))
>>   			return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x003CU);
>>   
>> -	if (apie_h && (scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE)) {
>> +	if (apie_s) {
>>   		ret = setup_apcb(vcpu, &vsie_page->crycb, crycb_addr,
>>   				 vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.crycb,
>>   				 fmt_o, fmt_h);
>>
Christian Borntraeger April 29, 2019, 7:10 a.m. UTC | #5
On 26.04.19 10:56, Pierre Morel wrote:
> When the guest do not have AP instructions nor Key management
> we should return without shadowing the CRYCB.
> 
> We did not check correctly in the past.
> 
> Fixes: b10bd9a256ae ("s390: vsie: Use effective CRYCBD.31 to check CRYCBD
> validity")
> Fixes: 6ee74098201b ("KVM: s390: vsie: allow CRYCB FORMAT-0")
> 
> Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel@linux.ibm.com>
> Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
> ---
>  arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 6 ++++--
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
> index c6983d9..ac411e9 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
> @@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
>  	u8 ecb3_flags;
>  	u32 ecd_flags;
>  	int apie_h;
> +	int apie_s;
>  	int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76);
>  	int fmt_o = crycbd_o & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
>  	int fmt_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
> @@ -298,7 +299,8 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
>  	scb_s->crycbd = 0;
>  
>  	apie_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->eca & ECA_APIE;
> -	if (!apie_h && (!key_msk || fmt_o == CRYCB_FORMAT0))
> +	apie_s = apie_h & scb_o->eca;
> +	if (!apie_s && (!key_msk || (fmt_o == CRYCB_FORMAT0)))
>  		return 0;
>  
>  	if (!crycb_addr)
> @@ -309,7 +311,7 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
>  		    ((crycb_addr + 128) & PAGE_MASK))
>  			return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x003CU);
>  
> -	if (apie_h && (scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE)) {
> +	if (apie_s) {
>  		ret = setup_apcb(vcpu, &vsie_page->crycb, crycb_addr,
>  				 vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.crycb,
>  				 fmt_o, fmt_h);
> 

thanks applied.
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
index c6983d9..ac411e9 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c
@@ -290,6 +290,7 @@  static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
 	u8 ecb3_flags;
 	u32 ecd_flags;
 	int apie_h;
+	int apie_s;
 	int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76);
 	int fmt_o = crycbd_o & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
 	int fmt_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK;
@@ -298,7 +299,8 @@  static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
 	scb_s->crycbd = 0;
 
 	apie_h = vcpu->arch.sie_block->eca & ECA_APIE;
-	if (!apie_h && (!key_msk || fmt_o == CRYCB_FORMAT0))
+	apie_s = apie_h & scb_o->eca;
+	if (!apie_s && (!key_msk || (fmt_o == CRYCB_FORMAT0)))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (!crycb_addr)
@@ -309,7 +311,7 @@  static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page)
 		    ((crycb_addr + 128) & PAGE_MASK))
 			return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x003CU);
 
-	if (apie_h && (scb_o->eca & ECA_APIE)) {
+	if (apie_s) {
 		ret = setup_apcb(vcpu, &vsie_page->crycb, crycb_addr,
 				 vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.crycb,
 				 fmt_o, fmt_h);