From patchwork Mon Apr 29 09:09:58 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Christian Borntraeger X-Patchwork-Id: 10921469 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DFB2D92A for ; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 09:10:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D09112860A for ; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 09:10:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id C4B7E28630; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 09:10:17 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.9 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3BAB52860A for ; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 09:10:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727773AbfD2JKQ (ORCPT ); Mon, 29 Apr 2019 05:10:16 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:53130 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727723AbfD2JKN (ORCPT ); Mon, 29 Apr 2019 05:10:13 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098393.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x3T99uw4043161 for ; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 05:10:12 -0400 Received: from e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.97]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2s5wg0j84a-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 05:10:12 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp01.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Mon, 29 Apr 2019 10:10:07 +0100 Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.61]) by b06cxnps3075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x3T9A5JR50790448 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Mon, 29 Apr 2019 09:10:05 GMT Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id A18E711C050; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 09:10:05 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9153111C054; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 09:10:05 +0000 (GMT) Received: from tuxmaker.boeblingen.de.ibm.com (unknown [9.152.85.9]) by d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 09:10:05 +0000 (GMT) Received: by tuxmaker.boeblingen.de.ibm.com (Postfix, from userid 25651) id 501EF20F5D4; Mon, 29 Apr 2019 11:10:05 +0200 (CEST) From: Christian Borntraeger To: Paolo Bonzini , =?utf-8?b?UmFkaW0gS3LEjW3DocWZ?= Cc: KVM , Cornelia Huck , Christian Borntraeger , linux-s390 , Janosch Frank , David Hildenbrand , Eric Farman , Pierre Morel Subject: [GIT PULL 08/12] KVM: s390: enable MSA9 keywrapping functions depending on cpu model Date: Mon, 29 Apr 2019 11:09:58 +0200 X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.19.1 In-Reply-To: <20190429091002.71164-1-borntraeger@de.ibm.com> References: <20190429091002.71164-1-borntraeger@de.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19042909-4275-0000-0000-0000032F7819 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19042909-4276-0000-0000-0000383ECCC0 Message-Id: <20190429091002.71164-9-borntraeger@de.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-04-29_05:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1904290067 Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP Instead of adding a new machine option to disable/enable the keywrapping options of pckmo (like for AES and DEA) we can now use the CPU model to decide. As ECC is also wrapped with the AES key we need that to be enabled. Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand --- arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c | 5 ++++- 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h index c47e22bba87f..e224246ff93c 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ struct kvm_s390_sie_block { #define ECD_HOSTREGMGMT 0x20000000 #define ECD_MEF 0x08000000 #define ECD_ETOKENF 0x02000000 +#define ECD_ECC 0x00200000 __u32 ecd; /* 0x01c8 */ __u8 reserved1cc[18]; /* 0x01cc */ __u64 pp; /* 0x01de */ diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c index 38ca8324a91a..eb68ada1334b 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c @@ -2890,6 +2890,25 @@ void kvm_arch_vcpu_postcreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->arch.enabled_gmap = vcpu->arch.gmap; } +static bool kvm_has_pckmo_subfunc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long nr) +{ + if (test_bit_inv(nr, (unsigned long *)&kvm->arch.model.subfuncs.pckmo) && + test_bit_inv(nr, (unsigned long *)&kvm_s390_available_subfunc.pckmo)) + return true; + return false; +} + +static bool kvm_has_pckmo_ecc(struct kvm *kvm) +{ + /* At least one ECC subfunction must be present */ + return kvm_has_pckmo_subfunc(kvm, 32) || + kvm_has_pckmo_subfunc(kvm, 33) || + kvm_has_pckmo_subfunc(kvm, 34) || + kvm_has_pckmo_subfunc(kvm, 40) || + kvm_has_pckmo_subfunc(kvm, 41); + +} + static void kvm_s390_vcpu_crypto_setup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { /* @@ -2902,13 +2921,19 @@ static void kvm_s390_vcpu_crypto_setup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->arch.sie_block->crycbd = vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.crycbd; vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 &= ~(ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA); vcpu->arch.sie_block->eca &= ~ECA_APIE; + vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecd &= ~ECD_ECC; if (vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.apie) vcpu->arch.sie_block->eca |= ECA_APIE; /* Set up protected key support */ - if (vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.aes_kw) + if (vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.aes_kw) { vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 |= ECB3_AES; + /* ecc is also wrapped with AES key */ + if (kvm_has_pckmo_ecc(vcpu->kvm)) + vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecd |= ECD_ECC; + } + if (vcpu->kvm->arch.crypto.dea_kw) vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 |= ECB3_DEA; } diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c index d62fa148558b..c6983d962abf 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/vsie.c @@ -288,6 +288,7 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) const u32 crycb_addr = crycbd_o & 0x7ffffff8U; unsigned long *b1, *b2; u8 ecb3_flags; + u32 ecd_flags; int apie_h; int key_msk = test_kvm_facility(vcpu->kvm, 76); int fmt_o = crycbd_o & CRYCB_FORMAT_MASK; @@ -320,7 +321,8 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) /* we may only allow it if enabled for guest 2 */ ecb3_flags = scb_o->ecb3 & vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecb3 & (ECB3_AES | ECB3_DEA); - if (!ecb3_flags) + ecd_flags = scb_o->ecd & vcpu->arch.sie_block->ecd & ECD_ECC; + if (!ecb3_flags && !ecd_flags) goto end; /* copy only the wrapping keys */ @@ -329,6 +331,7 @@ static int shadow_crycb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vsie_page *vsie_page) return set_validity_icpt(scb_s, 0x0035U); scb_s->ecb3 |= ecb3_flags; + scb_s->ecd |= ecd_flags; /* xor both blocks in one run */ b1 = (unsigned long *) vsie_page->crycb.dea_wrapping_key_mask;