Message ID | 20190710201244.25195-9-brijesh.singh@amd.com (mailing list archive) |
---|---|
State | New, archived |
Headers | show |
Series | Add AMD SEV guest live migration support | expand |
On Wed, 10 Jul 2019, Singh, Brijesh wrote: > diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt > index da24c138c8d1..94f0611f4d88 100644 > --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt > +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt > @@ -141,3 +141,17 @@ a0 corresponds to the APIC ID in the third argument (a2), bit 1 > corresponds to the APIC ID a2+1, and so on. > > Returns the number of CPUs to which the IPIs were delivered successfully. > + > +7. KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS > +------------------------- > +Architecture: x86 > +Status: active > +Purpose: Notify the encryption status changes in guest page table (SEV guest) > + > +a0: the guest physical address of the start page > +a1: the number of pages > +a2: encryption attribute > + > + Where: > + * 1: Encryption attribute is set > + * 0: Encryption attribute is cleared > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > index 26d1eb83f72a..b463a81dc176 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > @@ -1199,6 +1199,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { > uint16_t (*nested_get_evmcs_version)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); > > bool (*need_emulation_on_page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); > + int (*page_enc_status_hc)(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, > + unsigned long sz, unsigned long mode); > }; > > struct kvm_arch_async_pf { > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > index 3089942f6630..431718309359 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > @@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ struct kvm_sev_info { > int fd; /* SEV device fd */ > unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */ > struct list_head regions_list; /* List of registered regions */ > + unsigned long *page_enc_bmap; > + unsigned long page_enc_bmap_size; > }; > > struct kvm_svm { > @@ -1910,6 +1912,8 @@ static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) > > sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle); > sev_asid_free(kvm); > + > + kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap); > } > > static void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) Adding Cfir who flagged this kvfree(). Other freeing of sev->page_enc_bmap in this patch also set sev->page_enc_bmap_size to 0 and neither set sev->page_enc_bmap to NULL after freeing it. For extra safety, is it possible to sev->page_enc_bmap = NULL anytime the bitmap is kvfreed? > @@ -2084,6 +2088,7 @@ static void avic_set_running(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool is_run) > > static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) > { > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info; > struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); > u32 dummy; > u32 eax = 1; > @@ -2105,6 +2110,12 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) > > if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu) && !init_event) > avic_update_vapic_bar(svm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE); > + > + /* reset the page encryption bitmap */ > + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { > + kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap); > + sev->page_enc_bmap_size = 0; > + } > } > > static int avic_init_vcpu(struct vcpu_svm *svm) What is protecting sev->page_enc_bmap and sev->page_enc_bmap_size in calls to svm_vcpu_reset()?
In addition, it seems that svm_page_enc_status_hc() accepts 'gpa', 'npages', 'enc' directly from the guest, and so these can take arbitrary values. A very large 'npages' could lead to an int overflow in 'gfn_end = gfn_start + npages', making gfn_end < gfn_start. This could an OOB access in the bitmap. Concrete example: gfn_start = 2, npages = -1, gfn_end = 2+(-1) = 1, sev_resize_page_enc_bitmap allocates a bitmap for a single page (new_size=1), __bitmap_set access offset gfn_end - gfn_start = -1. On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 1:57 PM David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> wrote: > > On Wed, 10 Jul 2019, Singh, Brijesh wrote: > > > diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt > > index da24c138c8d1..94f0611f4d88 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt > > +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt > > @@ -141,3 +141,17 @@ a0 corresponds to the APIC ID in the third argument (a2), bit 1 > > corresponds to the APIC ID a2+1, and so on. > > > > Returns the number of CPUs to which the IPIs were delivered successfully. > > + > > +7. KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS > > +------------------------- > > +Architecture: x86 > > +Status: active > > +Purpose: Notify the encryption status changes in guest page table (SEV guest) > > + > > +a0: the guest physical address of the start page > > +a1: the number of pages > > +a2: encryption attribute > > + > > + Where: > > + * 1: Encryption attribute is set > > + * 0: Encryption attribute is cleared > > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > > index 26d1eb83f72a..b463a81dc176 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h > > @@ -1199,6 +1199,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { > > uint16_t (*nested_get_evmcs_version)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); > > > > bool (*need_emulation_on_page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); > > + int (*page_enc_status_hc)(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, > > + unsigned long sz, unsigned long mode); > > }; > > > > struct kvm_arch_async_pf { > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > > index 3089942f6630..431718309359 100644 > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > > @@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ struct kvm_sev_info { > > int fd; /* SEV device fd */ > > unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */ > > struct list_head regions_list; /* List of registered regions */ > > + unsigned long *page_enc_bmap; > > + unsigned long page_enc_bmap_size; > > }; > > > > struct kvm_svm { > > @@ -1910,6 +1912,8 @@ static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) > > > > sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle); > > sev_asid_free(kvm); > > + > > + kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap); > > } > > > > static void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) > > Adding Cfir who flagged this kvfree(). > > Other freeing of sev->page_enc_bmap in this patch also set > sev->page_enc_bmap_size to 0 and neither set sev->page_enc_bmap to NULL > after freeing it. > > For extra safety, is it possible to sev->page_enc_bmap = NULL anytime the > bitmap is kvfreed? > > > @@ -2084,6 +2088,7 @@ static void avic_set_running(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool is_run) > > > > static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) > > { > > + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info; > > struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); > > u32 dummy; > > u32 eax = 1; > > @@ -2105,6 +2110,12 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) > > > > if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu) && !init_event) > > avic_update_vapic_bar(svm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE); > > + > > + /* reset the page encryption bitmap */ > > + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { > > + kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap); > > + sev->page_enc_bmap_size = 0; > > + } > > } > > > > static int avic_init_vcpu(struct vcpu_svm *svm) > > What is protecting sev->page_enc_bmap and sev->page_enc_bmap_size in calls > to svm_vcpu_reset()?
On 7/21/19 3:57 PM, David Rientjes wrote: > On Wed, 10 Jul 2019, Singh, Brijesh wrote: > >> diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt >> index da24c138c8d1..94f0611f4d88 100644 >> --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt >> +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt >> @@ -141,3 +141,17 @@ a0 corresponds to the APIC ID in the third argument (a2), bit 1 >> corresponds to the APIC ID a2+1, and so on. >> >> Returns the number of CPUs to which the IPIs were delivered successfully. >> + >> +7. KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS >> +------------------------- >> +Architecture: x86 >> +Status: active >> +Purpose: Notify the encryption status changes in guest page table (SEV guest) >> + >> +a0: the guest physical address of the start page >> +a1: the number of pages >> +a2: encryption attribute >> + >> + Where: >> + * 1: Encryption attribute is set >> + * 0: Encryption attribute is cleared >> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h >> index 26d1eb83f72a..b463a81dc176 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h >> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h >> @@ -1199,6 +1199,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { >> uint16_t (*nested_get_evmcs_version)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); >> >> bool (*need_emulation_on_page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); >> + int (*page_enc_status_hc)(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, >> + unsigned long sz, unsigned long mode); >> }; >> >> struct kvm_arch_async_pf { >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c >> index 3089942f6630..431718309359 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c >> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c >> @@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ struct kvm_sev_info { >> int fd; /* SEV device fd */ >> unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */ >> struct list_head regions_list; /* List of registered regions */ >> + unsigned long *page_enc_bmap; >> + unsigned long page_enc_bmap_size; >> }; >> >> struct kvm_svm { >> @@ -1910,6 +1912,8 @@ static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) >> >> sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle); >> sev_asid_free(kvm); >> + >> + kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap); >> } >> >> static void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) > > Adding Cfir who flagged this kvfree(). > > Other freeing of sev->page_enc_bmap in this patch also set > sev->page_enc_bmap_size to 0 and neither set sev->page_enc_bmap to NULL > after freeing it. > > For extra safety, is it possible to sev->page_enc_bmap = NULL anytime the > bitmap is kvfreed? > Good catch, I'll fix it in next rev. >> @@ -2084,6 +2088,7 @@ static void avic_set_running(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool is_run) >> >> static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) >> { >> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info; >> struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); >> u32 dummy; >> u32 eax = 1; >> @@ -2105,6 +2110,12 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) >> >> if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu) && !init_event) >> avic_update_vapic_bar(svm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE); >> + >> + /* reset the page encryption bitmap */ >> + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { >> + kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap); >> + sev->page_enc_bmap_size = 0; >> + } >> } >> >> static int avic_init_vcpu(struct vcpu_svm *svm) > > What is protecting sev->page_enc_bmap and sev->page_enc_bmap_size in calls > to svm_vcpu_reset()? > Yes, it need to be protected with vm lock. I will fix it in next rev. Additionally, I think what I have here is wrong, we need to reset the bitmap only when bsp is getting reset. -Brijesh
On 7/22/19 12:12 PM, Cfir Cohen wrote: > In addition, it seems that svm_page_enc_status_hc() accepts 'gpa', > 'npages', 'enc' directly from the guest, and so these can take > arbitrary values. A very large 'npages' could lead to an int overflow > in 'gfn_end = gfn_start + npages', making gfn_end < gfn_start. This > could an OOB access in the bitmap. Concrete example: gfn_start = 2, > npages = -1, gfn_end = 2+(-1) = 1, sev_resize_page_enc_bitmap > allocates a bitmap for a single page (new_size=1), __bitmap_set access > offset gfn_end - gfn_start = -1. > Good point. I will add a check for it, something like if (gfn_end <= gfn_start) return -EINVAL; > > On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 1:57 PM David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> wrote: >> >> On Wed, 10 Jul 2019, Singh, Brijesh wrote: >> >>> diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt >>> index da24c138c8d1..94f0611f4d88 100644 >>> --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt >>> +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt >>> @@ -141,3 +141,17 @@ a0 corresponds to the APIC ID in the third argument (a2), bit 1 >>> corresponds to the APIC ID a2+1, and so on. >>> >>> Returns the number of CPUs to which the IPIs were delivered successfully. >>> + >>> +7. KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS >>> +------------------------- >>> +Architecture: x86 >>> +Status: active >>> +Purpose: Notify the encryption status changes in guest page table (SEV guest) >>> + >>> +a0: the guest physical address of the start page >>> +a1: the number of pages >>> +a2: encryption attribute >>> + >>> + Where: >>> + * 1: Encryption attribute is set >>> + * 0: Encryption attribute is cleared >>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h >>> index 26d1eb83f72a..b463a81dc176 100644 >>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h >>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h >>> @@ -1199,6 +1199,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { >>> uint16_t (*nested_get_evmcs_version)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); >>> >>> bool (*need_emulation_on_page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); >>> + int (*page_enc_status_hc)(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, >>> + unsigned long sz, unsigned long mode); >>> }; >>> >>> struct kvm_arch_async_pf { >>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c >>> index 3089942f6630..431718309359 100644 >>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c >>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c >>> @@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ struct kvm_sev_info { >>> int fd; /* SEV device fd */ >>> unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */ >>> struct list_head regions_list; /* List of registered regions */ >>> + unsigned long *page_enc_bmap; >>> + unsigned long page_enc_bmap_size; >>> }; >>> >>> struct kvm_svm { >>> @@ -1910,6 +1912,8 @@ static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) >>> >>> sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle); >>> sev_asid_free(kvm); >>> + >>> + kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap); >>> } >>> >>> static void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) >> >> Adding Cfir who flagged this kvfree(). >> >> Other freeing of sev->page_enc_bmap in this patch also set >> sev->page_enc_bmap_size to 0 and neither set sev->page_enc_bmap to NULL >> after freeing it. >> >> For extra safety, is it possible to sev->page_enc_bmap = NULL anytime the >> bitmap is kvfreed? >> >>> @@ -2084,6 +2088,7 @@ static void avic_set_running(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool is_run) >>> >>> static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) >>> { >>> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info; >>> struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); >>> u32 dummy; >>> u32 eax = 1; >>> @@ -2105,6 +2110,12 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) >>> >>> if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu) && !init_event) >>> avic_update_vapic_bar(svm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE); >>> + >>> + /* reset the page encryption bitmap */ >>> + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { >>> + kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap); >>> + sev->page_enc_bmap_size = 0; >>> + } >>> } >>> >>> static int avic_init_vcpu(struct vcpu_svm *svm) >> >> What is protecting sev->page_enc_bmap and sev->page_enc_bmap_size in calls >> to svm_vcpu_reset()?
> struct kvm_arch_async_pf { > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > index 3089942f6630..431718309359 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > @@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ struct kvm_sev_info { > int fd; /* SEV device fd */ > unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */ > struct list_head regions_list; /* List of registered regions */ > + unsigned long *page_enc_bmap; > + unsigned long page_enc_bmap_size; > }; > Just a high level question. Would it be better for these bitmaps to live in kvm_memory_slot and the ioctl to be take a memslot instead of a GPA + length? The c-bit status bitmap will probably need to be checked at when checking the dirty log and KVM_GET_DIRTY_LOG operations on memslots.
diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt index da24c138c8d1..94f0611f4d88 100644 --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt @@ -141,3 +141,17 @@ a0 corresponds to the APIC ID in the third argument (a2), bit 1 corresponds to the APIC ID a2+1, and so on. Returns the number of CPUs to which the IPIs were delivered successfully. + +7. KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS +------------------------- +Architecture: x86 +Status: active +Purpose: Notify the encryption status changes in guest page table (SEV guest) + +a0: the guest physical address of the start page +a1: the number of pages +a2: encryption attribute + + Where: + * 1: Encryption attribute is set + * 0: Encryption attribute is cleared diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 26d1eb83f72a..b463a81dc176 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -1199,6 +1199,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { uint16_t (*nested_get_evmcs_version)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); bool (*need_emulation_on_page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); + int (*page_enc_status_hc)(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, + unsigned long sz, unsigned long mode); }; struct kvm_arch_async_pf { diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 3089942f6630..431718309359 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ struct kvm_sev_info { int fd; /* SEV device fd */ unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */ struct list_head regions_list; /* List of registered regions */ + unsigned long *page_enc_bmap; + unsigned long page_enc_bmap_size; }; struct kvm_svm { @@ -1910,6 +1912,8 @@ static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle); sev_asid_free(kvm); + + kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap); } static void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) @@ -2084,6 +2088,7 @@ static void avic_set_running(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool is_run) static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) { + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info; struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); u32 dummy; u32 eax = 1; @@ -2105,6 +2110,12 @@ static void svm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event) if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu) && !init_event) avic_update_vapic_bar(svm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE); + + /* reset the page encryption bitmap */ + if (sev_guest(vcpu->kvm)) { + kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap); + sev->page_enc_bmap_size = 0; + } } static int avic_init_vcpu(struct vcpu_svm *svm) @@ -7357,6 +7368,63 @@ static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) return ret; } +static int sev_resize_page_enc_bitmap(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long new_size) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + unsigned long *map; + unsigned long sz; + + if (sev->page_enc_bmap_size >= new_size) + return 0; + + sz = ALIGN(new_size, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8; + + map = vmalloc(sz); + if (!map) { + pr_err_once("Failed to allocate decrypted bitmap size %lx\n", sz); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + /* mark the page encrypted (by default) */ + memset(map, 0xff, sz); + + bitmap_copy(map, sev->page_enc_bmap, sev->page_enc_bmap_size); + kvfree(sev->page_enc_bmap); + + sev->page_enc_bmap = map; + sev->page_enc_bmap_size = new_size; + + return 0; +} + +static int svm_page_enc_status_hc(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long gpa, + unsigned long npages, unsigned long enc) +{ + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info; + gfn_t gfn_start, gfn_end; + int ret; + + if (!npages) + return 0; + + gfn_start = gpa_to_gfn(gpa); + gfn_end = gfn_start + npages; + + mutex_lock(&kvm->lock); + ret = sev_resize_page_enc_bitmap(kvm, gfn_end); + if (ret) + goto unlock; + + if (enc) + __bitmap_set(sev->page_enc_bmap, gfn_start, gfn_end - gfn_start); + else + __bitmap_clear(sev->page_enc_bmap, gfn_start, gfn_end - gfn_start); + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock); + return ret; +} + static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp) { struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd; @@ -7698,6 +7766,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = { .nested_get_evmcs_version = nested_get_evmcs_version, .need_emulation_on_page_fault = svm_need_emulation_on_page_fault, + + .page_enc_status_hc = svm_page_enc_status_hc }; static int __init svm_init(void) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index d98eac371c0a..78f8a93fc6dd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -7724,6 +7724,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __ro_after_init = { .get_vmcs12_pages = NULL, .nested_enable_evmcs = NULL, .need_emulation_on_page_fault = vmx_need_emulation_on_page_fault, + .page_enc_status_hc = NULL, }; static void vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush(void) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 63bb1ee8258e..6baf48ec0ed4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -7219,6 +7219,11 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) case KVM_HC_SEND_IPI: ret = kvm_pv_send_ipi(vcpu->kvm, a0, a1, a2, a3, op_64_bit); break; + case KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS: + ret = -KVM_ENOSYS; + if (kvm_x86_ops->page_enc_status_hc) + ret = kvm_x86_ops->page_enc_status_hc(vcpu->kvm, a0, a1, a2); + break; default: ret = -KVM_ENOSYS; break; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h index 6c0ce49931e5..3dc9e579f4f9 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #define KVM_HC_MIPS_CONSOLE_OUTPUT 8 #define KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING 9 #define KVM_HC_SEND_IPI 10 +#define KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS 11 /* * hypercalls use architecture specific
This hypercall is used by the SEV guest to notify a change in the page encryption status to the hypervisor. The hypercall should be invoked only when the encryption attribute is changed from encrypted -> decrypted and vice versa. By default all guest pages are considered encrypted. Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> --- Documentation/virtual/kvm/hypercalls.txt | 14 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 5 ++ include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 93 insertions(+)