From patchwork Thu Jul 18 19:43:53 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Matthew Garrett X-Patchwork-Id: 11049521 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4F3AE13AC for ; Thu, 18 Jul 2019 19:46:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3F43428179 for ; Thu, 18 Jul 2019 19:46:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 3392B2883B; Thu, 18 Jul 2019 19:46:38 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-14.5 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI,USER_IN_DEF_DKIM_WL autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D261128179 for ; Thu, 18 Jul 2019 19:46:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S2391587AbfGRTol (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Jul 2019 15:44:41 -0400 Received: from mail-pf1-f201.google.com ([209.85.210.201]:56047 "EHLO mail-pf1-f201.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S2391566AbfGRToh (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Jul 2019 15:44:37 -0400 Received: by mail-pf1-f201.google.com with SMTP id i26so17159518pfo.22 for ; Thu, 18 Jul 2019 12:44:37 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20161025; h=date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version:references:subject:from:to :cc; bh=Ze1m51/U9qyeKdYZTkURxXHO7/2Jq1vWiS2UsV2hr9c=; b=gJjhUT6gQ/zQNCY6elSDV6M1tQCeC0P5Tp4UAQyfBx3bH4p1ifDoKIdCUkhGhE/+gg 1BYrEJUjZpq1lci7thr1J+jRZPv78zvcXe0wmCNbM+HBWEYXopMbBeSzpPtfVoUzVLk3 pujXzLMr6fRScyxTI3Haqr4j2hTxpLfQ6HsQowNOgyplYLOfo3yUrKFDJokCeo5/2PKy FwUf46Shg+19/eA24HYXmwakU6FgvCH1rsx/twSxIE8e9p1SMqOpYC5sjsn8o8C0psq/ OjMiRQ74r0yKmCrXaugmRON5LDzCp9Ky2OgcvlOWQFtleomMDWsvtTmBy0Cz29VGfC9M iF0A== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:date:in-reply-to:message-id:mime-version :references:subject:from:to:cc; bh=Ze1m51/U9qyeKdYZTkURxXHO7/2Jq1vWiS2UsV2hr9c=; b=getRYpodNixf/hWDbzCu817qUvNQKJGOKAYhRYP26vPFOBXG6XujGB6Trk28GmOip4 ClO8zW4R1HsiA91kv64M8mcfAxu+zpEzx4NS526Z8L6UjWqsLKy0Un92sk6XP1FxoqaK vxSY746P6hgc2u/WG3/sCqvf9p5E6YP7aHf5c2VoVEjx6sCReBrHn3SzJukxGKCfIrda vJpYx0UXMjbdFS8DPI8F3h/wfY6JUK8or6N4qIKBpUAPALbjiY8U50YfrO77sV9M21K4 1T6y/s1qRExllvxMugbnlsWyyarlXIR2EbdBeWPHzzSFyTPTHe4dhbQjRH5wtWm5HscN E3mg== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAXscGEBtSMzdyQ+6EEcE59jUQ4jb7lVBiXynbK0+qrWs9n1KqVy UMFknsDlRiDFE/kDeiKWTf8NJunjO8vfQEHtnhH9DQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzrK8iF6hcgKRXBxAlD2H7TfZZ22Mkvge4q89mEFnRwAMWXxSRoqJN7TQmQtZur9PR4mpbHHV2qq0UGBlX+3fC93g== X-Received: by 2002:a63:1950:: with SMTP id 16mr49329324pgz.312.1563479076972; Thu, 18 Jul 2019 12:44:36 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2019 12:43:53 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20190718194415.108476-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> Message-Id: <20190718194415.108476-8-matthewgarrett@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20190718194415.108476-1-matthewgarrett@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog Subject: [PATCH V36 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot From: Matthew Garrett To: jmorris@namei.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Dave Young , David Howells , Matthew Garrett , Kees Cook , kexec@lists.infradead.org Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: Dave Young Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided by secure boot. Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original kernel. secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot. Signed-off-by: Dave Young Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett Reviewed-by: Kees Cook cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org --- arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c index 5ebcd02cbca7..d2f4e706a428 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c @@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr, if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP)) return 0; + params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot; ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature; ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab; ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;