[RFC,v2] mm: slub: print kernel addresses in slub debug messages
diff mbox series

Message ID 20190809010837.24166-1-miles.chen@mediatek.com
State New
Headers show
Series
  • [RFC,v2] mm: slub: print kernel addresses in slub debug messages
Related show

Commit Message

Miles Chen Aug. 9, 2019, 1:08 a.m. UTC
From: Miles Chen <miles.chen@mediatek.com>

This RFC patch is sent to discuss the printing address with %p issue.

Since commit ad67b74d2469d9b8 ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p"),
%p gives obfuscated addresses now. When CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y, it is still
useful to get real virtual addresses.

Possible approaches are:
1. stop printing kernel addresses
2. print with %pK,
3. print with %px.
4. do nothing

This patch takes %px approach and shows the output here.
(%px will causes checkpatch warnings, let us ignore the warning here to
have the discussion). Also, use DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET instead of
DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS.

Before this patch:

INFO: Slab 0x(____ptrval____) objects=25 used=10 fp=0x(____ptrval____)
INFO: Object 0x(____ptrval____) @offset=1408 fp=0x(____ptrval____)
Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5
Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
...
FIX kmalloc-128: Object at 0x(____ptrval____) not freed

After this patch:

INFO: Slab 0xffffffbf00f57000 objects=25 used=23 fp=0xffffffc03d5c3500
INFO: Object 0xffffffc03d5c3500 @offset=13568 fp=0xffffffc03d5c0800
Redzone 00000000: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Redzone 00000010: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Redzone 00000020: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Redzone 00000030: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Redzone 00000040: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Redzone 00000050: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Redzone 00000060: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Redzone 00000070: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Object 00000000: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
Object 00000010: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
Object 00000020: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
Object 00000030: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
Object 00000040: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
Object 00000050: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
Object 00000060: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
Object 00000070: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5
Redzone 00000000: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
Padding 00000000: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
Padding 00000010: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
Padding 00000020: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
Padding 00000030: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
...
FIX kmalloc-128: Object at 0xffffffc03d5c3500 not freed

Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Miles Chen <miles.chen@mediatek.com>
---
 mm/slub.c | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

Comments

Matthew Wilcox Aug. 9, 2019, 2:46 a.m. UTC | #1
On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 09:08:37AM +0800, miles.chen@mediatek.com wrote:
> Possible approaches are:
> 1. stop printing kernel addresses
> 2. print with %pK,
> 3. print with %px.

No.  The point of obscuring kernel addresses is that if the attacker manages to find a way to get the kernel to spit out some debug messages that we shouldn't
leak all this extra information.

> 4. do nothing

5. Find something more useful to print.

> INFO: Slab 0x(____ptrval____) objects=25 used=10 fp=0x(____ptrval____)

... you don't have any randomness on your platform?

> INFO: Object 0x(____ptrval____) @offset=1408 fp=0x(____ptrval____)
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5
> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
> Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
> Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
> Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
> ...
> FIX kmalloc-128: Object at 0x(____ptrval____) not freed

But if you have randomness, at least some of these "pointers" are valuable
because you can compare them against "pointers" printed by other parts
of the kernel.

> After this patch:
> 
> INFO: Slab 0xffffffbf00f57000 objects=25 used=23 fp=0xffffffc03d5c3500
> INFO: Object 0xffffffc03d5c3500 @offset=13568 fp=0xffffffc03d5c0800
> Redzone 00000000: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone 00000010: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone 00000020: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone 00000030: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone 00000040: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone 00000050: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone 00000060: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Redzone 00000070: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Object 00000000: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object 00000010: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object 00000020: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object 00000030: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object 00000040: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object 00000050: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object 00000060: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
> Object 00000070: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5
> Redzone 00000000: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
> Padding 00000000: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
> Padding 00000010: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
> Padding 00000020: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
> Padding 00000030: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
> ...
> FIX kmalloc-128: Object at 0xffffffc03d5c3500 not freed

It looks prettier, but I'm not convinced it's more useful.  Unless your
platform lacks randomness ...
Miles Chen Aug. 9, 2019, 2:11 p.m. UTC | #2
On Thu, 2019-08-08 at 19:46 -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 09:08:37AM +0800, miles.chen@mediatek.com wrote:
> > Possible approaches are:
> > 1. stop printing kernel addresses
> > 2. print with %pK,
> > 3. print with %px.
> 
> No.  The point of obscuring kernel addresses is that if the attacker manages to find a way to get the kernel to spit out some debug messages that we shouldn't
> leak all this extra information.

got it.
> 
> > 4. do nothing
> 
> 5. Find something more useful to print.

agree
> 
> > INFO: Slab 0x(____ptrval____) objects=25 used=10 fp=0x(____ptrval____)
> 
> ... you don't have any randomness on your platform?

We have randomized base on our platforms.

> But if you have randomness, at least some of these "pointers" are valuable
> because you can compare them against "pointers" printed by other parts
> of the kernel.

Understood. Keep current %p, do not leak kernel addresses.

I'll collect more cases and see if we really need some extra
information. (maybe the @offset in current message is enough)


thanks for your comments!
Matthew Wilcox Aug. 9, 2019, 2:26 p.m. UTC | #3
On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 10:11:58PM +0800, Miles Chen wrote:
> On Thu, 2019-08-08 at 19:46 -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> > On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 09:08:37AM +0800, miles.chen@mediatek.com wrote:
> > > INFO: Slab 0x(____ptrval____) objects=25 used=10 fp=0x(____ptrval____)
> > 
> > ... you don't have any randomness on your platform?
> 
> We have randomized base on our platforms.

Look at initialize_ptr_random().  If you have randomness, then you
get a siphash_1u32() of the address.  With no randomness, you get this
___ptrval___ string instead.
Miles Chen Aug. 12, 2019, 8:24 a.m. UTC | #4
On Fri, 2019-08-09 at 07:26 -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 10:11:58PM +0800, Miles Chen wrote:
> > On Thu, 2019-08-08 at 19:46 -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> > > On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 09:08:37AM +0800, miles.chen@mediatek.com wrote:
> > > > INFO: Slab 0x(____ptrval____) objects=25 used=10 fp=0x(____ptrval____)
> > > 
> > > ... you don't have any randomness on your platform?
> > 
> > We have randomized base on our platforms.
> 
> Look at initialize_ptr_random().  If you have randomness, then you
> get a siphash_1u32() of the address.  With no randomness, you get this
> ___ptrval___ string instead.
> 
You are right. There is no randomness in this platform. (I ran my test
code on Qemu with no randomness)


thanks again
Vlastimil Babka Aug. 12, 2019, 1:32 p.m. UTC | #5
On 8/9/19 4:46 AM, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 09, 2019 at 09:08:37AM +0800, miles.chen@mediatek.com wrote:
>> Possible approaches are:
>> 1. stop printing kernel addresses
>> 2. print with %pK,
>> 3. print with %px.
> 
> No.  The point of obscuring kernel addresses is that if the attacker manages to find a way to get the kernel to spit out some debug messages that we shouldn't
> leak all this extra information.

On the other hand, while CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y is common, the actual
checks and printing happens when the (relatively expensive) checks are
actually enabled during boot, i.e. during a debugging session, not
production defaults. I can see how knowing the exact address might be
useful when e.g. a crash dump is also taken. I would say %pK would be a
good fit, if kptr_restrict also had a setting that makes %pK behave like
%px (looks like it doesn't), so that setting would be enabled in such a
debugging session.

>> 4. do nothing
> 
> 5. Find something more useful to print.
> 
>> INFO: Slab 0x(____ptrval____) objects=25 used=10 fp=0x(____ptrval____)
> 
> ... you don't have any randomness on your platform?
> 
>> INFO: Object 0x(____ptrval____) @offset=1408 fp=0x(____ptrval____)
>> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
>> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
>> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
>> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
>> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
>> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
>> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
>> Object (____ptrval____): 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5
>> Redzone (____ptrval____): bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
>> Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
>> Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
>> Padding (____ptrval____): 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
>> ...
>> FIX kmalloc-128: Object at 0x(____ptrval____) not freed
> 
> But if you have randomness, at least some of these "pointers" are valuable
> because you can compare them against "pointers" printed by other parts
> of the kernel.
> 
>> After this patch:
>>
>> INFO: Slab 0xffffffbf00f57000 objects=25 used=23 fp=0xffffffc03d5c3500
>> INFO: Object 0xffffffc03d5c3500 @offset=13568 fp=0xffffffc03d5c0800
>> Redzone 00000000: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Redzone 00000010: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Redzone 00000020: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Redzone 00000030: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Redzone 00000040: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Redzone 00000050: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Redzone 00000060: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Redzone 00000070: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Object 00000000: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
>> Object 00000010: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
>> Object 00000020: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
>> Object 00000030: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
>> Object 00000040: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
>> Object 00000050: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
>> Object 00000060: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b
>> Object 00000070: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b a5
>> Redzone 00000000: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb
>> Padding 00000000: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
>> Padding 00000010: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
>> Padding 00000020: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
>> Padding 00000030: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a
>> ...
>> FIX kmalloc-128: Object at 0xffffffc03d5c3500 not freed
> 
> It looks prettier, but I'm not convinced it's more useful.  Unless your
> platform lacks randomness ...
>

Patch
diff mbox series

diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 8834563cdb4b..bc1fb8e81557 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@  static void print_section(char *level, char *text, u8 *addr,
 			  unsigned int length)
 {
 	metadata_access_enable();
-	print_hex_dump(level, text, DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1, addr,
+	print_hex_dump(level, text, DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 1, addr,
 			length, 1);
 	metadata_access_disable();
 }
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@  static void print_tracking(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
 
 static void print_page_info(struct page *page)
 {
-	pr_err("INFO: Slab 0x%p objects=%u used=%u fp=0x%p flags=0x%04lx\n",
+	pr_err("INFO: Slab 0x%px objects=%u used=%u fp=0x%px flags=0x%04lx\n",
 	       page, page->objects, page->inuse, page->freelist, page->flags);
 
 }
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@  static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
 
 	print_page_info(page);
 
-	pr_err("INFO: Object 0x%p @offset=%tu fp=0x%p\n\n",
+	pr_err("INFO: Object 0x%px @offset=%tu fp=0x%px\n\n",
 	       p, p - addr, get_freepointer(s, p));
 
 	if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE)
@@ -991,7 +991,7 @@  static void trace(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, void *object,
 								int alloc)
 {
 	if (s->flags & SLAB_TRACE) {
-		pr_info("TRACE %s %s 0x%p inuse=%d fp=0x%p\n",
+		pr_info("TRACE %s %s 0x%px inuse=%d fp=0x%p\n",
 			s->name,
 			alloc ? "alloc" : "free",
 			object, page->inuse,
@@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@  static noinline int free_debug_processing(
 	slab_unlock(page);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&n->list_lock, flags);
 	if (!ret)
-		slab_fix(s, "Object at 0x%p not freed", object);
+		slab_fix(s, "Object at 0x%px not freed", object);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -3693,7 +3693,7 @@  static void list_slab_objects(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
 	for_each_object(p, s, addr, page->objects) {
 
 		if (!test_bit(slab_index(p, s, addr), map)) {
-			pr_err("INFO: Object 0x%p @offset=%tu\n", p, p - addr);
+			pr_err("INFO: Object 0x%px @offset=%tu\n", p, p - addr);
 			print_tracking(s, p);
 		}
 	}