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client-ip=162.221.158.21; receiver=esa5.hc3370-68.iphmx.com; envelope-from="Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com"; x-sender="postmaster@mail.citrix.com"; x-conformance=sidf_compatible IronPort-SDR: oC3ACnvQxj9MpdBlFDf+kR9DfCICksYk88pYJpgzU8aldyMw21VUq04Z+j42GZVQVOvox7Kzu9 bjqutr3CD8S5GpLQJoRJP83gl0NmbE+ugEL5vhgztDie11IOZ7KVdLFTXfSgVmEK32j8Iu7nuk 6/vhQh5KDU2O1h8D2P8nP13uvHkkH/aNFH9j95VT73aMdl511a1NxGlP5q560m3RG9uJ/7QLcW 5VSVrzTkYeuKRw8dvD7axlygLQuEI+2GwStkYJDfEFoaR6w+/RfUeKEnWUxgFr93jEoyMWNAjU 0LI= X-SBRS: 2.7 X-MesageID: 5321569 X-Ironport-Server: esa5.hc3370-68.iphmx.com X-Remote-IP: 162.221.158.21 X-Policy: $RELAYED X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,467,1559534400"; d="scan'208";a="5321569" From: Andrew Cooper To: Xen-devel Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2019 18:57:08 +0100 Message-ID: <20190904175708.18853-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.11.0 In-Reply-To: <20190819182612.16706-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> References: <20190819182612.16706-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v3 2/2] x86/AMD: Fix handling of x87 exception pointers on Fam17h hardware X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Andrew Cooper , Wei Liu , Jan Beulich , =?utf-8?q?Roger_Pau_Monn=C3=A9?= Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Sender: "Xen-devel" AMD Pre-Fam17h CPUs "optimise" {F,}X{SAVE,RSTOR} by not saving/restoring FOP/FIP/FDP if an x87 exception isn't pending. This causes an information leak, CVE-2006-1056, and worked around by several OSes, including Xen. AMD Fam17h CPUs no longer have this leak, and advertise so in a CPUID bit. Introduce the RSTR_FP_ERR_PTRS feature, as specified by AMD, and expose to all guests by default. While adjusting libxl's cpuid table, add CLZERO which looks to have been omitted previously. Also introduce an X86_BUG bit to trigger the (F)XRSTOR workaround, and set it on AMD hardware where RSTR_FP_ERR_PTRS is not advertised. Optimise the conditions for the workaround paths. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich --- CC: Jan Beulich CC: Wei Liu CC: Roger Pau Monné v3: * Rename to X86_BUG_FPU_PTRS * Reinstate, contrary to personal opinion, the fsw/fcw checks. v2: * Use the AMD naming, not that I am convinced this is a sensible name to use. * Adjust the i387 codepaths as well as the xstate ones. * Add xen-cpuid/libxl data for the CPUID bit. --- tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c | 3 +++ tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c | 1 + xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c | 7 +++++++ xen/arch/x86/i387.c | 16 +++++++--------- xen/arch/x86/xstate.c | 7 +++---- xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h | 3 +++ xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++ xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h | 1 + 8 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c index f1c6ce2076..953a3bbd8c 100644 --- a/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c +++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c @@ -257,8 +257,11 @@ int libxl_cpuid_parse_config(libxl_cpuid_policy_list *cpuid, const char* str) {"invtsc", 0x80000007, NA, CPUID_REG_EDX, 8, 1}, + {"clzero", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 0, 1}, + {"rstr-fp-err-ptrs", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 2, 1}, {"wbnoinvd", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 9, 1}, {"ibpb", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 12, 1}, + {"nc", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_ECX, 0, 8}, {"apicidsize", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_ECX, 12, 4}, diff --git a/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c b/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c index be6a8d27a5..f51facffb6 100644 --- a/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c +++ b/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c @@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ static const char *const str_e7d[32] = static const char *const str_e8b[32] = { [ 0] = "clzero", + [ 2] = "rstr-fp-err-ptrs", /* [ 8] */ [ 9] = "wbnoinvd", diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c index a2f83c79a5..dc9ed55ba6 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c @@ -580,6 +580,13 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } /* + * Older AMD CPUs don't save/load FOP/FIP/FDP unless an FPU exception + * is pending. Xen works around this at (F)XRSTOR time. + */ + if ( !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RSTR_FP_ERR_PTRS) ) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_BUG_FPU_PTRS); + + /* * Attempt to set lfence to be Dispatch Serialising. This MSR almost * certainly isn't virtualised (and Xen at least will leak the real * value in but silently discard writes), as well as being per-core diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/i387.c b/xen/arch/x86/i387.c index 88178485cb..e4f0965eed 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/i387.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/i387.c @@ -43,20 +43,18 @@ static inline void fpu_fxrstor(struct vcpu *v) const typeof(v->arch.xsave_area->fpu_sse) *fpu_ctxt = v->arch.fpu_ctxt; /* - * AMD CPUs don't save/restore FDP/FIP/FOP unless an exception + * Some CPUs don't save/restore FDP/FIP/FOP unless an exception * is pending. Clear the x87 state here by setting it to fixed * values. The hypervisor data segment can be sometimes 0 and * sometimes new user value. Both should be ok. Use the FPU saved * data block as a safe address because it should be in L1. */ - if ( !(fpu_ctxt->fsw & ~fpu_ctxt->fcw & 0x003f) && - boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ) - { + if ( cpu_bug_fpu_ptrs && + !(fpu_ctxt->fsw & ~fpu_ctxt->fcw & 0x003f) ) asm volatile ( "fnclex\n\t" "ffree %%st(7)\n\t" /* clear stack tag */ "fildl %0" /* load to clear state */ : : "m" (*fpu_ctxt) ); - } /* * FXRSTOR can fault if passed a corrupted data block. We handle this @@ -169,11 +167,11 @@ static inline void fpu_fxsave(struct vcpu *v) : "=m" (*fpu_ctxt) : "R" (fpu_ctxt) ); /* - * AMD CPUs don't save/restore FDP/FIP/FOP unless an exception - * is pending. + * Some CPUs don't save/restore FDP/FIP/FOP unless an exception is + * pending. In this case, the restore side will arrange safe values, + * and there is no point trying to restore FCS/FDS in addition. */ - if ( !(fpu_ctxt->fsw & 0x0080) && - boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ) + if ( cpu_bug_fpu_ptrs && !(fpu_ctxt->fsw & 0x0080) ) return; /* diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c b/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c index 3293ef834f..10016a05d0 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/xstate.c @@ -369,15 +369,14 @@ void xrstor(struct vcpu *v, uint64_t mask) unsigned int faults, prev_faults; /* - * AMD CPUs don't save/restore FDP/FIP/FOP unless an exception + * Some CPUs don't save/restore FDP/FIP/FOP unless an exception * is pending. Clear the x87 state here by setting it to fixed * values. The hypervisor data segment can be sometimes 0 and * sometimes new user value. Both should be ok. Use the FPU saved * data block as a safe address because it should be in L1. */ - if ( (mask & ptr->xsave_hdr.xstate_bv & X86_XCR0_FP) && - !(ptr->fpu_sse.fsw & ~ptr->fpu_sse.fcw & 0x003f) && - boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ) + if ( cpu_bug_fpu_ptrs && + !(ptr->fpu_sse.fsw & ~ptr->fpu_sse.fcw & 0x003f) ) asm volatile ( "fnclex\n\t" /* clear exceptions */ "ffree %%st(7)\n\t" /* clear stack tag */ "fildl %0" /* load to clear state */ diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h index 7e1ff17ad4..00d22caac7 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeature.h @@ -138,6 +138,9 @@ #define cpu_has_msr_tsc_aux (cpu_has_rdtscp || cpu_has_rdpid) +/* Bugs. */ +#define cpu_bug_fpu_ptrs boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_FPU_PTRS) + enum _cache_type { CACHE_TYPE_NULL = 0, CACHE_TYPE_DATA = 1, diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h index ab3650f73b..91eccf5161 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h @@ -43,5 +43,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_IDLE, X86_SYNTH(25)) /* VERW used by Xen for idle */ #define X86_NR_BUG 1 #define X86_BUG(x) ((FSCAPINTS + X86_NR_SYNTH) * 32 + (x)) +#define X86_BUG_FPU_PTRS X86_BUG( 0) /* (F)X{SAVE,RSTOR} doesn't save/restore FOP/FIP/FDP. */ + /* Total number of capability words, inc synth and bug words. */ #define NCAPINTS (FSCAPINTS + X86_NR_SYNTH + X86_NR_BUG) /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ diff --git a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h index f2ec470179..48d8d1f4e2 100644 --- a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h +++ b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h @@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(EFRO, 7*32+10) /* APERF/MPERF Read Only interface */ /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008.ebx, word 8 */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(CLZERO, 8*32+ 0) /*A CLZERO instruction */ +XEN_CPUFEATURE(RSTR_FP_ERR_PTRS, 8*32+ 2) /*A (F)X{SAVE,RSTOR} always saves/restores FPU Error pointers */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(WBNOINVD, 8*32+ 9) /* WBNOINVD instruction */ XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBPB, 8*32+12) /*A IBPB support only (no IBRS, used by AMD) */