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Authentication-Results: esa2.hc3370-68.iphmx.com; dkim=none (message not signed) header.i=none; spf=None smtp.pra=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com; spf=Pass smtp.mailfrom=Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com; spf=None smtp.helo=postmaster@mail.citrix.com Received-SPF: None (esa2.hc3370-68.iphmx.com: no sender authenticity information available from domain of andrew.cooper3@citrix.com) identity=pra; client-ip=162.221.158.21; receiver=esa2.hc3370-68.iphmx.com; envelope-from="Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com"; x-sender="andrew.cooper3@citrix.com"; x-conformance=sidf_compatible Received-SPF: Pass (esa2.hc3370-68.iphmx.com: domain of Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com designates 162.221.158.21 as permitted sender) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=162.221.158.21; receiver=esa2.hc3370-68.iphmx.com; envelope-from="Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com"; x-sender="Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com"; x-conformance=sidf_compatible; x-record-type="v=spf1"; x-record-text="v=spf1 ip4:209.167.231.154 ip4:178.63.86.133 ip4:195.66.111.40/30 ip4:85.115.9.32/28 ip4:199.102.83.4 ip4:192.28.146.160 ip4:192.28.146.107 ip4:216.52.6.88 ip4:216.52.6.188 ip4:162.221.158.21 ip4:162.221.156.83 ~all" Received-SPF: None (esa2.hc3370-68.iphmx.com: no sender authenticity information available from domain of postmaster@mail.citrix.com) identity=helo; client-ip=162.221.158.21; receiver=esa2.hc3370-68.iphmx.com; envelope-from="Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com"; x-sender="postmaster@mail.citrix.com"; x-conformance=sidf_compatible IronPort-SDR: 3WF5f3IlZDLHGpkjaR7RMetW4HrMeXAnygIYs2ngfocPAsSOIS3Goj7Epnr7V1jlJYcZPBDCDB Hw/wzb87qzVILfynjnjRJQaV3UmqsaICQD0awVJ/4EsukRd4tgnWqBV+uVC/WKMtnq+YHFes4R legQUtK/iLBJzFLCoAe1zw+ZuX4Sqmx0U3X/x8cGZkoXedSzS/3ndKn5RtL6RNsT8fKxa2Gz3l Z3HH88t6gaAxkYnJsr9dqMNQtI4H2P6S/nLsVy/jcxB1p1goFmFNnZmeZD4amCwUMful6OP4cQ hPk= X-SBRS: 2.7 X-MesageID: 5553062 X-Ironport-Server: esa2.hc3370-68.iphmx.com X-Remote-IP: 162.221.158.21 X-Policy: $RELAYED X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,501,1559534400"; d="scan'208";a="5553062" From: Andrew Cooper To: Xen-devel Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2019 20:27:57 +0100 Message-ID: <20190913192759.10795-9-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.11.0 In-Reply-To: <20190913192759.10795-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> References: <20190913192759.10795-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 08/10] tools/libxc: Rework xc_cpuid_apply_policy() to use {get, set}_cpu_policy() X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Andrew Cooper , Ian Jackson , Wei Liu , Jan Beulich , =?utf-8?q?Roger_Pau_Monn=C3=A9?= Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Sender: "Xen-devel" The purpose of this change is to stop using xc_cpuid_do_domctl(), and to stop basing decisions on a local CPUID instruction. This is not a correct or appropriate way to construct policy information for other domains. The overwhelming majority of this logic is redundant with the policy logic in Xen, but has a habit of becoming stale (e.g. c/s 97e4ebdcd76 resulting in the CPUID.7[1].eax not being offered to guests even when Xen is happy with the content). There are a few subtle side effects which need to remain in place. A successful call to xc_cpuid_apply_policy() must result in a call to xc_set_domain_cpu_policy() because that is currently the only way the ITSC/VMX/SVM bits become reflected in the guests CPUID view. Future cleanup will remove this side effect. The topology tweaks are local to libxc. Extend struct cpuid_policy with enough named fields to express the logic, but keep it identical to before. Fixing topology representation is another future area of work. No (expected) change in behaviour. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Acked-by: Wei Liu --- CC: Jan Beulich CC: Wei Liu CC: Roger Pau Monné CC: Ian Jackson The repositioning of xc_cpuid_apply_policy() relative to xc_cpuid_set() is simply to make the diff readable. It is completely illegible otherwise. v2: * Reword the commit message to drop AVX512_BF16 * Initialise host_featureset[] just in case. --- tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c | 798 ++++++++++------------------------------ xen/include/xen/lib/x86/cpuid.h | 11 +- 2 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 612 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c b/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c index 77f96a4ea6..8e93a60978 100644 --- a/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c +++ b/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c @@ -34,18 +34,13 @@ enum { #include -#include -#include +#include #define bitmaskof(idx) (1u << ((idx) & 31)) #define featureword_of(idx) ((idx) >> 5) #define clear_feature(idx, dst) ((dst) &= ~bitmaskof(idx)) #define set_feature(idx, dst) ((dst) |= bitmaskof(idx)) -#define DEF_MAX_BASE 0x0000000du -#define DEF_MAX_INTELEXT 0x80000008u -#define DEF_MAX_AMDEXT 0x8000001cu - int xc_get_cpu_levelling_caps(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t *caps) { DECLARE_SYSCTL; @@ -275,609 +270,6 @@ int xc_set_domain_cpu_policy(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, return ret; } -struct cpuid_domain_info -{ - unsigned int vendor; /* X86_VENDOR_* */ - - bool hvm; - uint64_t xfeature_mask; - - /* - * Careful with featureset lengths. - * - * Code in this file requires featureset to have at least - * xc_get_cpu_featureset_size() entries. This is a libxc compiletime - * constant. - * - * The featureset length used by the hypervisor may be different. If the - * hypervisor version is longer, XEN_SYSCTL_get_cpu_featureset will fail - * with -ENOBUFS, and libxc really does need rebuilding. If the - * hypervisor version is shorter, it is safe to zero-extend. - */ - uint32_t *featureset; - unsigned int nr_features; - - /* PV-only information. */ - bool pv64; - - /* HVM-only information. */ - bool pae; - bool nestedhvm; -}; - -static void cpuid(const unsigned int *input, unsigned int *regs) -{ - unsigned int count = (input[1] == XEN_CPUID_INPUT_UNUSED) ? 0 : input[1]; -#ifdef __i386__ - /* Use the stack to avoid reg constraint failures with some gcc flags */ - asm ( - "push %%ebx; push %%edx\n\t" - "cpuid\n\t" - "mov %%ebx,4(%4)\n\t" - "mov %%edx,12(%4)\n\t" - "pop %%edx; pop %%ebx\n\t" - : "=a" (regs[0]), "=c" (regs[2]) - : "0" (input[0]), "1" (count), "S" (regs) - : "memory" ); -#else - asm ( - "cpuid" - : "=a" (regs[0]), "=b" (regs[1]), "=c" (regs[2]), "=d" (regs[3]) - : "0" (input[0]), "2" (count) ); -#endif -} - -static int get_cpuid_domain_info(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, - struct cpuid_domain_info *info, - const uint32_t *featureset, - unsigned int nr_features) -{ - struct xen_domctl domctl = {}; - xc_dominfo_t di; - unsigned int in[2] = { 0, ~0U }, regs[4]; - unsigned int i, host_nr_features = xc_get_cpu_featureset_size(); - int rc; - - cpuid(in, regs); - info->vendor = x86_cpuid_lookup_vendor(regs[1], regs[2], regs[3]); - - if ( xc_domain_getinfo(xch, domid, 1, &di) != 1 || - di.domid != domid ) - return -ESRCH; - - info->hvm = di.hvm; - - info->featureset = calloc(host_nr_features, sizeof(*info->featureset)); - if ( !info->featureset ) - return -ENOMEM; - - info->nr_features = host_nr_features; - - if ( featureset ) - { - /* - * The user supplied featureset may be shorter or longer than - * host_nr_features. Shorter is fine, and we will zero-extend. - * Longer is fine, so long as it only padded with zeros. - */ - unsigned int fslen = min(host_nr_features, nr_features); - - memcpy(info->featureset, featureset, - fslen * sizeof(*info->featureset)); - - /* Check for truncated set bits. */ - for ( i = fslen; i < nr_features; ++i ) - if ( featureset[i] != 0 ) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - } - else - { - rc = xc_get_cpu_featureset(xch, (info->hvm - ? XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_featureset_hvm - : XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_featureset_pv), - &host_nr_features, info->featureset); - if ( rc ) - return -errno; - } - - /* Get xstate information. */ - domctl.cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_getvcpuextstate; - domctl.domain = domid; - rc = do_domctl(xch, &domctl); - if ( rc ) - return -errno; - - info->xfeature_mask = domctl.u.vcpuextstate.xfeature_mask; - - if ( di.hvm ) - { - uint64_t val; - - rc = xc_hvm_param_get(xch, domid, HVM_PARAM_PAE_ENABLED, &val); - if ( rc ) - return -errno; - - info->pae = !!val; - - rc = xc_hvm_param_get(xch, domid, HVM_PARAM_NESTEDHVM, &val); - if ( rc ) - return -errno; - - info->nestedhvm = !!val; - } - else - { - unsigned int width; - - rc = xc_domain_get_guest_width(xch, domid, &width); - if ( rc ) - return -errno; - - info->pv64 = (width == 8); - } - - return 0; -} - -static void free_cpuid_domain_info(struct cpuid_domain_info *info) -{ - free(info->featureset); -} - -static void amd_xc_cpuid_policy(const struct cpuid_domain_info *info, - const unsigned int *input, unsigned int *regs) -{ - switch ( input[0] ) - { - case 0x00000002: - case 0x00000004: - regs[0] = regs[1] = regs[2] = 0; - break; - - case 0x80000000: - if ( regs[0] > DEF_MAX_AMDEXT ) - regs[0] = DEF_MAX_AMDEXT; - break; - - case 0x80000008: - /* - * ECX[15:12] is ApicIdCoreSize: ECX[7:0] is NumberOfCores (minus one). - * Update to reflect vLAPIC_ID = vCPU_ID * 2. - */ - regs[2] = ((regs[2] + (1u << 12)) & 0xf000u) | - ((regs[2] & 0xffu) << 1) | 1u; - break; - - case 0x8000000a: { - if ( !info->nestedhvm ) - { - regs[0] = regs[1] = regs[2] = regs[3] = 0; - break; - } - -#define SVM_FEATURE_NPT 0x00000001 /* Nested page table support */ -#define SVM_FEATURE_LBRV 0x00000002 /* LBR virtualization support */ -#define SVM_FEATURE_SVML 0x00000004 /* SVM locking MSR support */ -#define SVM_FEATURE_NRIPS 0x00000008 /* Next RIP save on VMEXIT */ -#define SVM_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR 0x00000010 /* TSC ratio MSR support */ -#define SVM_FEATURE_VMCBCLEAN 0x00000020 /* VMCB clean bits support */ -#define SVM_FEATURE_FLUSHBYASID 0x00000040 /* TLB flush by ASID support */ -#define SVM_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS 0x00000080 /* Decode assists support */ -#define SVM_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER 0x00000400 /* Pause intercept filter */ - - /* Pass 1: Only passthrough SVM features which are - * available in hw and which are implemented - */ - regs[3] &= (SVM_FEATURE_NPT | SVM_FEATURE_LBRV | \ - SVM_FEATURE_NRIPS | SVM_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER | \ - SVM_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS); - - /* Pass 2: Always enable SVM features which are emulated */ - regs[3] |= SVM_FEATURE_VMCBCLEAN | SVM_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR; - break; - } - - } -} - -static void intel_xc_cpuid_policy(const struct cpuid_domain_info *info, - const unsigned int *input, unsigned int *regs) -{ - switch ( input[0] ) - { - case 0x00000004: - /* - * EAX[31:26] is Maximum Cores Per Package (minus one). - * Update to reflect vLAPIC_ID = vCPU_ID * 2. - */ - regs[0] = (((regs[0] & 0x7c000000u) << 1) | 0x04000000u | - (regs[0] & 0x3ffu)); - regs[3] &= 0x3ffu; - break; - - case 0x80000000: - if ( regs[0] > DEF_MAX_INTELEXT ) - regs[0] = DEF_MAX_INTELEXT; - break; - - case 0x80000005: - regs[0] = regs[1] = regs[2] = 0; - break; - - case 0x80000008: - /* Mask AMD Number of Cores information. */ - regs[2] = 0; - break; - } -} - -static void xc_cpuid_hvm_policy(const struct cpuid_domain_info *info, - const unsigned int *input, unsigned int *regs) -{ - switch ( input[0] ) - { - case 0x00000000: - if ( regs[0] > DEF_MAX_BASE ) - regs[0] = DEF_MAX_BASE; - break; - - case 0x00000001: - /* - * EBX[23:16] is Maximum Logical Processors Per Package. - * Update to reflect vLAPIC_ID = vCPU_ID * 2. - */ - regs[1] = (regs[1] & 0x0000ffffu) | ((regs[1] & 0x007f0000u) << 1); - - regs[2] = info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_SSE3)]; - regs[3] = (info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_FPU)] | - bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_HTT)); - break; - - case 0x00000007: /* Intel-defined CPU features */ - if ( input[1] == 0 ) - { - regs[1] = info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)]; - regs[2] = info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_PREFETCHWT1)]; - regs[3] = info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW)]; - } - else - { - regs[1] = 0; - regs[2] = 0; - regs[3] = 0; - } - regs[0] = 0; - break; - - case 0x0000000d: /* Xen automatically calculates almost everything. */ - if ( input[1] == 1 ) - regs[0] = info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT)]; - else - regs[0] = 0; - regs[1] = regs[2] = regs[3] = 0; - break; - - case 0x80000000: - /* Passthrough to cpu vendor specific functions */ - break; - - case 0x80000001: - regs[2] = (info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_LAHF_LM)] & - ~bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_CMP_LEGACY)); - regs[3] = info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL)]; - break; - - case 0x80000007: - /* - * Keep only TSCInvariant. This may be cleared by the hypervisor - * depending on guest TSC and migration settings. - */ - regs[0] = regs[1] = regs[2] = 0; - regs[3] &= 1u<<8; - break; - - case 0x80000008: - regs[0] &= 0x0000ffffu; - regs[1] = info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_CLZERO)]; - /* regs[2] handled in the per-vendor logic. */ - regs[3] = 0; - break; - - case 0x00000002: /* Intel cache info (dumped by AMD policy) */ - case 0x00000004: /* Intel cache info (dumped by AMD policy) */ - case 0x0000000a: /* Architectural Performance Monitor Features */ - case 0x80000002: /* Processor name string */ - case 0x80000003: /* ... continued */ - case 0x80000004: /* ... continued */ - case 0x80000005: /* AMD L1 cache/TLB info (dumped by Intel policy) */ - case 0x80000006: /* AMD L2/3 cache/TLB info ; Intel L2 cache features */ - case 0x8000000a: /* AMD SVM feature bits */ - case 0x80000019: /* AMD 1G TLB */ - case 0x8000001a: /* AMD perf hints */ - case 0x8000001c: /* AMD lightweight profiling */ - break; - - default: - regs[0] = regs[1] = regs[2] = regs[3] = 0; - break; - } - - if ( info->vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON) ) - amd_xc_cpuid_policy(info, input, regs); - else - intel_xc_cpuid_policy(info, input, regs); -} - -static void xc_cpuid_pv_policy(const struct cpuid_domain_info *info, - const unsigned int *input, unsigned int *regs) -{ - switch ( input[0] ) - { - case 0x00000000: - if ( regs[0] > DEF_MAX_BASE ) - regs[0] = DEF_MAX_BASE; - break; - - case 0x00000001: - { - /* Host topology exposed to PV guest. Provide host value. */ - bool host_htt = regs[3] & bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_HTT); - - /* - * Don't pick host's Initial APIC ID which can change from run - * to run. - */ - regs[1] &= 0x00ffffffu; - - regs[2] = info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_SSE3)]; - regs[3] = (info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_FPU)] & - ~bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_HTT)); - - if ( host_htt ) - regs[3] |= bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_HTT); - break; - } - - case 0x00000007: - if ( input[1] == 0 ) - { - regs[1] = info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)]; - regs[2] = info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_PREFETCHWT1)]; - regs[3] = info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW)]; - } - else - { - regs[1] = 0; - regs[2] = 0; - regs[3] = 0; - } - regs[0] = 0; - break; - - case 0x0000000d: /* Xen automatically calculates almost everything. */ - if ( input[1] == 1 ) - regs[0] = info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT)]; - else - regs[0] = 0; - regs[1] = regs[2] = regs[3] = 0; - break; - - case 0x80000000: - { - unsigned int max = (info->vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) - ? DEF_MAX_AMDEXT : DEF_MAX_INTELEXT; - - if ( regs[0] > max ) - regs[0] = max; - break; - } - - case 0x80000001: - { - /* Host topology exposed to PV guest. Provide host CMP_LEGACY value. */ - bool host_cmp_legacy = regs[2] & bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_CMP_LEGACY); - - regs[2] = (info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_LAHF_LM)] & - ~bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_CMP_LEGACY)); - regs[3] = info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL)]; - - if ( host_cmp_legacy ) - regs[2] |= bitmaskof(X86_FEATURE_CMP_LEGACY); - - break; - } - - case 0x80000008: - regs[0] &= 0x0000ffffu; - regs[1] = info->featureset[featureword_of(X86_FEATURE_CLZERO)]; - regs[2] = regs[3] = 0; - break; - - case 0x00000005: /* MONITOR/MWAIT */ - case 0x0000000b: /* Extended Topology Enumeration */ - case 0x8000000a: /* SVM revision and features */ - case 0x8000001b: /* Instruction Based Sampling */ - case 0x8000001c: /* Light Weight Profiling */ - case 0x8000001e: /* Extended topology reporting */ - regs[0] = regs[1] = regs[2] = regs[3] = 0; - break; - } -} - -static void xc_cpuid_policy(const struct cpuid_domain_info *info, - const unsigned int *input, unsigned int *regs) -{ - /* - * For hypervisor leaves (0x4000XXXX) only 0x4000xx00.EAX[7:0] bits (max - * number of leaves) can be set by user. Hypervisor will enforce this so - * all other bits are don't-care and we can set them to zero. - */ - if ( (input[0] & 0xffff0000) == 0x40000000 ) - { - regs[0] = regs[1] = regs[2] = regs[3] = 0; - return; - } - - if ( info->hvm ) - xc_cpuid_hvm_policy(info, input, regs); - else - xc_cpuid_pv_policy(info, input, regs); -} - -static int xc_cpuid_do_domctl( - xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, - const unsigned int *input, const unsigned int *regs) -{ - DECLARE_DOMCTL; - - memset(&domctl, 0, sizeof (domctl)); - domctl.domain = domid; - domctl.cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_set_cpuid; - domctl.u.cpuid.input[0] = input[0]; - domctl.u.cpuid.input[1] = input[1]; - domctl.u.cpuid.eax = regs[0]; - domctl.u.cpuid.ebx = regs[1]; - domctl.u.cpuid.ecx = regs[2]; - domctl.u.cpuid.edx = regs[3]; - - return do_domctl(xch, &domctl); -} - -static void sanitise_featureset(struct cpuid_domain_info *info) -{ - const uint32_t fs_size = xc_get_cpu_featureset_size(); - uint32_t disabled_features[fs_size]; - static const uint32_t deep_features[] = INIT_DEEP_FEATURES; - unsigned int i, b; - - if ( info->hvm ) - { - /* HVM or PVH Guest */ - - if ( !info->pae ) - clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PAE, info->featureset); - - if ( !info->nestedhvm ) - { - clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_SVM, info->featureset); - clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_VMX, info->featureset); - } - } - else - { - /* PV Guest */ - - if ( !info->pv64 ) - { - clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_LM, info->featureset); - if ( !(info->vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) ) - clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL, info->featureset); - } - - clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PSE, info->featureset); - clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PSE36, info->featureset); - clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PGE, info->featureset); - clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_PAGE1GB, info->featureset); - } - - if ( info->xfeature_mask == 0 ) - clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, info->featureset); - - /* Disable deep dependencies of disabled features. */ - for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(disabled_features); ++i ) - disabled_features[i] = ~info->featureset[i] & deep_features[i]; - - for ( b = 0; b < sizeof(disabled_features) * CHAR_BIT; ++b ) - { - const uint32_t *dfs; - - if ( !test_bit(b, disabled_features) || - !(dfs = x86_cpuid_lookup_deep_deps(b)) ) - continue; - - for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(disabled_features); ++i ) - { - info->featureset[i] &= ~dfs[i]; - disabled_features[i] &= ~dfs[i]; - } - } -} - -int xc_cpuid_apply_policy(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, - const uint32_t *featureset, unsigned int nr_features) -{ - struct cpuid_domain_info info = {}; - unsigned int input[2] = { 0, 0 }, regs[4]; - unsigned int base_max, ext_max; - int rc; - - rc = get_cpuid_domain_info(xch, domid, &info, featureset, nr_features); - if ( rc ) - goto out; - - cpuid(input, regs); - base_max = (regs[0] <= DEF_MAX_BASE) ? regs[0] : DEF_MAX_BASE; - input[0] = 0x80000000; - cpuid(input, regs); - - if ( info.vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD || info.vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON ) - ext_max = (regs[0] <= DEF_MAX_AMDEXT) ? regs[0] : DEF_MAX_AMDEXT; - else - ext_max = (regs[0] <= DEF_MAX_INTELEXT) ? regs[0] : DEF_MAX_INTELEXT; - - sanitise_featureset(&info); - - input[0] = 0; - input[1] = XEN_CPUID_INPUT_UNUSED; - for ( ; ; ) - { - cpuid(input, regs); - xc_cpuid_policy(&info, input, regs); - - if ( regs[0] || regs[1] || regs[2] || regs[3] ) - { - rc = xc_cpuid_do_domctl(xch, domid, input, regs); - if ( rc ) - goto out; - } - - /* Intel cache descriptor leaves. */ - if ( input[0] == 4 ) - { - input[1]++; - /* More to do? Then loop keeping %%eax==0x00000004. */ - if ( (regs[0] & 0x1f) != 0 ) - continue; - } - /* Extended Topology leaves. */ - else if ( input[0] == 0xb ) - { - uint8_t level_type = regs[2] >> 8; - - input[1]++; - if ( level_type >= 1 && level_type <= 2 ) - continue; - } - - input[0]++; - if ( !(input[0] & 0x80000000u) && (input[0] > base_max ) ) - input[0] = 0x80000000u; - - input[1] = XEN_CPUID_INPUT_UNUSED; - if ( (input[0] == 4) || (input[0] == 7) || (input[0] == 0xb) ) - input[1] = 0; - else if ( input[0] == 0xd ) - input[1] = 1; /* Xen automatically calculates almost everything. */ - - if ( (input[0] & 0x80000000u) && (input[0] > ext_max) ) - break; - } - - out: - free_cpuid_domain_info(&info); - return rc; -} - /* * Configure a single input with the informatiom from config. * @@ -1054,3 +446,191 @@ int xc_cpuid_set( return rc; } + +int xc_cpuid_apply_policy(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, + const uint32_t *featureset, unsigned int nr_features) +{ + int rc; + xc_dominfo_t di; + unsigned int i, nr_leaves, nr_msrs; + xen_cpuid_leaf_t *leaves = NULL; + struct cpuid_policy *p = NULL; + uint32_t err_leaf = -1, err_subleaf = -1, err_msr = -1; + + if ( xc_domain_getinfo(xch, domid, 1, &di) != 1 || + di.domid != domid ) + { + ERROR("Failed to obtain d%d info", domid); + rc = -ESRCH; + goto out; + } + + rc = xc_get_cpu_policy_size(xch, &nr_leaves, &nr_msrs); + if ( rc ) + { + PERROR("Failed to obtain policy info size"); + rc = -errno; + goto out; + } + + rc = -ENOMEM; + if ( (leaves = calloc(nr_leaves, sizeof(*leaves))) == NULL || + (p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p))) == NULL ) + goto out; + + nr_msrs = 0; + rc = xc_get_domain_cpu_policy(xch, domid, &nr_leaves, leaves, + &nr_msrs, NULL); + if ( rc ) + { + PERROR("Failed to obtain d%d's policy", domid); + rc = -errno; + goto out; + } + + rc = x86_cpuid_copy_from_buffer(p, leaves, nr_leaves, + &err_leaf, &err_subleaf); + if ( rc ) + { + ERROR("Failed to deserialise CPUID (err leaf %#x, subleaf %#x) (%d = %s)", + err_leaf, err_subleaf, -rc, strerror(-rc)); + goto out; + } + + if ( featureset ) + { + uint32_t disabled_features[FEATURESET_NR_ENTRIES], + feat[FEATURESET_NR_ENTRIES] = {}; + static const uint32_t deep_features[] = INIT_DEEP_FEATURES; + unsigned int i, b; + + /* + * The user supplied featureset may be shorter or longer than + * FEATURESET_NR_ENTRIES. Shorter is fine, and we will zero-extend. + * Longer is fine, so long as it only padded with zeros. + */ + unsigned int user_len = min(FEATURESET_NR_ENTRIES + 0u, nr_features); + + /* Check for truncated set bits. */ + rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; + for ( i = user_len; i < nr_features; ++i ) + if ( featureset[i] != 0 ) + goto out; + + memcpy(feat, featureset, sizeof(*featureset) * user_len); + + /* Disable deep dependencies of disabled features. */ + for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(disabled_features); ++i ) + disabled_features[i] = ~feat[i] & deep_features[i]; + + for ( b = 0; b < sizeof(disabled_features) * CHAR_BIT; ++b ) + { + const uint32_t *dfs; + + if ( !test_bit(b, disabled_features) || + !(dfs = x86_cpuid_lookup_deep_deps(b)) ) + continue; + + for ( i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(disabled_features); ++i ) + { + feat[i] &= ~dfs[i]; + disabled_features[i] &= ~dfs[i]; + } + } + + cpuid_featureset_to_policy(feat, p); + } + + if ( !di.hvm ) + { + uint32_t host_featureset[FEATURESET_NR_ENTRIES] = {}; + uint32_t len = ARRAY_SIZE(host_featureset); + + rc = xc_get_cpu_featureset(xch, XEN_SYSCTL_cpu_featureset_host, + &len, host_featureset); + if ( rc ) + { + /* Tolerate "buffer too small", as we've got the bits we need. */ + if ( errno == ENOBUFS ) + rc = 0; + else + { + PERROR("Failed to obtain host featureset"); + rc = -errno; + goto out; + } + } + + /* + * On hardware without CPUID Faulting, PV guests see real topology. + * As a consequence, they also need to see the host htt/cmp fields. + */ + p->basic.htt = test_bit(X86_FEATURE_HTT, host_featureset); + p->extd.cmp_legacy = test_bit(X86_FEATURE_CMP_LEGACY, host_featureset); + } + else + { + /* + * Topology for HVM guests is entirely controlled by Xen. For now, we + * hardcode APIC_ID = vcpu_id * 2 to give the illusion of no SMT. + */ + p->basic.htt = true; + p->extd.cmp_legacy = false; + + p->basic.lppp *= 2; + + switch ( p->x86_vendor ) + { + case X86_VENDOR_INTEL: + for ( i = 0; (p->cache.subleaf[i].type && + i < ARRAY_SIZE(p->cache.raw)); ++i ) + { + p->cache.subleaf[i].cores_per_package = + (p->cache.subleaf[i].cores_per_package << 1) | 1; + p->cache.subleaf[i].threads_per_cache = 0; + } + break; + + case X86_VENDOR_AMD: + case X86_VENDOR_HYGON: + p->extd.nc = (p->extd.nc << 1) | 1; + p->extd.apic_id_size++; + break; + } + + /* + * These settings are necessary to cause earlier HVM_PARAM_NESTEDHVM / + * XEN_DOMCTL_disable_migrate settings to be reflected correctly in + * CPUID. Xen will discard these bits if configuration hasn't been + * set for the domain. + */ + p->extd.itsc = true; + p->basic.vmx = true; + p->extd.svm = true; + } + + rc = x86_cpuid_copy_to_buffer(p, leaves, &nr_leaves); + if ( rc ) + { + ERROR("Failed to serialise CPUID (%d = %s)", -rc, strerror(-rc)); + goto out; + } + + rc = xc_set_domain_cpu_policy(xch, domid, nr_leaves, leaves, 0, NULL, + &err_leaf, &err_subleaf, &err_msr); + if ( rc ) + { + PERROR("Failed to set d%d's policy (err leaf %#x, subleaf %#x, msr %#x)", + domid, err_leaf, err_subleaf, err_msr); + rc = -errno; + goto out; + } + + rc = 0; + +out: + free(p); + free(leaves); + + return rc; +} diff --git a/xen/include/xen/lib/x86/cpuid.h b/xen/include/xen/lib/x86/cpuid.h index 79840f99ce..331ef4f4f0 100644 --- a/xen/include/xen/lib/x86/cpuid.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/lib/x86/cpuid.h @@ -154,8 +154,12 @@ struct cpuid_policy union { struct cpuid_leaf raw[CPUID_GUEST_NR_CACHE]; struct cpuid_cache_leaf { - uint32_t type:5, - :27, :32, :32, :32; + uint32_t /* a */ type:5, level:3; + bool self_init:1, fully_assoc:1; + uint32_t :4, threads_per_cache:12, cores_per_package:6; + uint32_t /* b */ line_size:12, partitions:10, ways:10; + uint32_t /* c */ sets; + bool /* d */ wbinvd:1, inclusive:1, complex:1; } subleaf[CPUID_GUEST_NR_CACHE]; } cache; @@ -259,7 +263,8 @@ struct cpuid_policy uint32_t e8b; struct { DECL_BITFIELD(e8b); }; }; - uint32_t /* c */:32, /* d */:32; + uint32_t nc:8, :4, apic_id_size:4, :16; + uint32_t /* d */:32; }; } extd;