[GIT,PULL] Smack patches for v5.4 - retry
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Message ID 745ac819-f2ae-4525-1855-535daf783638@schaufler-ca.com
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  • [GIT,PULL] Smack patches for v5.4 - retry
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Pull-request

https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next.git tags/smack-for-5.4-rc1

Message

Casey Schaufler Sept. 23, 2019, 8:14 p.m. UTC
Hello Linus

Thank for the instruction. I think this is correct.
I have four patches for v5.4. Nothing is major. All but one are in
response to mechanically detected potential issues. The remaining
patch cleans up kernel-doc notations.


The following changes since commit 0ecfebd2b52404ae0c54a878c872bb93363ada36:

  Linux 5.2 (2019-07-07 15:41:56 -0700)

are available in the Git repository at:

  https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next.git tags/smack-for-5.4-rc1

for you to fetch changes up to e5bfad3d7acc5702f32aafeb388362994f4d7bd0:

  smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lock (2019-09-04 09:37:07 -0700)

----------------------------------------------------------------
I have four patches for v5.4. Nothing is major. All but one are in
response to mechanically detected potential issues. The remaining
patch cleans up kernel-doc notations.

----------------------------------------------------------------
Eric Biggers (1):
      smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lock

Jann Horn (1):
      Smack: Don't ignore other bprm->unsafe flags if LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set

Jia-Ju Bai (1):
      security: smack: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb()

luanshi (1):
      smack: fix some kernel-doc notations

 security/smack/smack_access.c |  6 +++---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c    | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

Comments

Linus Torvalds Sept. 23, 2019, 9:35 p.m. UTC | #1
On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 1:14 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>
> Thank for the instruction. I think this is correct.

Looks fine, pulled.

That said, when I look closer:

> Jia-Ju Bai (1):
>       security: smack: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb()

This one seems wrong.

Not seriously so, but the quoting the logic from the commit:

    In smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(), there is an if statement
    on line 3920 to check whether skb is NULL:

        if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)

    This check indicates skb can be NULL in some cases.

and the fact is, skb _cannot_ be NULL, because when you test the
security of receiving an skb, you by definition always have an skb.

There is one single place that calls security_sock_rcv_skb(), and it
very much has a real skb.

So instead of adding a _new_ test for skb being NULL, the old test for
a NULL skb should just have been removed. It really doesn't make any
sense to have a NULL skb in that path - if some memory allocation had
failed on the receive path, that just means that the receive is never
done, it doesn't mean that you'd test a NULL skb for security policy
violations.

Anyway, it's pulled, but I think somebody should have checked and
thought about the automated tool reports a bit more..

               Linus
Linus Torvalds Sept. 23, 2019, 9:38 p.m. UTC | #2
On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 2:35 PM Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 1:14 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> >
> > Thank for the instruction. I think this is correct.
>
> Looks fine, pulled.

Oh, btw, can you get more signatures on your pgp key? I actually care
more about having a key than having a key with lots of signatures (*),
but signatures and a chain of trust would be good too.

                   Linus

(*) To me, keys are more of a "yeah, I'm the same person that usually
sends these pull requests" than some kind of hard identity.