| Message ID | 20191014103632.17930-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | fix the missing underflow in memory operation function | expand |
On Mon, Oct 14, 2019 at 12:36 PM Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> wrote: > > KASAN missed detecting size is negative numbers in memset(), memcpy(), > and memmove(), it will cause out-of-bounds bug, so needs to be detected > by KASAN. > > If size is negative numbers, then it has three reasons to be > defined as heap-out-of-bounds bug type. > 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as > a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, > so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds. > 2) If KASAN has new bug type and user-space passes negative size, > then there are duplicate reports. So don't produce new bug type > in order to prevent duplicate reports by some systems (e.g. syzbot) > to report the same bug twice. > 3) When size is negative numbers, it may be passed from user-space. > So we always print heap-out-of-bounds in order to prevent that > kernel-space and user-space have the same bug but have duplicate > reports. > > KASAN report: > > BUG: KASAN: heap-out-of-bounds in kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0 > Read of size 18446744073709551608 at addr ffffff8069660904 by task cat/72 > > CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004ajb-00001-gdb8af2f372b2-dirty #1 > Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) > Call trace: > dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288 > show_stack+0x14/0x20 > dump_stack+0x10c/0x164 > print_address_description.isra.9+0x68/0x378 > __kasan_report+0x164/0x1a0 > kasan_report+0xc/0x18 > check_memory_region+0x174/0x1d0 > memmove+0x34/0x88 > kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0 > > [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341 > > Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> > Reported -by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> > Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> > --- > mm/kasan/common.c | 13 ++++++++----- > mm/kasan/generic.c | 5 +++++ > mm/kasan/generic_report.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ > mm/kasan/tags.c | 5 +++++ > mm/kasan/tags_report.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ > 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c > index 6814d6d6a023..6ef0abd27f06 100644 > --- a/mm/kasan/common.c > +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c > @@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_write); > #undef memset > void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len) > { > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_); > + if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_)) > + return NULL; > > return __memset(addr, c, len); > } > @@ -110,8 +111,9 @@ void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len) > #undef memmove > void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) > { > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_); > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_); > + if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) || > + !check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_)) > + return NULL; > > return __memmove(dest, src, len); > } > @@ -119,8 +121,9 @@ void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) > #undef memcpy > void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) > { > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_); > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_); > + if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) || > + !check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_)) > + return NULL; > > return __memcpy(dest, src, len); > } > diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c > index 616f9dd82d12..02148a317d27 100644 > --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c > +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c > @@ -173,6 +173,11 @@ static __always_inline bool check_memory_region_inline(unsigned long addr, > if (unlikely(size == 0)) > return true; > > + if (unlikely((long)size < 0)) { > + kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); > + return false; > + } > + > if (unlikely((void *)addr < > kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START))) { > kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); > diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c > index 36c645939bc9..52a92c7db697 100644 > --- a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c > +++ b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c > @@ -107,6 +107,24 @@ static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info) > > const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info) > { > + /* > + * If access_size is negative numbers, then it has three reasons > + * to be defined as heap-out-of-bounds bug type. > + * 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as > + * a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, > + * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds. > + * 2) If KASAN has new bug type and user-space passes negative size, > + * then there are duplicate reports. So don't produce new bug type > + * in order to prevent duplicate reports by some systems > + * (e.g. syzbot) to report the same bug twice. > + * 3) When size is negative numbers, it may be passed from user-space. > + * So we always print heap-out-of-bounds in order to prevent that > + * kernel-space and user-space have the same bug but have duplicate > + * reports. > + */ > + if ((long)info->access_size < 0) > + return "heap-out-of-bounds"; > + > if (addr_has_shadow(info->access_addr)) > return get_shadow_bug_type(info); > return get_wild_bug_type(info); > diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags.c b/mm/kasan/tags.c > index 0e987c9ca052..b829535a3ad7 100644 > --- a/mm/kasan/tags.c > +++ b/mm/kasan/tags.c > @@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, > if (unlikely(size == 0)) > return true; > > + if (unlikely((long)size < 0)) { > + kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); > + return false; > + } > + > tag = get_tag((const void *)addr); > > /* > diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c > index 969ae08f59d7..f7ae474aef3a 100644 > --- a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c > +++ b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c > @@ -36,6 +36,24 @@ > > const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info) > { > + /* > + * If access_size is negative numbers, then it has three reasons > + * to be defined as heap-out-of-bounds bug type. > + * 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as > + * a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, > + * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds. > + * 2) If KASAN has new bug type and user-space passes negative size, > + * then there are duplicate reports. So don't produce new bug type > + * in order to prevent duplicate reports by some systems > + * (e.g. syzbot) to report the same bug twice. > + * 3) When size is negative numbers, it may be passed from user-space. > + * So we always print heap-out-of-bounds in order to prevent that > + * kernel-space and user-space have the same bug but have duplicate > + * reports. > + */ > + if ((long)info->access_size < 0) > + return "heap-out-of-bounds"; > + > #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY > struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta; > struct kmem_cache *cache; > -- > 2.18.0 > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "kasan-dev" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to kasan-dev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/kasan-dev/20191014103632.17930-1-walter-zh.wu%40mediatek.com.
On Mon, Oct 14, 2019 at 06:36:32PM +0800, Walter Wu wrote: > @@ -110,8 +111,9 @@ void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len) > #undef memmove > void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) > { > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_); > - check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_); > + if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) || > + !check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_)) This indentation is wrong. Should be: + if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) || + !check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_)) (also in one subsequent function)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c index 6814d6d6a023..6ef0abd27f06 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/common.c +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c @@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_check_write); #undef memset void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len) { - check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_); + if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)addr, len, true, _RET_IP_)) + return NULL; return __memset(addr, c, len); } @@ -110,8 +111,9 @@ void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len) #undef memmove void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) { - check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_); - check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_); + if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) || + !check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_)) + return NULL; return __memmove(dest, src, len); } @@ -119,8 +121,9 @@ void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) #undef memcpy void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len) { - check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_); - check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_); + if (!check_memory_region((unsigned long)src, len, false, _RET_IP_) || + !check_memory_region((unsigned long)dest, len, true, _RET_IP_)) + return NULL; return __memcpy(dest, src, len); } diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c index 616f9dd82d12..02148a317d27 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c @@ -173,6 +173,11 @@ static __always_inline bool check_memory_region_inline(unsigned long addr, if (unlikely(size == 0)) return true; + if (unlikely((long)size < 0)) { + kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); + return false; + } + if (unlikely((void *)addr < kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START))) { kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c index 36c645939bc9..52a92c7db697 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/generic_report.c +++ b/mm/kasan/generic_report.c @@ -107,6 +107,24 @@ static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info) const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info) { + /* + * If access_size is negative numbers, then it has three reasons + * to be defined as heap-out-of-bounds bug type. + * 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as + * a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, + * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds. + * 2) If KASAN has new bug type and user-space passes negative size, + * then there are duplicate reports. So don't produce new bug type + * in order to prevent duplicate reports by some systems + * (e.g. syzbot) to report the same bug twice. + * 3) When size is negative numbers, it may be passed from user-space. + * So we always print heap-out-of-bounds in order to prevent that + * kernel-space and user-space have the same bug but have duplicate + * reports. + */ + if ((long)info->access_size < 0) + return "heap-out-of-bounds"; + if (addr_has_shadow(info->access_addr)) return get_shadow_bug_type(info); return get_wild_bug_type(info); diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags.c b/mm/kasan/tags.c index 0e987c9ca052..b829535a3ad7 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/tags.c +++ b/mm/kasan/tags.c @@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ bool check_memory_region(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool write, if (unlikely(size == 0)) return true; + if (unlikely((long)size < 0)) { + kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip); + return false; + } + tag = get_tag((const void *)addr); /* diff --git a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c index 969ae08f59d7..f7ae474aef3a 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/tags_report.c +++ b/mm/kasan/tags_report.c @@ -36,6 +36,24 @@ const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info) { + /* + * If access_size is negative numbers, then it has three reasons + * to be defined as heap-out-of-bounds bug type. + * 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as + * a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, + * so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds. + * 2) If KASAN has new bug type and user-space passes negative size, + * then there are duplicate reports. So don't produce new bug type + * in order to prevent duplicate reports by some systems + * (e.g. syzbot) to report the same bug twice. + * 3) When size is negative numbers, it may be passed from user-space. + * So we always print heap-out-of-bounds in order to prevent that + * kernel-space and user-space have the same bug but have duplicate + * reports. + */ + if ((long)info->access_size < 0) + return "heap-out-of-bounds"; + #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta; struct kmem_cache *cache;
KASAN missed detecting size is negative numbers in memset(), memcpy(), and memmove(), it will cause out-of-bounds bug, so needs to be detected by KASAN. If size is negative numbers, then it has three reasons to be defined as heap-out-of-bounds bug type. 1) Casting negative numbers to size_t would indeed turn up as a large size_t and its value will be larger than ULONG_MAX/2, so that this can qualify as out-of-bounds. 2) If KASAN has new bug type and user-space passes negative size, then there are duplicate reports. So don't produce new bug type in order to prevent duplicate reports by some systems (e.g. syzbot) to report the same bug twice. 3) When size is negative numbers, it may be passed from user-space. So we always print heap-out-of-bounds in order to prevent that kernel-space and user-space have the same bug but have duplicate reports. KASAN report: BUG: KASAN: heap-out-of-bounds in kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0 Read of size 18446744073709551608 at addr ffffff8069660904 by task cat/72 CPU: 2 PID: 72 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.4.0-rc1-next-20191004ajb-00001-gdb8af2f372b2-dirty #1 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x288 show_stack+0x14/0x20 dump_stack+0x10c/0x164 print_address_description.isra.9+0x68/0x378 __kasan_report+0x164/0x1a0 kasan_report+0xc/0x18 check_memory_region+0x174/0x1d0 memmove+0x34/0x88 kmalloc_memmove_invalid_size+0x70/0xa0 [1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199341 Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Reported -by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> --- mm/kasan/common.c | 13 ++++++++----- mm/kasan/generic.c | 5 +++++ mm/kasan/generic_report.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ mm/kasan/tags.c | 5 +++++ mm/kasan/tags_report.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)