diff mbox series

[v3] selinux: sidtab: reverse lookup hash table

Message ID 20191105134217.132137-1-jeffv@google.com (mailing list archive)
State Superseded
Headers show
Series [v3] selinux: sidtab: reverse lookup hash table | expand

Commit Message

Jeffrey Vander Stoep Nov. 5, 2019, 1:42 p.m. UTC
This replaces the reverse table lookup and reverse cache with a
hashtable which improves cache-miss reverese-lookup times from
O(n) to O(1)* and maintains the same performance as a reverse
cache hit.

This reduces the time needed to add a new sidtab entry from ~500us
to 5us on a Pixel 3 when there are ~10,000 sidtab entries.

The implementation uses the kernel's generic hashtable API,
It uses the context's string represtation as the hash source,
and the kernels generic string hashing algorithm full_name_hash()
to reduce the string to a 32 bit value.

This change also maintains the improvement introduced in commit
ee1a84fd which removed the need to keep the current sidtab locked
during policy reload. It does however introduce periodic locking of
the target sidtab while converting the hashtable. Sidtab entries
are never modified or removed, so the context struct stored in the
sid_to_context tree can also be used for the context_to_sid
hashtable to reduce memory usage.

This bug was reported by:
- Stephen Smally on the selinux bug tracker.
  BUG: kernel softlockup due to too many SIDs/contexts #37
  https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/37
- Jovana Knezevic on Android's bugtracker.
  Bug: 140252993
  "During multi-user performance testing, we create and remove users
  many times. selinux_android_restorecon_pkgdir goes from 1ms to over
  20ms after about 200 user creations and removals. Accumulated over
  ~280 packages, that adds a significant time to user creation,
  making perf benchmarks unreliable."

* Hashtable lookup is only O(1) when n < the number of buckets.

Changes in V2:
-The hashtable uses sidtab_entry_leaf objects directly so these
objects are shared between the sid_to_context lookup tree and the
context_to_sid hashtable. This simplifies memory allocation and
was suggested by Ondrej Mosnacek.
-The new sidtab hash stats file in selinuxfs has been moved out of
the avc dir and into a new "ss" dir.

V3:
-Move the hash_add() and count increment to after an smp_wmb()
statement to enforce that prior objects have been written before
becoming available for lookups.
-Add lock nesting notation.

Change-Id: I9b498100c94f05222c54e24f53eba76468f360fd
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reported-by: Jovana Knezevic <jovanak@google.com>
---
 security/selinux/Kconfig            |  12 ++
 security/selinux/include/security.h |   1 +
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        |  64 +++++++
 security/selinux/ss/context.h       |  11 +-
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c      |   5 +
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |  87 +++++++---
 security/selinux/ss/services.h      |   4 +-
 security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c        | 249 +++++++++++++---------------
 security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h        |  16 +-
 9 files changed, 287 insertions(+), 162 deletions(-)

Comments

Stephen Smalley Nov. 5, 2019, 5:52 p.m. UTC | #1
On 11/5/19 8:42 AM, Jeff Vander Stoep wrote:
> This replaces the reverse table lookup and reverse cache with a
> hashtable which improves cache-miss reverese-lookup times from

reverse

> O(n) to O(1)* and maintains the same performance as a reverse
> cache hit.
> 
> This reduces the time needed to add a new sidtab entry from ~500us
> to 5us on a Pixel 3 when there are ~10,000 sidtab entries.
> 
> The implementation uses the kernel's generic hashtable API,
> It uses the context's string represtation as the hash source,
> and the kernels generic string hashing algorithm full_name_hash()
> to reduce the string to a 32 bit value.
> 
> This change also maintains the improvement introduced in commit
> ee1a84fd which removed the need to keep the current sidtab locked

Preferred style is "commit <12+ chars of sha1> ("title line")"; 
checkpatch.pl would have caught it except for the line break between 
commit and the hash I think.  ala
commit ee1a84fdfeed ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve 
performance")
This ensures that the commit is unambiguously identified and the reader 
gets an idea of what it is without having to go look.

> during policy reload. It does however introduce periodic locking of
> the target sidtab while converting the hashtable. Sidtab entries
> are never modified or removed, so the context struct stored in the
> sid_to_context tree can also be used for the context_to_sid
> hashtable to reduce memory usage.
> 
> This bug was reported by:
> - Stephen Smally on the selinux bug tracker.

Smalley (although I don't think I'm the original reporter, came from a 
mailing list email IIRC)

<snip>
> V3:
> -Move the hash_add() and count increment to after an smp_wmb()
> statement to enforce that prior objects have been written before
> becoming available for lookups.

smp_wmb() is SMP-conditional; wmb() is mandatory per 
memory-barriers.txt. I thought we needed wmb() for the old sidtab hash 
table update to avoid reordering even on the UP case.  And I think 
memory-barriers.txt recommends pairing every write barrier with a 
corresponding read barrier for the reader code, which my code lacked 
(since memory-barriers.txt didn't exist at the time and I was just 
following the guidance from other docs), so presumably you want/need that.

> -Add lock nesting notation.

Is it truly needed locking nesting or can we get rid of it as suggested 
by Ondrej?

Patch wouldn't apply for me (on selinux/next); not sure why but some 
comments below.

> 
> Change-Id: I9b498100c94f05222c54e24f53eba76468f360fd

Don't include AOSP Change-Ids in upstream patches.

<snip>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
> index 8af7a690eb40..5494379e1ac7 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
> @@ -99,3 +99,15 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE
>   	  via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy.
>   
>   	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0.
> +
> +config SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS
> +	int "NSA SELinux sidtab hashtable size"
> +	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
> +	range 8 13
> +	default 9
> +	help
> +	  This option sets the number of buckets used in the sitab hashtable

sidtab

> +	  to 2^SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS buckets. The number of hash
> +	  collisions may be viewed at /selinux/ss/sidtab_hash_stats. If chain

Since Linux 3.0, selinuxfs is mounted on /sys/fs/selinux rather than 
/selinux so it would be /sys/fs/selinux/ss/sidtab_hash_stats.  The other 
config option help texts are out of date but don't worry about those in 
this patch.

> +	  lengths are high (e.g. > 20) than selecting a higher value here will
> +	  ensure that lookups times are fast and stable.
<snip>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> index 7eff19c41bcb..4bb4ff027042 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
<snip>
> @@ -1576,6 +1602,7 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
>   		{ "cache_threshold",
>   		  &sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR },
>   		{ "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
> +		{ "sidtab_hash_stats", &sel_sidtab_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },

Still awaiting a verdict from Paul on whether we should conform to 
checkpatch.pl warning on symbolic modes or stick with them for 
consistency until such a time as we convert them en masse?

>   #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
>   		{ "cache_stats", &sel_avc_cache_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
>   #endif
> @@ -1601,6 +1628,35 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
>   	return 0;
>   }
>   
> +static int sel_make_ss_files(struct dentry *dir)
> +{
> +	struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb;
> +	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
> +	int i;
> +	static struct tree_descr files[] = {
> +		{ "sidtab_hash_stats", &sel_sidtab_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
> +	};
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(files); i++) {
> +		struct inode *inode;
> +		struct dentry *dentry;
> +
> +		dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, files[i].name);
> +		if (!dentry)
> +			return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +		inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|files[i].mode);
> +		if (!inode)

dput(dentry); here (got fixed elsewhere recently IIRC).

> +			return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +		inode->i_fop = files[i].ops;
> +		inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
> +		d_add(dentry, inode);
> +	}
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>   static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
>   				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
>   {
<snip>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> index 62e6a53f4ac9..9578fb3e994f 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
<snip>
> @@ -1433,6 +1446,7 @@ static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
>   	rc = -EINVAL;
>   	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
>   		goto out;
> +
>   	rc = 0;
>   out:
>   	if (rc)

Avoid unrelated whitespace changes

> @@ -1440,6 +1454,42 @@ static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
>   	return rc;
>   }
>   
> +int context_add_hash(struct policydb *policydb,
> +		     struct context *context)
> +{
> +	int rc;
> +	char *str;
> +	int len;
> +
> +	if (context->str) {
> +		context->hash = context_compute_hash(context->str);
> +	} else {
> +		rc = context_struct_to_string(policydb, context,
> +					      &str, &len);
> +		if (rc)
> +			return rc;
> +		context->hash = context_compute_hash(str);
> +		kfree(str);
> +	}

I'm guessing that KCSAN is going to complain about this and other 
existing cases in our code that rely on atomic load/store of 
naturally-aligned word-sized values.  At some point we'll probably need 
to convert them all to using READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE or similar constructs 
when we do this outside of a spinlock or write lock (as here).  Offhand, 
this may only be a problem for the cases where we are passing in a 
context structure that is part of the active policydb, as in 
security_port_sid() and other callers, since it is then a shared 
structure that could be visible to other threads.  Same issue already 
exists however for the sid field there so not really new.

> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
<snip>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> index 9d156d5156da..2267878da626 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
> @@ -16,26 +16,37 @@
>   #include "security.h"
>   #include "sidtab.h"
>   
> +#define index_to_sid(index) (index + SECINITSID_NUM + 1)
> +#define sid_to_index(sid) (sid - (SECINITSID_NUM + 1))
> +
>   int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
>   {
>   	u32 i;
>   
>   	memset(s->roots, 0, sizeof(s->roots));
>   
> -	/* max count is SIDTAB_MAX so valid index is always < SIDTAB_MAX */
> -	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE; i++)
> -		s->rcache[i] = SIDTAB_MAX;
> -
>   	for (i = 0; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++)
>   		s->isids[i].set = 0;
>   
>   	s->count = 0;
>   	s->convert = NULL;
> +	hash_init(s->context_to_sid);
>   
>   	spin_lock_init(&s->lock);
>   	return 0;
>   }
>   
> +static u32 context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context)
> +{
> +	struct sidtab_entry_leaf *entry;
> +

I think we need a read barrier or ACQUIRE operation of some kind here or 
in the callers to ensure that the hash is in a good state.

> +	hash_for_each_possible(s->context_to_sid, entry, list, context->hash) {
> +		if (context_cmp(&entry->context, context))
> +			return entry->sid;
> +	}
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>   int sidtab_set_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
>   {
>   	struct sidtab_isid_entry *entry;
<snip>
> @@ -304,29 +274,35 @@ static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
>   		rc = -ENOMEM;
>   		dst_convert = sidtab_do_lookup(convert->target, count, 1);
>   		if (!dst_convert) {
> -			context_destroy(dst);
> +			context_destroy(&dst->context);
>   			goto out_unlock;
>   		}
>   
> -		rc = convert->func(context, dst_convert, convert->args);
> +		rc = convert->func(context, &dst_convert->context,
> +				convert->args);
>   		if (rc) {
> -			context_destroy(dst);
> +			context_destroy(&dst->context);
>   			goto out_unlock;
>   		}
> +		dst_convert->sid = index_to_sid(count);
>   
>   		/* at this point we know the insert won't fail */
> +		spin_lock_irqsave(&convert->target->lock, flags);
>   		convert->target->count = count + 1;
> +		hash_add(convert->target->context_to_sid,
> +			 &dst_convert->list, dst_convert->context.hash);
> +		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&convert->target->lock, flags);

As Ondrej asked, do we need to take this lock?

>   	}
>   
>   	if (context->len)
>   		pr_info("SELinux:  Context %s is not valid (left unmapped).\n",
>   			context->str);
>   
> -	sidtab_rcache_push(s, count);
> -	*index = count;
> +	*sid = index_to_sid(count);
>   
> -	/* write entries before writing new count */
> +	/* Write entries before updating count and inserting into hashtable. */
>   	smp_store_release(&s->count, count + 1);
> +	hash_add(s->context_to_sid, &dst->list, dst->context.hash);

I think we need a separate acquire/release or write/read barrier pairing 
for the reverse hash table that is independent of the one for the 
forward table.

>   
>   	rc = 0;
>   out_unlock:
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index 8af7a690eb40..5494379e1ac7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -99,3 +99,15 @@  config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE
 	  via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy.
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0.
+
+config SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS
+	int "NSA SELinux sidtab hashtable size"
+	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
+	range 8 13
+	default 9
+	help
+	  This option sets the number of buckets used in the sitab hashtable
+	  to 2^SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS buckets. The number of hash
+	  collisions may be viewed at /selinux/ss/sidtab_hash_stats. If chain
+	  lengths are high (e.g. > 20) than selecting a higher value here will
+	  ensure that lookups times are fast and stable.
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 5c83f56144d2..69833cea69a8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -365,5 +365,6 @@  extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
 extern void avtab_cache_init(void);
 extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void);
 extern void hashtab_cache_init(void);
+extern int security_sidtab_hash_stats(struct selinux_state *state, char *page);
 
 #endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 7eff19c41bcb..4bb4ff027042 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1486,6 +1486,32 @@  static ssize_t sel_read_avc_hash_stats(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 	return length;
 }
 
+static ssize_t sel_read_sidtab_hash_stats(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+					size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
+	char *page;
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	length = security_sidtab_hash_stats(state, page);
+	if (length >= 0)
+		length = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page,
+						length);
+	free_page((unsigned long)page);
+
+	return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_sidtab_hash_stats_ops = {
+	.read		= sel_read_sidtab_hash_stats,
+	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
 static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops = {
 	.read		= sel_read_avc_cache_threshold,
 	.write		= sel_write_avc_cache_threshold,
@@ -1576,6 +1602,7 @@  static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
 		{ "cache_threshold",
 		  &sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR },
 		{ "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
+		{ "sidtab_hash_stats", &sel_sidtab_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
 		{ "cache_stats", &sel_avc_cache_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
 #endif
@@ -1601,6 +1628,35 @@  static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int sel_make_ss_files(struct dentry *dir)
+{
+	struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb;
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+	int i;
+	static struct tree_descr files[] = {
+		{ "sidtab_hash_stats", &sel_sidtab_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
+	};
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(files); i++) {
+		struct inode *inode;
+		struct dentry *dentry;
+
+		dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, files[i].name);
+		if (!dentry)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|files[i].mode);
+		if (!inode)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		inode->i_fop = files[i].ops;
+		inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
+		d_add(dentry, inode);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
@@ -1955,6 +2011,14 @@  static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	}
 
 	ret = sel_make_avc_files(dentry);
+
+	dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "ss", &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_ss_files(dentry);
 	if (ret)
 		goto err;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
index 212e3479a0d9..80db6c7627a1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@  struct context {
 	u32 len;        /* length of string in bytes */
 	struct mls_range range;
 	char *str;	/* string representation if context cannot be mapped. */
+	u32 hash;	/* a hash of the string representation */
 };
 
 static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c)
@@ -135,12 +136,13 @@  static inline int context_cpy(struct context *dst, struct context *src)
 		kfree(dst->str);
 		return rc;
 	}
+	dst->hash = src->hash;
 	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline void context_destroy(struct context *c)
 {
-	c->user = c->role = c->type = 0;
+	c->user = c->role = c->type = c->hash = 0;
 	kfree(c->str);
 	c->str = NULL;
 	c->len = 0;
@@ -149,6 +151,8 @@  static inline void context_destroy(struct context *c)
 
 static inline int context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
 {
+	if (c1->hash && c2->hash && (c1->hash != c2->hash))
+		return 0;
 	if (c1->len && c2->len)
 		return (c1->len == c2->len && !strcmp(c1->str, c2->str));
 	if (c1->len || c2->len)
@@ -159,5 +163,10 @@  static inline int context_cmp(struct context *c1, struct context *c2)
 		mls_context_cmp(c1, c2));
 }
 
+static inline unsigned int context_compute_hash(const char *s)
+{
+	return full_name_hash(NULL, s, strlen(s));
+}
+
 #endif	/* _SS_CONTEXT_H_ */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 8eb89d1cb09e..6f692a4f0253 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -920,6 +920,11 @@  int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
 			sidtab_destroy(s);
 			goto out;
 		}
+		rc = context_add_hash(p, &c->context[0]);
+		if (rc) {
+			sidtab_destroy(s);
+			goto out;
+		}
 
 		rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, c->sid[0], &c->context[0]);
 		if (rc) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 62e6a53f4ac9..9578fb3e994f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1272,6 +1272,17 @@  static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *p,
 
 #include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
 
+int security_sidtab_hash_stats(struct selinux_state *state, char *page)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	rc = sidtab_hash_stats(state->ss->sidtab, page);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
 const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
 {
 	if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
@@ -1375,6 +1386,8 @@  static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
 	int rc = 0;
 
 	context_init(ctx);
+	/* hash the string before it gets mutated */
+	ctx->hash = context_compute_hash(scontext);
 
 	/* Parse the security context. */
 
@@ -1433,6 +1446,7 @@  static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
 	rc = -EINVAL;
 	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
 		goto out;
+
 	rc = 0;
 out:
 	if (rc)
@@ -1440,6 +1454,42 @@  static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
 	return rc;
 }
 
+int context_add_hash(struct policydb *policydb,
+		     struct context *context)
+{
+	int rc;
+	char *str;
+	int len;
+
+	if (context->str) {
+		context->hash = context_compute_hash(context->str);
+	} else {
+		rc = context_struct_to_string(policydb, context,
+					      &str, &len);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+		context->hash = context_compute_hash(str);
+		kfree(str);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int context_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			  struct context *context, u32 *sid)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+
+	if (!context->hash) {
+		rc = context_add_hash(policydb, context);
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	return sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, context, sid);
+}
+
 static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state,
 					const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 					u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
@@ -1492,7 +1542,7 @@  static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state,
 		str = NULL;
 	} else if (rc)
 		goto out_unlock;
-	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &context, sid);
+	rc = context_to_sid(state, &context, sid);
 	context_destroy(&context);
 out_unlock:
 	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
@@ -1793,7 +1843,7 @@  static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
 			goto out_unlock;
 	}
 	/* Obtain the sid for the context. */
-	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
+	rc = context_to_sid(state, &newcontext, out_sid);
 out_unlock:
 	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	context_destroy(&newcontext);
@@ -2021,6 +2071,10 @@  static int convert_context(struct context *oldc, struct context *newc, void *p)
 			goto bad;
 	}
 
+	rc = context_add_hash(args->newp, newc);
+	if (rc)
+		goto bad;
+
 	return 0;
 bad:
 	/* Map old representation to string and save it. */
@@ -2268,9 +2322,7 @@  int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
-						   &c->context[0],
-						   &c->sid[0]);
+			rc = context_to_sid(state, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
 		}
@@ -2311,14 +2363,10 @@  int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
-						  &c->context[0],
-						  &c->sid[0]);
+			rc = context_to_sid(state, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
-						   &c->context[1],
-						   &c->sid[1]);
+			rc = context_to_sid(state, &c->context[1], &c->sid[1]);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
 		}
@@ -2407,9 +2455,7 @@  int security_node_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
-						   &c->context[0],
-						   &c->sid[0]);
+			rc = context_to_sid(state, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
 		}
@@ -2496,7 +2542,7 @@  int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state,
 						 &usercon))
 				continue;
 
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
+			rc = context_to_sid(state, &usercon, &sid);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out_unlock;
 			if (mynel < maxnel) {
@@ -2567,7 +2613,6 @@  static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
 				       u32 *sid)
 {
 	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
-	struct sidtab *sidtab = state->ss->sidtab;
 	int len;
 	u16 sclass;
 	struct genfs *genfs;
@@ -2602,7 +2647,7 @@  static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
 		goto out;
 
 	if (!c->sid[0]) {
-		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
+		rc = context_to_sid(state, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 	}
@@ -2665,8 +2710,7 @@  int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)
 	if (c) {
 		sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0],
-						   &c->sid[0]);
+			rc = context_to_sid(state, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
 		}
@@ -2908,8 +2952,7 @@  int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state,
 			goto out_unlock;
 		}
 	}
-
-	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
+	rc = context_to_sid(state, &newcon, new_sid);
 out_unlock:
 	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	context_destroy(&newcon);
@@ -3497,7 +3540,7 @@  int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
 		if (!mls_context_isvalid(policydb, &ctx_new))
 			goto out_free;
 
-		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
+		rc = context_to_sid(state, &ctx_new, sid);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
index f27c68a482bb..7ba391e81b81 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ 
 #define _SS_SERVICES_H_
 
 #include "policydb.h"
-#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "context.h"
 
 /* Mapping for a single class */
 struct selinux_mapping {
@@ -38,4 +38,6 @@  void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms,
 void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
 					struct avtab_node *node);
 
+int context_add_hash(struct policydb *policydb, struct context *context);
+
 #endif	/* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
index 9d156d5156da..2267878da626 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -16,26 +16,37 @@ 
 #include "security.h"
 #include "sidtab.h"
 
+#define index_to_sid(index) (index + SECINITSID_NUM + 1)
+#define sid_to_index(sid) (sid - (SECINITSID_NUM + 1))
+
 int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
 {
 	u32 i;
 
 	memset(s->roots, 0, sizeof(s->roots));
 
-	/* max count is SIDTAB_MAX so valid index is always < SIDTAB_MAX */
-	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE; i++)
-		s->rcache[i] = SIDTAB_MAX;
-
 	for (i = 0; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++)
 		s->isids[i].set = 0;
 
 	s->count = 0;
 	s->convert = NULL;
+	hash_init(s->context_to_sid);
 
 	spin_lock_init(&s->lock);
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static u32 context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context)
+{
+	struct sidtab_entry_leaf *entry;
+
+	hash_for_each_possible(s->context_to_sid, entry, list, context->hash) {
+		if (context_cmp(&entry->context, context))
+			return entry->sid;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int sidtab_set_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
 {
 	struct sidtab_isid_entry *entry;
@@ -46,14 +57,58 @@  int sidtab_set_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
 
 	entry = &s->isids[sid - 1];
 
-	rc = context_cpy(&entry->context, context);
+	rc = context_cpy(&entry->leaf.context, context);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
 	entry->set = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Multiple initial sids may map to the same context. Check that this
+	 * context is not already represented in the context_to_sid hashtable
+	 * to avoid duplicate entries and long linked lists upon hash
+	 * collision.
+	 */
+	if (!context_to_sid(s, context)) {
+		entry->leaf.sid = sid;
+		hash_add(s->context_to_sid, &entry->leaf.list, context->hash);
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int sidtab_hash_stats(struct sidtab *sidtab, char *page)
+{
+	int i;
+	int chain_len = 0;
+	int slots_used = 0;
+	int entries = 0;
+	int max_chain_len = 0;
+	int cur_bucket = 0;
+	struct sidtab_entry_leaf *entry;
+
+
+	hash_for_each(sidtab->context_to_sid, i, entry, list) {
+		entries++;
+		if (i == cur_bucket) {
+			chain_len++;
+			if (chain_len == 1)
+				slots_used++;
+		} else {
+			cur_bucket = i;
+			if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+				max_chain_len = chain_len;
+			chain_len = 0;
+		}
+	}
+	if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+		max_chain_len = chain_len;
+	return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "context_to_sid:  %d entries and "
+			 "%d/%d buckets used, longest chain length %d\n",
+			 entries, slots_used, SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS,
+			 max_chain_len);
+}
+
 static u32 sidtab_level_from_count(u32 count)
 {
 	u32 capacity = SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES;
@@ -87,7 +142,8 @@  static int sidtab_alloc_roots(struct sidtab *s, u32 level)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static struct context *sidtab_do_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index, int alloc)
+static struct sidtab_entry_leaf *sidtab_do_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index,
+						  int alloc)
 {
 	union sidtab_entry_inner *entry;
 	u32 level, capacity_shift, leaf_index = index / SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES;
@@ -124,7 +180,7 @@  static struct context *sidtab_do_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index, int alloc)
 		if (!entry->ptr_leaf)
 			return NULL;
 	}
-	return &entry->ptr_leaf->entries[index % SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES].context;
+	return &entry->ptr_leaf->entries[index % SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES];
 }
 
 static struct context *sidtab_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index)
@@ -135,12 +191,12 @@  static struct context *sidtab_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index)
 	if (index >= count)
 		return NULL;
 
-	return sidtab_do_lookup(s, index, 0);
+	return &sidtab_do_lookup(s, index, 0)->context;
 }
 
 static struct context *sidtab_lookup_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
 {
-	return s->isids[sid - 1].set ? &s->isids[sid - 1].context : NULL;
+	return s->isids[sid - 1].set ? &s->isids[sid - 1].leaf.context : NULL;
 }
 
 static struct context *sidtab_search_core(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, int force)
@@ -149,7 +205,7 @@  static struct context *sidtab_search_core(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, int force)
 
 	if (sid != 0) {
 		if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
-			context = sidtab_lookup(s, sid - (SECINITSID_NUM + 1));
+			context = sidtab_lookup(s, sid_to_index(sid));
 		else
 			context = sidtab_lookup_initial(s, sid);
 		if (context && (!context->len || force))
@@ -169,117 +225,29 @@  struct context *sidtab_search_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
 	return sidtab_search_core(s, sid, 1);
 }
 
-static int sidtab_find_context(union sidtab_entry_inner entry,
-			       u32 *pos, u32 count, u32 level,
-			       struct context *context, u32 *index)
-{
-	int rc;
-	u32 i;
-
-	if (level != 0) {
-		struct sidtab_node_inner *node = entry.ptr_inner;
-
-		i = 0;
-		while (i < SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES && *pos < count) {
-			rc = sidtab_find_context(node->entries[i],
-						 pos, count, level - 1,
-						 context, index);
-			if (rc == 0)
-				return 0;
-			i++;
-		}
-	} else {
-		struct sidtab_node_leaf *node = entry.ptr_leaf;
-
-		i = 0;
-		while (i < SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES && *pos < count) {
-			if (context_cmp(&node->entries[i].context, context)) {
-				*index = *pos;
-				return 0;
-			}
-			(*pos)++;
-			i++;
-		}
-	}
-	return -ENOENT;
-}
-
-static void sidtab_rcache_update(struct sidtab *s, u32 index, u32 pos)
-{
-	while (pos > 0) {
-		WRITE_ONCE(s->rcache[pos], READ_ONCE(s->rcache[pos - 1]));
-		--pos;
-	}
-	WRITE_ONCE(s->rcache[0], index);
-}
-
-static void sidtab_rcache_push(struct sidtab *s, u32 index)
-{
-	sidtab_rcache_update(s, index, SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE - 1);
-}
-
-static int sidtab_rcache_search(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
-				u32 *index)
-{
-	u32 i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE; i++) {
-		u32 v = READ_ONCE(s->rcache[i]);
-
-		if (v >= SIDTAB_MAX)
-			continue;
-
-		if (context_cmp(sidtab_do_lookup(s, v, 0), context)) {
-			sidtab_rcache_update(s, v, i);
-			*index = v;
-			return 0;
-		}
-	}
-	return -ENOENT;
-}
-
-static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
-				 u32 *index)
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
+			  u32 *sid)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
-	u32 count, count_locked, level, pos;
+	u32 count;
 	struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;
-	struct context *dst, *dst_convert;
+	struct sidtab_entry_leaf *dst, *dst_convert;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = sidtab_rcache_search(s, context, index);
-	if (rc == 0)
+	*sid = context_to_sid(s, context);
+	if (*sid)
 		return 0;
 
-	/* read entries only after reading count */
-	count = smp_load_acquire(&s->count);
-	level = sidtab_level_from_count(count);
-
-	pos = 0;
-	rc = sidtab_find_context(s->roots[level], &pos, count, level,
-				 context, index);
-	if (rc == 0) {
-		sidtab_rcache_push(s, *index);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	/* lock-free search failed: lock, re-search, and insert if not found */
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
 
+	rc = 0;
+	*sid = context_to_sid(s, context);
+	if (*sid)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
 	convert = s->convert;
-	count_locked = s->count;
-	level = sidtab_level_from_count(count_locked);
-
-	/* if count has changed before we acquired the lock, then catch up */
-	while (count < count_locked) {
-		if (context_cmp(sidtab_do_lookup(s, count, 0), context)) {
-			sidtab_rcache_push(s, count);
-			*index = count;
-			rc = 0;
-			goto out_unlock;
-		}
-		++count;
-	}
+	count = s->count;
 
 	/* bail out if we already reached max entries */
 	rc = -EOVERFLOW;
@@ -292,7 +260,9 @@  static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
 	if (!dst)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
-	rc = context_cpy(dst, context);
+	dst->sid = index_to_sid(count);
+
+	rc = context_cpy(&dst->context, context);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
@@ -304,29 +274,35 @@  static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		dst_convert = sidtab_do_lookup(convert->target, count, 1);
 		if (!dst_convert) {
-			context_destroy(dst);
+			context_destroy(&dst->context);
 			goto out_unlock;
 		}
 
-		rc = convert->func(context, dst_convert, convert->args);
+		rc = convert->func(context, &dst_convert->context,
+				convert->args);
 		if (rc) {
-			context_destroy(dst);
+			context_destroy(&dst->context);
 			goto out_unlock;
 		}
+		dst_convert->sid = index_to_sid(count);
 
 		/* at this point we know the insert won't fail */
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&convert->target->lock, flags);
 		convert->target->count = count + 1;
+		hash_add(convert->target->context_to_sid,
+			 &dst_convert->list, dst_convert->context.hash);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&convert->target->lock, flags);
 	}
 
 	if (context->len)
 		pr_info("SELinux:  Context %s is not valid (left unmapped).\n",
 			context->str);
 
-	sidtab_rcache_push(s, count);
-	*index = count;
+	*sid = index_to_sid(count);
 
-	/* write entries before writing new count */
+	/* Write entries before updating count and inserting into hashtable. */
 	smp_store_release(&s->count, count + 1);
+	hash_add(s->context_to_sid, &dst->list, dst->context.hash);
 
 	rc = 0;
 out_unlock:
@@ -334,25 +310,22 @@  static int sidtab_reverse_lookup(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid)
+static void sidtab_convert_hashtable(struct sidtab *s, u32 count)
 {
-	int rc;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	struct sidtab_entry_leaf *entry;
 	u32 i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
-		struct sidtab_isid_entry *entry = &s->isids[i];
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		entry = sidtab_do_lookup(s, i, 0);
+		entry->sid = index_to_sid(i);
 
-		if (entry->set && context_cmp(context, &entry->context)) {
-			*sid = i + 1;
-			return 0;
-		}
-	}
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+		hash_add(s->context_to_sid, &entry->list, entry->context.hash);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
 
-	rc = sidtab_reverse_lookup(s, context, sid);
-	if (rc)
-		return rc;
-	*sid += SECINITSID_NUM + 1;
-	return 0;
+		cond_resched();
+	}
 }
 
 static int sidtab_convert_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner *edst,
@@ -399,6 +372,7 @@  static int sidtab_convert_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner *edst,
 		}
 		cond_resched();
 	}
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -448,8 +422,12 @@  int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params)
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
 		s->convert = NULL;
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+		return rc;
 	}
-	return rc;
+
+	sidtab_convert_hashtable(params->target, count);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void sidtab_destroy_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner entry, u32 level)
@@ -483,11 +461,16 @@  void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)
 
 	for (i = 0; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++)
 		if (s->isids[i].set)
-			context_destroy(&s->isids[i].context);
+			context_destroy(&s->isids[i].leaf.context);
 
 	level = SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL;
 	while (level && !s->roots[level].ptr_inner)
 		--level;
 
 	sidtab_destroy_tree(s->roots[level], level);
+	/*
+	 * The context_to_sid hashtable's objects are all shared
+	 * with the isids array and context tree, and so don't need
+	 * to be cleaned up here.
+	 */
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
index 285d68b824b9..f23640fe29b5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
@@ -12,12 +12,15 @@ 
 
 #include <linux/spinlock_types.h>
 #include <linux/log2.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
 
 #include "context.h"
 #include "flask.h"
 
 struct sidtab_entry_leaf {
+	u32 sid;
 	struct context context;
+	struct hlist_node list;
 };
 
 struct sidtab_node_inner;
@@ -57,7 +60,7 @@  struct sidtab_node_inner {
 
 struct sidtab_isid_entry {
 	int set;
-	struct context context;
+	struct sidtab_entry_leaf leaf;
 };
 
 struct sidtab_convert_params {
@@ -66,7 +69,8 @@  struct sidtab_convert_params {
 	struct sidtab *target;
 };
 
-#define SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE 3
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BITS CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << SIDTAB_HASH_BITS)
 
 struct sidtab {
 	/*
@@ -83,11 +87,11 @@  struct sidtab {
 	struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;
 	spinlock_t lock;
 
-	/* reverse lookup cache - access atomically via {READ|WRITE}_ONCE() */
-	u32 rcache[SIDTAB_RCACHE_SIZE];
-
 	/* index == SID - 1 (no entry for SECSID_NULL) */
 	struct sidtab_isid_entry isids[SECINITSID_NUM];
+
+	/* Hash table for fast reverse context-to-sid lookups. */
+	DECLARE_HASHTABLE(context_to_sid, SIDTAB_HASH_BITS);
 };
 
 int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s);
@@ -101,6 +105,8 @@  int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid);
 
 void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s);
 
+int sidtab_hash_stats(struct sidtab *sidtab, char *page);
+
 #endif	/* _SS_SIDTAB_H_ */