| Message ID | 20191119091822.276265-1-javierm@redhat.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
| Series | efi: Only print errors about failing to get certs if EFI vars are found | expand |
Hi, On 19-11-2019 10:18, Javier Martinez Canillas wrote: > If CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is enabled, the kernel attempts to load the certs > from the db, dbx and MokListRT EFI variables into the appropriate keyrings. > > But it just assumes that the variables will be present and prints an error > if the certs can't be loaded, even when is possible that the variables may > not exist. For example the MokListRT variable will only be present if shim > is used. > > So only print an error message about failing to get the certs list from an > EFI variable if this is found. Otherwise these printed errors just pollute > the kernel ring buffer with confusing messages like the following: > > [ 5.427251] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e > [ 5.427261] MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list > [ 5.428012] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e > [ 5.428023] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT > > Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> > Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> Thanks for this, I just noticed a potential issue which I missed when you send this to me for testing: > > --- > > security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 31 ++++++++++--------- > 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c > index 81b19c52832..336fa528359 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c > +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c > @@ -39,16 +39,18 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void) > * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable. > */ > static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, > - unsigned long *size) > + unsigned long *size, efi_status_t *status) > { > - efi_status_t status; > unsigned long lsize = 4; > unsigned long tmpdb[4]; > void *db; > > - status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb); > - if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { > - pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", status); > + *status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb); > + if (*status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) > + return NULL; > + > + if (*status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { > + pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", *status); > return NULL; > } > > @@ -56,10 +58,10 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, > if (!db) > return NULL; > > - status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db); > - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { > + *status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db); > + if (*status != EFI_SUCCESS) { > kfree(db); > - pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status); > + pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", *status); > return NULL; > } > > @@ -144,6 +146,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) > efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; > void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL; > unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0; > + efi_status_t status; > int rc = 0; > > if (!efi.get_variable) > @@ -153,8 +156,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) > * an error if we can't get them. > */ > if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) { > - db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize); > - if (!db) { > + db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize, &status); > + if (!db && status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) { > pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n"); > } else { > rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db", > @@ -166,8 +169,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) > } > } > > - mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize); > - if (!mok) { > + mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status); > + if (!mok && status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) { > pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n"); > } else { > rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT", This means that if status == EFI_NOT_FOUND we end up still trying to parse the signature list, I guess that moksize == 0 or some such is saving us here, but I believe that this should really be: if (!mok) { if (status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n"); } else { rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT", > @@ -177,8 +180,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) > kfree(mok); > } > > - dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize); > - if (!dbx) { > + dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize, &status); > + if (!dbx && status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) { > pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n"); > } else { > rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:dbx", Idem. Regards, Hans
Hello Hans, Thanks a lot for your feedback. On 11/19/19 11:59 AM, Hans de Goede wrote: > Hi, > > On 19-11-2019 10:18, Javier Martinez Canillas wrote: >> If CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is enabled, the kernel attempts to load the certs >> from the db, dbx and MokListRT EFI variables into the appropriate keyrings. >> >> But it just assumes that the variables will be present and prints an error >> if the certs can't be loaded, even when is possible that the variables may >> not exist. For example the MokListRT variable will only be present if shim >> is used. >> >> So only print an error message about failing to get the certs list from an >> EFI variable if this is found. Otherwise these printed errors just pollute >> the kernel ring buffer with confusing messages like the following: >> >> [ 5.427251] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e >> [ 5.427261] MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list >> [ 5.428012] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e >> [ 5.428023] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT >> >> Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> >> Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> > > Thanks for this, I just noticed a potential issue which I missed > when you send this to me for testing: > [snip] >> >> if (!efi.get_variable) >> @@ -153,8 +156,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) >> * an error if we can't get them. >> */ >> if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) { >> - db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize); >> - if (!db) { >> + db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize, &status); >> + if (!db && status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) { >> pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n"); >> } else { >> rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db", You are correct, this is another instance of the same issue that you mentioned. >> @@ -166,8 +169,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) >> } >> } >> >> - mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize); >> - if (!mok) { >> + mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status); >> + if (!mok && status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) { >> pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n"); >> } else { >> rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT", > > This means that if status == EFI_NOT_FOUND we end up still > trying to parse the signature list, I guess that moksize == 0 > or some such is saving us here, but I believe that > this should really be: > > if (!mok) { > if (status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) > pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n"); > } else { > rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT", > Agreed. I'll fix the issues and post a v2. Since we are adding these statements, I could also print debug messages for the case that status == EFI_NOT_FOUND. Best regards,
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c index 81b19c52832..336fa528359 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c @@ -39,16 +39,18 @@ static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void) * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable. */ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, - unsigned long *size) + unsigned long *size, efi_status_t *status) { - efi_status_t status; unsigned long lsize = 4; unsigned long tmpdb[4]; void *db; - status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb); - if (status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { - pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", status); + *status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, &tmpdb); + if (*status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) + return NULL; + + if (*status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) { + pr_err("Couldn't get size: 0x%lx\n", *status); return NULL; } @@ -56,10 +58,10 @@ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, if (!db) return NULL; - status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db); - if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) { + *status = efi.get_variable(name, guid, NULL, &lsize, db); + if (*status != EFI_SUCCESS) { kfree(db); - pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", status); + pr_err("Error reading db var: 0x%lx\n", *status); return NULL; } @@ -144,6 +146,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) efi_guid_t mok_var = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; void *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL, *mok = NULL; unsigned long dbsize = 0, dbxsize = 0, moksize = 0; + efi_status_t status; int rc = 0; if (!efi.get_variable) @@ -153,8 +156,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) * an error if we can't get them. */ if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) { - db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize); - if (!db) { + db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize, &status); + if (!db && status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) { pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n"); } else { rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db", @@ -166,8 +169,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) } } - mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize); - if (!mok) { + mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status); + if (!mok && status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) { pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT\n"); } else { rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT", @@ -177,8 +180,8 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) kfree(mok); } - dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize); - if (!dbx) { + dbx = get_cert_list(L"dbx", &secure_var, &dbxsize, &status); + if (!dbx && status != EFI_NOT_FOUND) { pr_info("Couldn't get UEFI dbx list\n"); } else { rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:dbx",
If CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is enabled, the kernel attempts to load the certs from the db, dbx and MokListRT EFI variables into the appropriate keyrings. But it just assumes that the variables will be present and prints an error if the certs can't be loaded, even when is possible that the variables may not exist. For example the MokListRT variable will only be present if shim is used. So only print an error message about failing to get the certs list from an EFI variable if this is found. Otherwise these printed errors just pollute the kernel ring buffer with confusing messages like the following: [ 5.427251] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 5.427261] MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list [ 5.428012] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 5.428023] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> --- security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 31 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)