From patchwork Thu Jan 23 15:12:00 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Howells X-Patchwork-Id: 11348371 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 04783924 for ; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 15:12:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D756921D7E for ; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 15:12:10 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="Liw91XNp" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727847AbgAWPMK (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 Jan 2020 10:12:10 -0500 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-1.mimecast.com ([207.211.31.120]:53435 "EHLO us-smtp-1.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726590AbgAWPMK (ORCPT ); Thu, 23 Jan 2020 10:12:10 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1579792329; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=TOTDTwuaI0Kk0LUy5rbPDT0f6tV/bdzpgd5A51iAmQw=; b=Liw91XNpW2Keht2Q1ClXCZRASkSQSrbbFXovrJg/eoSftPuVRrPTVROh56KtVBukmsKYQ8 ukzjF39WdaasFdnPCRrFDGbUV8enhva+T6FdJ/tB7ocu+QX6jDutvGNybly36j43iyq3vv /8gPWvnKtrXZBCmCyraUHglegnx6sjE= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-207-dY3-Hz3EOVSB5G3kVMwjQA-1; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 10:12:04 -0500 X-MC-Unique: dY3-Hz3EOVSB5G3kVMwjQA-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx03.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.13]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EED9D18B5F95; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 15:12:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: from warthog.procyon.org.uk (ovpn-120-49.rdu2.redhat.com [10.10.120.49]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A3DED8CCCB; Thu, 23 Jan 2020 15:12:01 +0000 (UTC) Organization: Red Hat UK Ltd. Registered Address: Red Hat UK Ltd, Amberley Place, 107-111 Peascod Street, Windsor, Berkshire, SI4 1TE, United Kingdom. Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 From: David Howells In-Reply-To: <8ee40192da117d9cdf4eab1e63ab5f77b359801c.camel@btinternet.com> References: <8ee40192da117d9cdf4eab1e63ab5f77b359801c.camel@btinternet.com> To: Stephen Smalley Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, Richard Haines , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: SELinux: How to split permissions for keys? MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-ID: <4057699.1579792320.1@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 15:12:00 +0000 Message-ID: <4057700.1579792320@warthog.procyon.org.uk> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.13 Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: Hi Stephen, I have patches to split the permissions that are used for keys to make them a bit finer grained and easier to use - and also to move to ACLs rather than fixed masks. See patch "keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL" here: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-acl However, I may not have managed the permission mask transformation inside SELinux correctly. Could you lend an eyeball? The change to the permissions model is as follows: The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions: (1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring. (2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked. The SEARCH permission is split to create: (1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found. (2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring. (3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated. The WRITE permission is also split to create: (1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be added, removed and replaced in a keyring. (2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator. (3) REVOKE - see above. The change to SELinux is attached below. Should the split be pushed down into the SELinux policy rather than trying to calculate it? Thanks, David diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 116b4d644f68..c8db5235b01f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -6556,6 +6556,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, { struct key *key; struct key_security_struct *ksec; + unsigned oldstyle_perm; u32 sid; /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the @@ -6564,13 +6565,26 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, if (perm == 0) return 0; + oldstyle_perm = perm & (KEY_NEED_VIEW | KEY_NEED_READ | KEY_NEED_WRITE | + KEY_NEED_SEARCH | KEY_NEED_LINK); + if (perm & KEY_NEED_SETSEC) + oldstyle_perm |= OLD_KEY_NEED_SETATTR; + if (perm & KEY_NEED_INVAL) + oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_SEARCH; + if (perm & KEY_NEED_REVOKE && !(perm & OLD_KEY_NEED_SETATTR)) + oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_WRITE; + if (perm & KEY_NEED_JOIN) + oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_SEARCH; + if (perm & KEY_NEED_CLEAR) + oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_WRITE; + sid = cred_sid(cred); key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); ksec = key->security; return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL); + sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, oldstyle_perm, NULL); } static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)