diff mbox series

[v7,8/9] crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG

Message ID 20200127165646.19806-9-andrew.smirnov@gmail.com (mailing list archive)
State Changes Requested
Delegated to: Herbert Xu
Headers show
Series enable CAAM's HWRNG as default | expand

Commit Message

Andrey Smirnov Jan. 27, 2020, 4:56 p.m. UTC
Instantiate CAAM RNG with prediction resistance enabled to improve its
quality (with PR on DRNG is forced to reseed from TRNG every time
random data is generated).

Signed-off-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Healy <cphealy@gmail.com>
Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Iuliana Prodan <iuliana.prodan@nxp.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-imx@nxp.com
---
 drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c |  3 ++-
 drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c    | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h    |  2 ++
 drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h    |  4 +++-
 4 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

Comments

Andrei Botila Feb. 4, 2020, 1:09 p.m. UTC | #1
On 1/27/2020 6:56 PM, Andrey Smirnov wrote:
> +static bool caam_mc_skip_hwrng_init(struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv)
> +{
> +       return ctrlpriv->mc_en;
> +       /*
> +        * FIXME: Add check for MC firmware version that need
> +        * reinitialization due to PR bit
> +        */
> +}
> +

Hi Andrey,

Please use the following patch as a way to check for MC firmware version.
This should be squashed into current PATCH v7 8/9.

-- >8 --

From: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com>
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: caam - check mc firmware version before instantiating
  rng

Management Complex firmware with version lower than 10.20.0
doesn't provide prediction resistance support. Consider this
and only instantiate rng when mc f/w version is lower.

Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com>
---
  drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig |  1 +
  drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c  | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
  2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
index fac5b2e26610..d0e833121d8c 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM
  	depends on FSL_SOC || ARCH_MXC || ARCH_LAYERSCAPE
  	select SOC_BUS
  	select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_COMMON
+	imply FSL_MC_BUS
  	help
  	  Enables the driver module for Freescale's Cryptographic Accelerator
  	  and Assurance Module (CAAM), also known as the SEC version 4 (SEC4).
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
index 167a79fa3b8a..52b98e8d5175 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
  #include <linux/of_address.h>
  #include <linux/of_irq.h>
  #include <linux/sys_soc.h>
+#include <linux/fsl/mc.h>
  
  #include "compat.h"
  #include "regs.h"
@@ -578,14 +579,24 @@ static void caam_remove_debugfs(void *root)
  }
  #endif
  
-static bool caam_mc_skip_hwrng_init(struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv)
+#ifdef CONFIG_FSL_MC_BUS
+static bool check_version(struct fsl_mc_version *mc_version, u32 major,
+			  u32 minor, u32 revision)
  {
-	return ctrlpriv->mc_en;
-	/*
-	 * FIXME: Add check for MC firmware version that need
-	 * reinitialization due to PR bit
-	 */
+	if (mc_version->major > major)
+		return true;
+
+	if (mc_version->major == major) {
+		if (mc_version->minor > minor)
+			return true;
+
+		if (mc_version->minor == minor && mc_version->revision > 0)
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
  }
+#endif
  
  /* Probe routine for CAAM top (controller) level */
  static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
@@ -605,6 +616,7 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
  	u8 rng_vid;
  	int pg_size;
  	int BLOCK_OFFSET = 0;
+	bool pr_support = false;
  
  	ctrlpriv = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*ctrlpriv), GFP_KERNEL);
  	if (!ctrlpriv)
@@ -691,16 +703,28 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
  	/* Get the IRQ of the controller (for security violations only) */
  	ctrlpriv->secvio_irq = irq_of_parse_and_map(nprop, 0);
  
+	np = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "fsl,qoriq-mc");
+	ctrlpriv->mc_en = !!np;
+	of_node_put(np);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_FSL_MC_BUS
+	if (ctrlpriv->mc_en) {
+		struct fsl_mc_version *mc_version;
+
+		mc_version = fsl_mc_get_version();
+		if (mc_version)
+			pr_support = check_version(mc_version, 10, 20, 0);
+		else
+			return -EPROBE_DEFER;
+	}
+#endif
+
  	/*
  	 * Enable DECO watchdogs and, if this is a PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT kernel,
  	 * long pointers in master configuration register.
  	 * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, MC f/w performs
  	 * the configuration.
  	 */
-	np = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "fsl,qoriq-mc");
-	ctrlpriv->mc_en = !!np;
-	of_node_put(np);
-
  	if (!ctrlpriv->mc_en)
  		clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->mcr, MCFGR_AWCACHE_MASK,
  			      MCFGR_AWCACHE_CACH | MCFGR_AWCACHE_BUFF |
@@ -807,7 +831,7 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
  	 * already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
  	 * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC f/w.
  	 */
-	if (!caam_mc_skip_hwrng_init(ctrlpriv) && rng_vid >= 4) {
+	if (!(ctrlpriv->mc_en && pr_support) && rng_vid >= 4) {
  		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
  			rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
  		/*
Horia Geanta Feb. 4, 2020, 2:19 p.m. UTC | #2
On 2/4/2020 3:09 PM, Andrei Botila (OSS) wrote:
> On 1/27/2020 6:56 PM, Andrey Smirnov wrote:
>> +static bool caam_mc_skip_hwrng_init(struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv)
>> +{
>> +       return ctrlpriv->mc_en;
>> +       /*
>> +        * FIXME: Add check for MC firmware version that need
>> +        * reinitialization due to PR bit
>> +        */
>> +}
>> +
> 
> Hi Andrey,
> 
> Please use the following patch as a way to check for MC firmware version.
> This should be squashed into current PATCH v7 8/9.
> 
Btw, this depends on the fsl-mc bus patch that adds fsl_mc_get_version()
bus: fsl-mc: add api to retrieve mc version
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11352493/

As already stated, I would like to take the fsl-mc bus dependency
through the crypto tree.
Greg, Herbert - are you ok with this?

Thanks,
Horia

> -- >8 --
> 
> From: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com>
> Subject: [PATCH] crypto: caam - check mc firmware version before instantiating
>   rng
> 
> Management Complex firmware with version lower than 10.20.0
> doesn't provide prediction resistance support. Consider this
> and only instantiate rng when mc f/w version is lower.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andrei Botila <andrei.botila@nxp.com>
> ---
>   drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig |  1 +
>   drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c  | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
>   2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
> index fac5b2e26610..d0e833121d8c 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/Kconfig
> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM
>   	depends on FSL_SOC || ARCH_MXC || ARCH_LAYERSCAPE
>   	select SOC_BUS
>   	select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_COMMON
> +	imply FSL_MC_BUS
>   	help
>   	  Enables the driver module for Freescale's Cryptographic Accelerator
>   	  and Assurance Module (CAAM), also known as the SEC version 4 (SEC4).
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
> index 167a79fa3b8a..52b98e8d5175 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
> @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
>   #include <linux/of_address.h>
>   #include <linux/of_irq.h>
>   #include <linux/sys_soc.h>
> +#include <linux/fsl/mc.h>
>   
>   #include "compat.h"
>   #include "regs.h"
> @@ -578,14 +579,24 @@ static void caam_remove_debugfs(void *root)
>   }
>   #endif
>   
> -static bool caam_mc_skip_hwrng_init(struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv)
> +#ifdef CONFIG_FSL_MC_BUS
> +static bool check_version(struct fsl_mc_version *mc_version, u32 major,
> +			  u32 minor, u32 revision)
>   {
> -	return ctrlpriv->mc_en;
> -	/*
> -	 * FIXME: Add check for MC firmware version that need
> -	 * reinitialization due to PR bit
> -	 */
> +	if (mc_version->major > major)
> +		return true;
> +
> +	if (mc_version->major == major) {
> +		if (mc_version->minor > minor)
> +			return true;
> +
> +		if (mc_version->minor == minor && mc_version->revision > 0)
> +			return true;
> +	}
> +
> +	return false;
>   }
> +#endif
>   
>   /* Probe routine for CAAM top (controller) level */
>   static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> @@ -605,6 +616,7 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>   	u8 rng_vid;
>   	int pg_size;
>   	int BLOCK_OFFSET = 0;
> +	bool pr_support = false;
>   
>   	ctrlpriv = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*ctrlpriv), GFP_KERNEL);
>   	if (!ctrlpriv)
> @@ -691,16 +703,28 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>   	/* Get the IRQ of the controller (for security violations only) */
>   	ctrlpriv->secvio_irq = irq_of_parse_and_map(nprop, 0);
>   
> +	np = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "fsl,qoriq-mc");
> +	ctrlpriv->mc_en = !!np;
> +	of_node_put(np);
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_FSL_MC_BUS
> +	if (ctrlpriv->mc_en) {
> +		struct fsl_mc_version *mc_version;
> +
> +		mc_version = fsl_mc_get_version();
> +		if (mc_version)
> +			pr_support = check_version(mc_version, 10, 20, 0);
> +		else
> +			return -EPROBE_DEFER;
> +	}
> +#endif
> +
>   	/*
>   	 * Enable DECO watchdogs and, if this is a PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT kernel,
>   	 * long pointers in master configuration register.
>   	 * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, MC f/w performs
>   	 * the configuration.
>   	 */
> -	np = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "fsl,qoriq-mc");
> -	ctrlpriv->mc_en = !!np;
> -	of_node_put(np);
> -
>   	if (!ctrlpriv->mc_en)
>   		clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->mcr, MCFGR_AWCACHE_MASK,
>   			      MCFGR_AWCACHE_CACH | MCFGR_AWCACHE_BUFF |
> @@ -807,7 +831,7 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>   	 * already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
>   	 * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC f/w.
>   	 */
> -	if (!caam_mc_skip_hwrng_init(ctrlpriv) && rng_vid >= 4) {
> +	if (!(ctrlpriv->mc_en && pr_support) && rng_vid >= 4) {
>   		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
>   			rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
>   		/*
>
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
index 790624ae83c6..62f3a69ae837 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamrng.c
@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@  static u32 *caam_init_desc(u32 *desc, dma_addr_t dst_dma, int len)
 {
 	init_job_desc(desc, 0);	/* + 1 cmd_sz */
 	/* Generate random bytes: + 1 cmd_sz */
-	append_operation(desc, OP_ALG_ALGSEL_RNG | OP_TYPE_CLASS1_ALG);
+	append_operation(desc, OP_ALG_ALGSEL_RNG | OP_TYPE_CLASS1_ALG |
+			 OP_ALG_PR_ON);
 	/* Store bytes */
 	append_fifo_store(desc, dst_dma, len, FIFOST_TYPE_RNGSTORE);
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
index bcbc832b208e..ad3f6aa921d3 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
@@ -36,7 +36,8 @@  static void build_instantiation_desc(u32 *desc, int handle, int do_sk)
 	init_job_desc(desc, 0);
 
 	op_flags = OP_TYPE_CLASS1_ALG | OP_ALG_ALGSEL_RNG |
-			(handle << OP_ALG_AAI_SHIFT) | OP_ALG_AS_INIT;
+			(handle << OP_ALG_AAI_SHIFT) | OP_ALG_AS_INIT |
+			OP_ALG_PR_ON;
 
 	/* INIT RNG in non-test mode */
 	append_operation(desc, op_flags);
@@ -276,12 +277,25 @@  static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int state_handle_mask,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	for (sh_idx = 0; sh_idx < RNG4_MAX_HANDLES; sh_idx++) {
+		const u32 rdsta_if = RDSTA_IF0 << sh_idx;
+		const u32 rdsta_pr = RDSTA_PR0 << sh_idx;
+		const u32 rdsta_mask = rdsta_if | rdsta_pr;
 		/*
 		 * If the corresponding bit is set, this state handle
 		 * was initialized by somebody else, so it's left alone.
 		 */
-		if ((1 << sh_idx) & state_handle_mask)
-			continue;
+		if (rdsta_if & state_handle_mask) {
+			if (rdsta_pr & state_handle_mask)
+				continue;
+
+			dev_info(ctrldev,
+				 "RNG4 SH%d was previously instantiated without prediction resistance. Tearing it down\n",
+				 sh_idx);
+
+			ret = deinstantiate_rng(ctrldev, rdsta_if);
+			if (ret)
+				break;
+		}
 
 		/* Create the descriptor for instantiating RNG State Handle */
 		build_instantiation_desc(desc, sh_idx, gen_sk);
@@ -301,9 +315,9 @@  static int instantiate_rng(struct device *ctrldev, int state_handle_mask,
 		if (ret)
 			break;
 
-		rdsta_val = rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) & RDSTA_IFMASK;
+		rdsta_val = rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) & RDSTA_MASK;
 		if ((status && status != JRSTA_SSRC_JUMP_HALT_CC) ||
-		    !(rdsta_val & (1 << sh_idx))) {
+		    (rdsta_val & rdsta_mask) != rdsta_mask) {
 			ret = -EAGAIN;
 			break;
 		}
@@ -563,6 +577,15 @@  static void caam_remove_debugfs(void *root)
 }
 #endif
 
+static bool caam_mc_skip_hwrng_init(struct caam_drv_private *ctrlpriv)
+{
+	return ctrlpriv->mc_en;
+	/*
+	 * FIXME: Add check for MC firmware version that need
+	 * reinitialization due to PR bit
+	 */
+}
+
 /* Probe routine for CAAM top (controller) level */
 static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
@@ -783,7 +806,7 @@  static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	 * already instantiated, do RNG instantiation
 	 * In case of SoCs with Management Complex, RNG is managed by MC f/w.
 	 */
-	if (!ctrlpriv->mc_en && rng_vid >= 4) {
+	if (!caam_mc_skip_hwrng_init(ctrlpriv) && rng_vid >= 4) {
 		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init =
 			rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta);
 		/*
@@ -793,11 +816,11 @@  static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		 * to regenerate these keys before the next POR.
 		 */
 		gen_sk = ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_SKVN ? 0 : 1;
-		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_IFMASK;
+		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init &= RDSTA_MASK;
 		do {
 			int inst_handles =
 				rd_reg32(&ctrl->r4tst[0].rdsta) &
-								RDSTA_IFMASK;
+								RDSTA_MASK;
 			/*
 			 * If either SH were instantiated by somebody else
 			 * (e.g. u-boot) then it is assumed that the entropy
@@ -837,7 +860,7 @@  static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		 * Set handles init'ed by this module as the complement of the
 		 * already initialized ones
 		 */
-		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_IFMASK;
+		ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init = ~ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init & RDSTA_MASK;
 
 		/* Enable RDB bit so that RNG works faster */
 		clrsetbits_32(&ctrl->scfgr, 0, SCFGR_RDBENABLE);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h
index 4b6854bf896a..e796d3cb9be8 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/desc.h
@@ -1254,6 +1254,8 @@ 
 #define OP_ALG_ICV_OFF		(0 << OP_ALG_ICV_SHIFT)
 #define OP_ALG_ICV_ON		(1 << OP_ALG_ICV_SHIFT)
 
+#define OP_ALG_PR_ON		BIT(1)
+
 #define OP_ALG_DIR_SHIFT	0
 #define OP_ALG_DIR_MASK		1
 #define OP_ALG_DECRYPT		0
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h b/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h
index c191e8fd0fa7..0f810bc13b2b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h
@@ -524,9 +524,11 @@  struct rng4tst {
 	u32 rsvd1[40];
 #define RDSTA_SKVT 0x80000000
 #define RDSTA_SKVN 0x40000000
+#define RDSTA_PR0 BIT(4)
+#define RDSTA_PR1 BIT(5)
 #define RDSTA_IF0 0x00000001
 #define RDSTA_IF1 0x00000002
-#define RDSTA_IFMASK (RDSTA_IF1 | RDSTA_IF0)
+#define RDSTA_MASK (RDSTA_PR1 | RDSTA_PR0 | RDSTA_IF1 | RDSTA_IF0)
 	u32 rdsta;
 	u32 rsvd2[15];
 };