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[v2,10/13] KVM: x86: Shrink the usercopy region of the emulation context

Message ID 20200218232953.5724-11-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series KVM: x86: Allow userspace to disable the emulator | expand

Commit Message

Sean Christopherson Feb. 18, 2020, 11:29 p.m. UTC
Shuffle a few operand structs to the end of struct x86_emulate_ctxt and
update the cache creation to whitelist only the region of the emulation
context that is expected to be copied to/from user memory, e.g. the
instruction operands, registers, and fetch/io/mem caches.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h |  8 +++++---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c         | 12 ++++++------
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

Comments

Vitaly Kuznetsov Feb. 26, 2020, 5:51 p.m. UTC | #1
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> writes:

> Shuffle a few operand structs to the end of struct x86_emulate_ctxt and
> update the cache creation to whitelist only the region of the emulation
> context that is expected to be copied to/from user memory, e.g. the
> instruction operands, registers, and fetch/io/mem caches.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h |  8 +++++---
>  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c         | 12 ++++++------
>  2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
> index 2f0a600efdff..82f712d5c692 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
> @@ -322,9 +322,6 @@ struct x86_emulate_ctxt {
>  	u8 intercept;
>  	u8 op_bytes;
>  	u8 ad_bytes;
> -	struct operand src;
> -	struct operand src2;
> -	struct operand dst;
>  	int (*execute)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
>  	int (*check_perm)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
>  	/*
> @@ -349,6 +346,11 @@ struct x86_emulate_ctxt {
>  	u8 seg_override;
>  	u64 d;
>  	unsigned long _eip;
> +
> +	/* Here begins the usercopy section. */
> +	struct operand src;
> +	struct operand src2;
> +	struct operand dst;

Out of pure curiosity, how certain are we that this is going to be
enough for userspaces?

>  	struct operand memop;
>  	/* Fields above regs are cleared together. */
>  	unsigned long _regs[NR_VCPU_REGS];
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 370af9fe0f5b..e1eaca65756b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -235,13 +235,13 @@ static struct kmem_cache *x86_emulator_cache;
>  
>  static struct kmem_cache *kvm_alloc_emulator_cache(void)
>  {
> -	return kmem_cache_create_usercopy("x86_emulator",
> -					  sizeof(struct x86_emulate_ctxt),
> +	unsigned int useroffset = offsetof(struct x86_emulate_ctxt, src);
> +	unsigned int size = sizeof(struct x86_emulate_ctxt);
> +
> +	return kmem_cache_create_usercopy("x86_emulator", size,
>  					  __alignof__(struct x86_emulate_ctxt),
> -					  SLAB_ACCOUNT,
> -					  0,
> -					  sizeof(struct x86_emulate_ctxt),
> -					  NULL);
> +					  SLAB_ACCOUNT, useroffset,
> +					  size - useroffset, NULL);
>  }
>  
>  static int emulator_fix_hypercall(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
Paolo Bonzini March 2, 2020, 6:40 p.m. UTC | #2
On 26/02/20 18:51, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
>> +
>> +	/* Here begins the usercopy section. */
>> +	struct operand src;
>> +	struct operand src2;
>> +	struct operand dst;
> Out of pure curiosity, how certain are we that this is going to be
> enough for userspaces?
> 

And also, where exactly are the user copies done?

Paolo
Sean Christopherson March 2, 2020, 7:13 p.m. UTC | #3
On Wed, Feb 26, 2020 at 06:51:02PM +0100, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
> Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> writes:
> 
> > Shuffle a few operand structs to the end of struct x86_emulate_ctxt and
> > update the cache creation to whitelist only the region of the emulation
> > context that is expected to be copied to/from user memory, e.g. the
> > instruction operands, registers, and fetch/io/mem caches.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h |  8 +++++---
> >  arch/x86/kvm/x86.c         | 12 ++++++------
> >  2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
> > index 2f0a600efdff..82f712d5c692 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
> > @@ -322,9 +322,6 @@ struct x86_emulate_ctxt {
> >  	u8 intercept;
> >  	u8 op_bytes;
> >  	u8 ad_bytes;
> > -	struct operand src;
> > -	struct operand src2;
> > -	struct operand dst;
> >  	int (*execute)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
> >  	int (*check_perm)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
> >  	/*
> > @@ -349,6 +346,11 @@ struct x86_emulate_ctxt {
> >  	u8 seg_override;
> >  	u64 d;
> >  	unsigned long _eip;
> > +
> > +	/* Here begins the usercopy section. */
> > +	struct operand src;
> > +	struct operand src2;
> > +	struct operand dst;
> 
> Out of pure curiosity, how certain are we that this is going to be
> enough for userspaces?

This is purely related to in-kernel hardening, there's no concern about
this being "enough" because it's not directly visible to userspace.

usercopy refers to the kernel copying data to/from user memory.  When
running with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y, copy_{to,from}_user performs
extra checks to warn if the kernel is doing something potentially
dangerous.  For this code specifically, it will warn if user data is
being copied into a struct and the affected range within the struct isn't
explicitly annotated as being safe for usercopy.  The idea is that the
kernel shouldn't be copying user data into variables that the kernel
expects are fully under its control.

Currently, KVM marks the entire struct x86_emulate_ctxt as being "safe"
for usercopy, which is sub-optimal because HARDENED_USERCOPY wouldn't be
able to detect KVM bugs, e.g. if "enum x86emul_mode mode" were overwritten
by copy_from_user().  Shuffling the emulator fields so that the all fields
that are used for usercopy are clustered together allows KVM to use a more
precise declaration for which fields are "safe", e.g. the theoretical @mode
bug would now be caught.
Sean Christopherson March 2, 2020, 7:19 p.m. UTC | #4
On Mon, Mar 02, 2020 at 07:40:27PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 26/02/20 18:51, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
> >> +
> >> +	/* Here begins the usercopy section. */
> >> +	struct operand src;
> >> +	struct operand src2;
> >> +	struct operand dst;
> > Out of pure curiosity, how certain are we that this is going to be
> > enough for userspaces?
> > 
> 
> And also, where exactly are the user copies done?

Anything that funnels into ctxt->ops->read_std() or ctxt->ops->write_std(),
e.g.

	if (ctxt->src2.type == OP_MEM) {
		rc = segmented_read(ctxt, ctxt->src2.addr.mem,
				    &ctxt->src2.val, ctxt->src2.bytes);
		if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
			goto done;
	}


segmented_read() : @data = &ctxt->src2.val
|
|-> read_emulated()
    |
    |-> ctxt->ops->read_emulated() / emulator_read_emulated()
        |
        |-> emulator_read_write()
            |
            |-> emulator_read_write_onepage()
                |
                |-> ops->read_write_emulate() / read_emulate()
                    |
                    |-> kvm_vcpu_read_guest()
                        |
                        ...
                          |-> __kvm_read_guest_page()
                              |
                              |-> __copy_from_user(data, ...)
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
index 2f0a600efdff..82f712d5c692 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/kvm_emulate.h
@@ -322,9 +322,6 @@  struct x86_emulate_ctxt {
 	u8 intercept;
 	u8 op_bytes;
 	u8 ad_bytes;
-	struct operand src;
-	struct operand src2;
-	struct operand dst;
 	int (*execute)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
 	int (*check_perm)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
 	/*
@@ -349,6 +346,11 @@  struct x86_emulate_ctxt {
 	u8 seg_override;
 	u64 d;
 	unsigned long _eip;
+
+	/* Here begins the usercopy section. */
+	struct operand src;
+	struct operand src2;
+	struct operand dst;
 	struct operand memop;
 	/* Fields above regs are cleared together. */
 	unsigned long _regs[NR_VCPU_REGS];
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 370af9fe0f5b..e1eaca65756b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -235,13 +235,13 @@  static struct kmem_cache *x86_emulator_cache;
 
 static struct kmem_cache *kvm_alloc_emulator_cache(void)
 {
-	return kmem_cache_create_usercopy("x86_emulator",
-					  sizeof(struct x86_emulate_ctxt),
+	unsigned int useroffset = offsetof(struct x86_emulate_ctxt, src);
+	unsigned int size = sizeof(struct x86_emulate_ctxt);
+
+	return kmem_cache_create_usercopy("x86_emulator", size,
 					  __alignof__(struct x86_emulate_ctxt),
-					  SLAB_ACCOUNT,
-					  0,
-					  sizeof(struct x86_emulate_ctxt),
-					  NULL);
+					  SLAB_ACCOUNT, useroffset,
+					  size - useroffset, NULL);
 }
 
 static int emulator_fix_hypercall(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);