diff mbox series

[2/5] KVM: VMX: Add guest physical address check in EPT violation and misconfig

Message ID 20200227172306.21426-3-mgamal@redhat.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show
Series KVM: Support guest MAXPHYADDR < host MAXPHYADDR | expand

Commit Message

Mohammed Gamal Feb. 27, 2020, 5:23 p.m. UTC
Check guest physical address against it's maximum physical memory. If
the guest's physical address exceeds the maximum (i.e. has reserved bits
set), inject a guest page fault with PFERR_RSVD_MASK.

Signed-off-by: Mohammed Gamal <mgamal@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

Comments

Jim Mattson Feb. 27, 2020, 5:55 p.m. UTC | #1
On Thu, Feb 27, 2020 at 9:23 AM Mohammed Gamal <mgamal@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Check guest physical address against it's maximum physical memory. If
Nit: "its," without an apostrophe.

> the guest's physical address exceeds the maximum (i.e. has reserved bits
> set), inject a guest page fault with PFERR_RSVD_MASK.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mohammed Gamal <mgamal@redhat.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 13 +++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 63aaf44edd1f..477d196aa235 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -5162,6 +5162,12 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>         gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
>         trace_kvm_page_fault(gpa, exit_qualification);
>
> +       /* Check if guest gpa doesn't exceed physical memory limits */
> +       if (gpa >= (1ull << cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu))) {
> +               kvm_inject_rsvd_bits_pf(vcpu, gpa);

Even if PFERR_RSVD_MASK is set in the page fault error code, shouldn't
we set still conditionally set:
    PFERR_WRITE_MASK - for an attempted write
    PFERR_USER_MASK - for a usermode access
    PFERR_FETCH_MASK - for an instruction fetch

> +               return 1;
> +       }
> +
>         /* Is it a read fault? */
>         error_code = (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ)
>                      ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
> @@ -5193,6 +5199,13 @@ static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>          * nGPA here instead of the required GPA.
>          */
>         gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
> +
> +       /* Check if guest gpa doesn't exceed physical memory limits */
> +       if (gpa >= (1ull << cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu))) {
> +               kvm_inject_rsvd_bits_pf(vcpu, gpa);

And here as well?

> +               return 1;
> +       }
> +
>         if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
>             !kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_FAST_MMIO_BUS, gpa, 0, NULL)) {
>                 trace_kvm_fast_mmio(gpa);
> --
> 2.21.1
>
Sean Christopherson Feb. 28, 2020, 10:36 p.m. UTC | #2
On Thu, Feb 27, 2020 at 09:55:32AM -0800, Jim Mattson wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 27, 2020 at 9:23 AM Mohammed Gamal <mgamal@redhat.com> wrote:
> >
> > Check guest physical address against it's maximum physical memory. If
> Nit: "its," without an apostrophe.
> 
> > the guest's physical address exceeds the maximum (i.e. has reserved bits
> > set), inject a guest page fault with PFERR_RSVD_MASK.

Wish I had actually read this series when it first flew by, just spent
several hours debugging this exact thing when running the "access" test.

> > Signed-off-by: Mohammed Gamal <mgamal@redhat.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 13 +++++++++++++
> >  1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > index 63aaf44edd1f..477d196aa235 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> > @@ -5162,6 +5162,12 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >         gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
> >         trace_kvm_page_fault(gpa, exit_qualification);
> >
> > +       /* Check if guest gpa doesn't exceed physical memory limits */
> > +       if (gpa >= (1ull << cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu))) {

Add a helper for this, it's easier than copy-pasting the comment and code
everywhere.  BIT_ULL() is also handy.

static inline bool kvm_mmu_is_illegal_gpa(gpa_t gpa)
{
	return (gpa < BIT_ULL(cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu)));
}

> > +               kvm_inject_rsvd_bits_pf(vcpu, gpa);
> 
> Even if PFERR_RSVD_MASK is set in the page fault error code, shouldn't
> we set still conditionally set:
>     PFERR_WRITE_MASK - for an attempted write
>     PFERR_USER_MASK - for a usermode access
>     PFERR_FETCH_MASK - for an instruction fetch

Yep.  Move this down below where error_code is calculated.  Then the code
should be something like this.  Not fun to handle this with EPT :-(

Note, VMCS.GUEST_LINEAR_ADDRESS isn't guaranteed to be accurate, e.g. if
the guest is putting bad gpas into Intel PT, but I don't think we have any
choice but to blindly cram it in and hope for the best.

	if (unlikely(kvm_mmu_is_illegal_gpa(vcpu, gpa))) {
		/* Morph the EPT error code into a #PF error code. */
		error_code &= ~(PFERR_USER_MASK | PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK |
				PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK);
		if (vmx_get_cpl(vcpu) == 3)
			error_code |= PFERR_USER_MASK;
		error_code |= PFERR_PRESENT_MASK;

		kvm_inject_rsvd_bits_pf(vcpu, vmcs_readl(GUEST_LINEAR_ADDRESS),
					error_code);

		return 1;
	}

 
> > +               return 1;
> > +       }
> > +
> >         /* Is it a read fault? */
> >         error_code = (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ)
> >                      ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
> > @@ -5193,6 +5199,13 @@ static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >          * nGPA here instead of the required GPA.
> >          */
> >         gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
> > +
> > +       /* Check if guest gpa doesn't exceed physical memory limits */
> > +       if (gpa >= (1ull << cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu))) {
> > +               kvm_inject_rsvd_bits_pf(vcpu, gpa);
> 
> And here as well?

This shouldn't happen.  If KVM creates a bad EPTE for an illegal GPA, we
done goofed up.  I.e.

	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_mmu_is_illegal_gpa(vcpu, gpa))) {
		vcpu->run->blah = blah;
		return 0;
	}

> 
> > +               return 1;
> > +       }
> > +
> >         if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
> >             !kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_FAST_MMIO_BUS, gpa, 0, NULL)) {
> >                 trace_kvm_fast_mmio(gpa);
> > --
> > 2.21.1
> >
diff mbox series

Patch

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 63aaf44edd1f..477d196aa235 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -5162,6 +5162,12 @@  static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
 	trace_kvm_page_fault(gpa, exit_qualification);
 
+	/* Check if guest gpa doesn't exceed physical memory limits */
+	if (gpa >= (1ull << cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu))) {
+		kvm_inject_rsvd_bits_pf(vcpu, gpa);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
 	/* Is it a read fault? */
 	error_code = (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ)
 		     ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
@@ -5193,6 +5199,13 @@  static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * nGPA here instead of the required GPA.
 	 */
 	gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
+
+	/* Check if guest gpa doesn't exceed physical memory limits */
+	if (gpa >= (1ull << cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu))) {
+		kvm_inject_rsvd_bits_pf(vcpu, gpa);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
 	if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
 	    !kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_FAST_MMIO_BUS, gpa, 0, NULL)) {
 		trace_kvm_fast_mmio(gpa);