From patchwork Tue Mar 31 10:41:48 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Maarten Lankhorst X-Patchwork-Id: 11467269 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 67A0092A for ; Tue, 31 Mar 2020 10:42:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from gabe.freedesktop.org (gabe.freedesktop.org [131.252.210.177]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 508E420772 for ; Tue, 31 Mar 2020 10:42:22 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 508E420772 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=intel-gfx-bounces@lists.freedesktop.org Received: from gabe.freedesktop.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by gabe.freedesktop.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8ABCF6E7D9; Tue, 31 Mar 2020 10:42:17 +0000 (UTC) X-Original-To: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Delivered-To: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Received: from mblankhorst.nl (mblankhorst.nl [IPv6:2a02:2308::216:3eff:fe92:dfa3]) by gabe.freedesktop.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D8F5A6E2DE for ; Tue, 31 Mar 2020 10:42:12 +0000 (UTC) From: Maarten Lankhorst To: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2020 12:41:48 +0200 Message-Id: <20200331104209.432176-2-maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20200331104209.432176-1-maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> References: <20200331104209.432176-1-maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH 02/23] perf/core: Only copy-to-user after completely unlocking all locks. X-BeenThere: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Intel graphics driver community testing & development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: intel-gfx-bounces@lists.freedesktop.org Sender: "Intel-gfx" We inadvertently create a dependency on mmap_sem with a whole chain. This breaks any user who wants to take a lock and call rcu_barrier(), while also taking that lock inside mmap_sem: <4> [604.892532] ====================================================== <4> [604.892534] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected <4> [604.892536] 5.6.0-rc7-CI-Patchwork_17096+ #1 Tainted: G U <4> [604.892537] ------------------------------------------------------ <4> [604.892538] kms_frontbuffer/2595 is trying to acquire lock: <4> [604.892540] ffffffff8264a558 (rcu_state.barrier_mutex){+.+.}, at: rcu_barrier+0x23/0x190 <4> [604.892547] but task is already holding lock: <4> [604.892547] ffff888484716050 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: i915_gem_object_pin_to_display_plane+0x89/0x270 [i915] <4> [604.892592] which lock already depends on the new lock. <4> [604.892593] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: <4> [604.892594] -> #6 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}: <4> [604.892597] __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.15+0xc3/0x1090 <4> [604.892598] ww_mutex_lock+0x39/0x70 <4> [604.892600] dma_resv_lockdep+0x10e/0x1f5 <4> [604.892602] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x300 <4> [604.892604] kernel_init_freeable+0x17b/0x1dc <4> [604.892605] kernel_init+0x5/0x100 <4> [604.892606] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50 <4> [604.892607] -> #5 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}: <4> [604.892609] dma_resv_lockdep+0xec/0x1f5 <4> [604.892610] do_one_initcall+0x58/0x300 <4> [604.892610] kernel_init_freeable+0x17b/0x1dc <4> [604.892611] kernel_init+0x5/0x100 <4> [604.892612] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50 <4> [604.892613] -> #4 (&mm->mmap_sem#2){++++}: <4> [604.892615] __might_fault+0x63/0x90 <4> [604.892617] _copy_to_user+0x1e/0x80 <4> [604.892619] perf_read+0x200/0x2b0 <4> [604.892621] vfs_read+0x96/0x160 <4> [604.892622] ksys_read+0x9f/0xe0 <4> [604.892623] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x220 <4> [604.892624] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe <4> [604.892625] -> #3 (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+.}: <4> [604.892626] __mutex_lock+0x9a/0x9c0 <4> [604.892627] perf_event_init_cpu+0xa4/0x140 <4> [604.892629] perf_event_init+0x19d/0x1cd <4> [604.892630] start_kernel+0x362/0x4e4 <4> [604.892631] secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 <4> [604.892631] -> #2 (pmus_lock){+.+.}: <4> [604.892633] __mutex_lock+0x9a/0x9c0 <4> [604.892633] perf_event_init_cpu+0x6b/0x140 <4> [604.892635] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x9b/0x9d0 <4> [604.892636] _cpu_up+0xa2/0x140 <4> [604.892637] do_cpu_up+0x61/0xa0 <4> [604.892639] smp_init+0x57/0x96 <4> [604.892639] kernel_init_freeable+0x87/0x1dc <4> [604.892640] kernel_init+0x5/0x100 <4> [604.892642] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50 <4> [604.892642] -> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}: <4> [604.892643] cpus_read_lock+0x34/0xd0 <4> [604.892644] rcu_barrier+0xaa/0x190 <4> [604.892645] kernel_init+0x21/0x100 <4> [604.892647] ret_from_fork+0x24/0x50 <4> [604.892647] -> #0 (rcu_state.barrier_mutex){+.+.}: <4> [604.892649] __lock_acquire+0x1328/0x15d0 <4> [604.892650] lock_acquire+0xa7/0x1c0 <4> [604.892651] __mutex_lock+0x9a/0x9c0 <4> [604.892652] rcu_barrier+0x23/0x190 <4> [604.892680] i915_gem_object_unbind+0x29d/0x3f0 [i915] <4> [604.892707] i915_gem_object_pin_to_display_plane+0x141/0x270 [i915] <4> [604.892737] intel_pin_and_fence_fb_obj+0xec/0x1f0 [i915] <4> [604.892767] intel_plane_pin_fb+0x3f/0xd0 [i915] <4> [604.892797] intel_prepare_plane_fb+0x13b/0x5c0 [i915] <4> [604.892798] drm_atomic_helper_prepare_planes+0x85/0x110 <4> [604.892827] intel_atomic_commit+0xda/0x390 [i915] <4> [604.892828] drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x57/0xa0 <4> [604.892830] drm_mode_setcrtc+0x1c4/0x720 <4> [604.892830] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xb0/0xf0 <4> [604.892831] drm_ioctl+0x2e1/0x390 <4> [604.892833] ksys_ioctl+0x7b/0x90 <4> [604.892835] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x11/0x20 <4> [604.892835] do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x220 <4> [604.892836] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe <4> [604.892837] Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst Reported-by: kbuild test robot --- kernel/events/core.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 085d9263d595..8b95a6512e31 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -4926,20 +4926,20 @@ static int __perf_read_group_add(struct perf_event *leader, } static int perf_read_group(struct perf_event *event, - u64 read_format, char __user *buf) + u64 read_format, char __user *buf, + u64 **values) { struct perf_event *leader = event->group_leader, *child; struct perf_event_context *ctx = leader->ctx; int ret; - u64 *values; lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->mutex); - values = kzalloc(event->read_size, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!values) + *values = kzalloc(event->read_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!*values) return -ENOMEM; - values[0] = 1 + leader->nr_siblings; + *values[0] = 1 + leader->nr_siblings; /* * By locking the child_mutex of the leader we effectively @@ -4947,47 +4947,42 @@ static int perf_read_group(struct perf_event *event, */ mutex_lock(&leader->child_mutex); - ret = __perf_read_group_add(leader, read_format, values); + ret = __perf_read_group_add(leader, read_format, *values); if (ret) goto unlock; list_for_each_entry(child, &leader->child_list, child_list) { - ret = __perf_read_group_add(child, read_format, values); + ret = __perf_read_group_add(child, read_format, *values); if (ret) goto unlock; } - mutex_unlock(&leader->child_mutex); - ret = event->read_size; - if (copy_to_user(buf, values, event->read_size)) - ret = -EFAULT; - goto out; - unlock: mutex_unlock(&leader->child_mutex); -out: - kfree(values); + if (ret < 0) + kfree(*values); return ret; } static int perf_read_one(struct perf_event *event, - u64 read_format, char __user *buf) + u64 read_format, char __user *buf, + u64 **values) { u64 enabled, running; - u64 values[4]; int n = 0; - values[n++] = __perf_event_read_value(event, &enabled, &running); + *values = kzalloc(sizeof(**values) * 4, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!*values) + return -ENOMEM; + + *values[n++] = __perf_event_read_value(event, &enabled, &running); if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_ENABLED) - values[n++] = enabled; + *values[n++] = enabled; if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_RUNNING) - values[n++] = running; + *values[n++] = running; if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_ID) - values[n++] = primary_event_id(event); - - if (copy_to_user(buf, values, n * sizeof(u64))) - return -EFAULT; + *values[n++] = primary_event_id(event); return n * sizeof(u64); } @@ -5009,7 +5004,8 @@ static bool is_event_hup(struct perf_event *event) * Read the performance event - simple non blocking version for now */ static ssize_t -__perf_read(struct perf_event *event, char __user *buf, size_t count) +__perf_read(struct perf_event *event, char __user *buf, + size_t count, u64 **values) { u64 read_format = event->attr.read_format; int ret; @@ -5027,9 +5023,9 @@ __perf_read(struct perf_event *event, char __user *buf, size_t count) WARN_ON_ONCE(event->ctx->parent_ctx); if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_GROUP) - ret = perf_read_group(event, read_format, buf); + ret = perf_read_group(event, read_format, buf, values); else - ret = perf_read_one(event, read_format, buf); + ret = perf_read_one(event, read_format, buf, values); return ret; } @@ -5039,6 +5035,7 @@ perf_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { struct perf_event *event = file->private_data; struct perf_event_context *ctx; + u64 *values; int ret; ret = security_perf_event_read(event); @@ -5046,9 +5043,15 @@ perf_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) return ret; ctx = perf_event_ctx_lock(event); - ret = __perf_read(event, buf, count); + ret = __perf_read(event, buf, count, &values); perf_event_ctx_unlock(event, ctx); + if (ret > 0) { + if (copy_to_user(buf, values, ret)) + ret = -EFAULT; + kfree(values); + } + return ret; }