From patchwork Fri Jun 19 02:06:00 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: David Gibson X-Patchwork-Id: 11613139 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2F85692A for ; Fri, 19 Jun 2020 02:09:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 06DFB20773 for ; Fri, 19 Jun 2020 02:09:23 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=gibson.dropbear.id.au header.i=@gibson.dropbear.id.au header.b="Dh6czTEK" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 06DFB20773 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=gibson.dropbear.id.au Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+patchwork-qemu-devel=patchwork.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:49934 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jm6T4-00013O-7X for patchwork-qemu-devel@patchwork.kernel.org; Thu, 18 Jun 2020 22:09:22 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:41938) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jm6QC-0003BD-7B; Thu, 18 Jun 2020 22:06:24 -0400 Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org ([203.11.71.1]:47045 helo=ozlabs.org) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jm6Q9-0000os-9Z; Thu, 18 Jun 2020 22:06:23 -0400 Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1007) id 49p2GT2LD1z9sT2; Fri, 19 Jun 2020 12:06:08 +1000 (AEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=gibson.dropbear.id.au; s=201602; t=1592532369; bh=qMsc309NrDU+kjkrkNdXuQ5jS6081SEdRvf2Ra68+0k=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Dh6czTEKkpC3AwFZDUZjJ8VQHRUr7RcuJheAzLqBP5kPURdYs+0yGjCA/XT1zxs7D s1fb+ETwTqir/AVT8/Fg42F1EGeA4vLI/0GtfCdmqaPQ+UY6gkl6xNDVkQ5NE1MxKj c0LeubLAdqYb7kxaejnrpYAIiqHooNIW4j31udso= From: David Gibson To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brijesh.singh@amd.com, pair@us.ibm.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, dgilbert@redhat.com, frankja@linux.ibm.com Subject: [PATCH v3 7/9] spapr: Add PEF based host trust limitation Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2020 12:06:00 +1000 Message-Id: <20200619020602.118306-8-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20200619020602.118306-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> References: <20200619020602.118306-1-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Received-SPF: pass client-ip=203.11.71.1; envelope-from=dgibson@ozlabs.org; helo=ozlabs.org X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: First seen = 2020/06/18 22:06:09 X-ACL-Warn: Detected OS = Linux 2.2.x-3.x [generic] X-Spam_score_int: -9 X-Spam_score: -1.0 X-Spam_bar: - X-Spam_report: (-1.0 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS=1, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001 autolearn=_AUTOLEARN X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Eduardo Habkost , kvm@vger.kernel.org, mst@redhat.com, Ram Pai , cohuck@redhat.com, david@redhat.com, mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-ppc@nongnu.org, David Gibson , Richard Henderson Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+patchwork-qemu-devel=patchwork.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" Some upcoming POWER machines have a system called PEF (Protected Execution Facility) which uses a small ultravisor to allow guests to run in a way that they can't be eavesdropped by the hypervisor. The effect is roughly similar to AMD SEV, although the mechanisms are quite different. Most of the work of this is done between the guest, KVM and the ultravisor, with little need for involvement by qemu. However qemu does need to tell KVM to allow secure VMs. Because the availability of secure mode is a guest visible difference which depends on having the right hardware and firmware, we don't enable this by default. In order to run a secure guest you need to create a "pef-guest" object and set the host-trust-limitation machine property to point to it. Note that this just *allows* secure guests, the architecture of PEF is such that the guest still needs to talk to the ultravisor to enter secure mode. Qemu has no directly way of knowing if the guest is in secure mode, and certainly can't know until well after machine creation time. Signed-off-by: David Gibson Acked-by: Ram Pai --- target/ppc/Makefile.objs | 2 +- target/ppc/pef.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 target/ppc/pef.c diff --git a/target/ppc/Makefile.objs b/target/ppc/Makefile.objs index e8fa18ce13..ac93b9700e 100644 --- a/target/ppc/Makefile.objs +++ b/target/ppc/Makefile.objs @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ obj-y += machine.o mmu_helper.o mmu-hash32.o monitor.o arch_dump.o obj-$(TARGET_PPC64) += mmu-hash64.o mmu-book3s-v3.o compat.o obj-$(TARGET_PPC64) += mmu-radix64.o endif -obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o +obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o pef.o obj-$(call lnot,$(CONFIG_KVM)) += kvm-stub.o obj-y += dfp_helper.o obj-y += excp_helper.o diff --git a/target/ppc/pef.c b/target/ppc/pef.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..53a6af0347 --- /dev/null +++ b/target/ppc/pef.c @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +/* + * PEF (Protected Execution Facility) for POWER support + * + * Copyright David Gibson, Redhat Inc. 2020 + * + * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later. + * See the COPYING file in the top-level directory. + * + */ + +#include "qemu/osdep.h" + +#include "qapi/error.h" +#include "qom/object_interfaces.h" +#include "sysemu/kvm.h" +#include "migration/blocker.h" +#include "exec/host-trust-limitation.h" + +#define TYPE_PEF_GUEST "pef-guest" +#define PEF_GUEST(obj) \ + OBJECT_CHECK(PefGuestState, (obj), TYPE_PEF_GUEST) + +typedef struct PefGuestState PefGuestState; + +/** + * PefGuestState: + * + * The PefGuestState object is used for creating and managing a PEF + * guest. + * + * # $QEMU \ + * -object pef-guest,id=pef0 \ + * -machine ...,host-trust-limitation=pef0 + */ +struct PefGuestState { + Object parent_obj; +}; + +static int pef_kvm_init(HostTrustLimitation *gmpo, Error **errp) +{ + if (!kvm_check_extension(kvm_state, KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST)) { + error_setg(errp, + "KVM implementation does not support Secure VMs (is an ultravisor running?)"); + return -1; + } else { + int ret = kvm_vm_enable_cap(kvm_state, KVM_CAP_PPC_SECURE_GUEST, 0, 1); + + if (ret < 0) { + error_setg(errp, + "Error enabling PEF with KVM"); + return -1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static void pef_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data) +{ + HostTrustLimitationClass *gmpc = HOST_TRUST_LIMITATION_CLASS(oc); + + gmpc->kvm_init = pef_kvm_init; +} + +static const TypeInfo pef_guest_info = { + .parent = TYPE_OBJECT, + .name = TYPE_PEF_GUEST, + .instance_size = sizeof(PefGuestState), + .class_init = pef_guest_class_init, + .interfaces = (InterfaceInfo[]) { + { TYPE_HOST_TRUST_LIMITATION }, + { TYPE_USER_CREATABLE }, + { } + } +}; + +static void +pef_register_types(void) +{ + type_register_static(&pef_guest_info); +} + +type_init(pef_register_types);