[08/12] ima: Shallow copy the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
diff mbox series

Message ID 20200623003236.830149-9-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com
State New
Headers show
Series
  • ima: Fix rule parsing bugs and extend KEXEC_CMDLINE rule support
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Commit Message

Tyler Hicks June 23, 2020, 12:32 a.m. UTC
The args_p member is a simple string that is allocated by
ima_rule_init(). Shallow copy it like other non-LSM references in
ima_rule_entry structs.

There are no longer any necessary error path cleanups to do in
ima_lsm_copy_rule() so reference ownership from entry to nentry becomes
easier.

Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 13 ++-----------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

Comments

Mimi Zohar June 25, 2020, 9:18 p.m. UTC | #1
On Mon, 2020-06-22 at 19:32 -0500, Tyler Hicks wrote:
> The args_p member is a simple string that is allocated by
> ima_rule_init(). Shallow copy it like other non-LSM references in
> ima_rule_entry structs.
> 
> There are no longer any necessary error path cleanups to do in
> ima_lsm_copy_rule() so reference ownership from entry to nentry becomes
> easier.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
> ---
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 13 ++-----------
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index e33347148aa9..e9c7d318fdd4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -306,10 +306,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>  			continue;
>  
>  		nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type;
> -		nentry->lsm[i].args_p = kstrdup(entry->lsm[i].args_p,
> -						GFP_KERNEL);
> -		if (!nentry->lsm[i].args_p)
> -			goto out_err;
> +		nentry->lsm[i].args_p = entry->lsm[i].args_p;
> +		entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;

Nice.

>  
>  		security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
>  					  Audit_equal,
> @@ -325,13 +323,6 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>  	entry->keyrings = NULL;
>  	entry->template = NULL;
>  	return nentry;
> -
> -out_err:
> -	nentry->fsname = NULL;
> -	nentry->keyrings = NULL;
> -	nentry->template = NULL;
> -	ima_free_rule(nentry);
> -	return NULL;
>  }

Definitely moving ima_free_rule() to the subsequent patch makes sense.

Mimi

>  
>  static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)

Patch
diff mbox series

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e33347148aa9..e9c7d318fdd4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -306,10 +306,8 @@  static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 			continue;
 
 		nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type;
-		nentry->lsm[i].args_p = kstrdup(entry->lsm[i].args_p,
-						GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!nentry->lsm[i].args_p)
-			goto out_err;
+		nentry->lsm[i].args_p = entry->lsm[i].args_p;
+		entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
 
 		security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
 					  Audit_equal,
@@ -325,13 +323,6 @@  static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	entry->keyrings = NULL;
 	entry->template = NULL;
 	return nentry;
-
-out_err:
-	nentry->fsname = NULL;
-	nentry->keyrings = NULL;
-	nentry->template = NULL;
-	ima_free_rule(nentry);
-	return NULL;
 }
 
 static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)