From patchwork Thu Jul 9 00:12:23 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Casey Schaufler X-Patchwork-Id: 11653055 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2E4631709 for ; Thu, 9 Jul 2020 00:31:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 15DA820739 for ; Thu, 9 Jul 2020 00:31:09 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=yahoo.com header.i=@yahoo.com header.b="fe/2kW0H" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726118AbgGIAbI (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Jul 2020 20:31:08 -0400 Received: from sonic310-23.consmr.mail.bf2.yahoo.com ([74.6.135.197]:41182 "EHLO sonic310-23.consmr.mail.bf2.yahoo.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726100AbgGIAbI (ORCPT ); Wed, 8 Jul 2020 20:31:08 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=yahoo.com; s=s2048; t=1594254665; bh=8Xj9Lax9lenKkxM8g2QwiadQG1SiC0sJyjF6lj6tgYM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From:Subject; b=fe/2kW0HHqGGLUJ360nOTUgHbWKHvIwqOtUiuUYqUQ5F/m83hs+Y8LJw6i5wvoYaO6N492baAXLFnfADFKLsE26jctjBeoQOXch++BhTpUktwIdSi9DKRkPpVvTVZXOE8Hy77h5QnKIGhQDO0HR7Fmvckw7N1xlCe63FkC/lNRqVOhagMjmoLHq0zLbtRRg1JRBYl3jqucUwD7dJes7aZGAN11u7VbvIllf21s/Td1vfZBDrxw72A/ugoOXwzfaQhpR/jr+ig6B5oNy8IAhJRAqKVQw4NWFXU3AfRi5gkBzOqog7YsTl8e91TfPRVa6FVBhhnV423JI9FZMqs/Vr+w== X-YMail-OSG: jWxwphoVM1mMc8xuUraeUG54C4NSJbwAtTsBGN3iiVJ7P88UOC9IHnerU4Vl7.D qR.OiLttYpukCZooXgJH_dGxqZy3Yik23PzGB0JjJS5wze95wDkyyH8FCHCzpVVQITevLxahaLIM iCddmMtO253zDE7CQ4klR2kvTk6rqbCbTyQoKhf11Yljq1KJDjwJjJQl0qlW1Ljv0B.FkSO15ZPZ .OUcNu28H6rx_n2Hqahl.Qg4.0.SMAHaBwdJw.LFtxkdM65_DZDj01VLLZ0.YJJR7jJA2pDI5Iji iJyfVcXAfwjjIR2kJxgmSX.5ihvW5fAXWfaLevn.UTaL2KGTJSVeQynQI7e7cXlgDM3wxEjOEBfW hjVkyWrn4Wzjveb_pi_QIehzphTVrYaXpC_clVlW8SiRE33k32utNB29o_UM07aKPbXlyEeCvNXU jV7raAKqt0f_Vi3XVBoSoKF9x2P1VkDU783Wgd1nu8wy6y3iBg5yAQalRTHYQDzCVkOEIsUFD1Wj mrMSJrgv.OiP2ShJqfAFD4Ze2_abRjrcZWbLJ.JVnfaBot_US.0IAafw7TOObEeQqj0ADRp0Unx. 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Change the IMA functions to pass the lsmblob to be compatible with the LSM functions. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: John Johansen Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 11 +++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 10 ++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 ++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 35 +++++++++++---------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 +++++------ 5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 64bff42f5d56..b83b0c06d9bc 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -236,9 +236,9 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {} #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS */ /* LIM API function definitions */ -int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, - int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, - struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, + struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, + int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *keyring); int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, @@ -264,8 +264,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry); const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename); /* IMA policy related functions */ -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, - enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, + struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, + int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *keyring); void ima_init_policy(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index bf22de8b7ce0..ea78825e0033 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy. * @inode: pointer to inode to measure * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate - * @secid: secid of the task being validated + * @blob: LSM data of the task being validated * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC, * MAY_APPEND) * @func: caller identifier @@ -183,16 +183,16 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask. * */ -int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, - int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, - struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, + struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, + int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *keyring) { int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH; flags &= ima_policy_flag; - return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr, + return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, blob, func, mask, flags, pcr, template_desc, keyring); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 3dfb573c7171..bf66e3e6f398 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -54,10 +54,8 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) return 0; security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */ - return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], func, - mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, - NULL); + return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), &blob, func, mask, + IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL); } static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index e70d8626208c..5093f9b4db8b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -188,8 +188,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) } static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, - u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func) + struct lsmblob *blob, char *buf, loff_t size, + int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. */ - action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr, + action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, blob, mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL); violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) && (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE)); @@ -386,8 +386,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */ - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); } @@ -426,8 +425,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); - /* scaffolding */ - action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], 0, + action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), &blob, 0, MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0); /* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */ @@ -466,16 +464,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct lsmblob blob; security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ - ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], - NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); + ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0, + MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) return ret; security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob); - /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ - return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0], - NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); + return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &blob, NULL, 0, + MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); } /** @@ -493,8 +489,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) struct lsmblob blob; security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0, + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } @@ -675,9 +670,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf, - size, MAY_READ, func); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, buf, size, + MAY_READ, func); } /** @@ -773,9 +767,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, */ if (func) { security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding */ - action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], 0, - func, &pcr, &template, keyring); + action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), &blob, 0, func, + &pcr, &template, keyring); if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE)) return; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 8f9c66a0a612..6a8f347001fd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, * @rule: a pointer to a rule * @inode: a pointer to an inode * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation - * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated + * @blob: the lsm data of the task to be validated * @func: LIM hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @keyring: keyring name to check in policy for KEY_CHECK func @@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, * Returns true on rule match, false on failure. */ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, const char *keyring) { @@ -500,7 +500,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid); rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, @@ -544,7 +543,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is * being made - * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated + * @blob: LSM data of the task to be validated * @func: IMA hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @pcr: set the pcr to extend @@ -559,8 +558,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, - enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, + struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, + int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *keyring) { @@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, if (!(entry->action & actmask)) continue; - if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask, + if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, blob, func, mask, keyring)) continue;