[v3,05/12] ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook is combined with an invalid cond
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Message ID 20200709061911.954326-6-tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com
State New
Headers show
Series
  • ima: Fix rule parsing bugs and extend KEXEC_CMDLINE rule support
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Commit Message

Tyler Hicks July 9, 2020, 6:19 a.m. UTC
The KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function only supports the pcr conditional. Make
this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that
other conditionals are supported.

Since KEXEC_CMDLINE's inception, ima_match_rules() has always returned
true on any loaded KEXEC_CMDLINE rule without any consideration for
other conditionals present in the rule. Make it clear that pcr is the
only supported KEXEC_CMDLINE conditional by returning an error during
policy load.

An example of why this is a problem can be explained with the following
rule:

 dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t

An IMA policy author would have assumed that rule is valid because the
parser accepted it but the result was that measurements for all
KEXEC_CMDLINE operations would be disabled.

Fixes: b0935123a183 ("IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
---

* v3
  - Adjust for the indentation change introduced in patch #4
  - Added Lakshmi's Reviewed-by
* v2
  - Added Mimi's Reviewed-by

 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

Patch
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diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 40c28f1a6a5a..1c64bd6f1728 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -343,6 +343,17 @@  static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static bool ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
+		if (entry->lsm[i].args_p)
+			return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 /*
  * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
  * to the old, stale LSM policy.  Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
@@ -998,6 +1009,16 @@  static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		/* Validation of these hook functions is in ima_parse_rule() */
 		break;
 	case KEXEC_CMDLINE:
+		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
+			return false;
+
+		if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_PCR))
+			return false;
+
+		if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry))
+			return false;
+
+		break;
 	case KEY_CHECK:
 		if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE))
 			return false;