[RFC,07/15] Documentation/pkeys: Update documentation for kernel pkeys
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Message ID 20200714070220.3500839-8-ira.weiny@intel.com
State New
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Series
  • PKS: Add Protection Keys Supervisor (PKS) support
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Commit Message

Ira Weiny July 14, 2020, 7:02 a.m. UTC
From: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>

Future Intel CPUS will support Protection Key Supervisor (PKS).

Update the protection key documentation to cover pkeys on supervisor
pages.

Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
---
 Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst | 81 +++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

Patch
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diff --git a/Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst b/Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst
index ec575e72d0b2..5ac400a5a306 100644
--- a/Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst
+++ b/Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst
@@ -4,25 +4,33 @@ 
 Memory Protection Keys
 ======================
 
-Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU aka PKEYs) is a feature
-which is found on Intel's Skylake (and later) "Scalable Processor"
-Server CPUs. It will be available in future non-server Intel parts
-and future AMD processors.
-
-For anyone wishing to test or use this feature, it is available in
-Amazon's EC2 C5 instances and is known to work there using an Ubuntu
-17.04 image.
-
 Memory Protection Keys provides a mechanism for enforcing page-based
 protections, but without requiring modification of the page tables
-when an application changes protection domains.  It works by
-dedicating 4 previously ignored bits in each page table entry to a
-"protection key", giving 16 possible keys.
+when an application changes protection domains.
+
+PKeys Userspace (PKU) is a feature which is found on Intel's Skylake "Scalable
+Processor" Server CPUs and later.  And It will be available in future
+non-server Intel parts and future AMD processors.
+
+Future Intel processors will support Protection Keys for Supervisor pages
+(PKS).
+
+For anyone wishing to test or use user space pkeys, it is available in Amazon's
+EC2 C5 instances and is known to work there using an Ubuntu 17.04 image.
+
+pkes work by dedicating 4 previously Reserved bits in each page table entry to
+a "protection key", giving 16 possible keys.  User and Supervisor pages are
+treated separately.
 
-There is also a new user-accessible register (PKRU) with two separate
-bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key.  Being a CPU
-register, PKRU is inherently thread-local, potentially giving each
-thread a different set of protections from every other thread.
+Protections for each page are controlled with per CPU registers for each type
+of page User and Supervisor.  Each of these 32 bit register stores two separate
+bits (Access Disable and Write Disable) for each key.
+
+For Userspace the register is user-accessible (rdpkru/wrpkru).  For
+Supervisor, the register (MSR_IA32_PKRS) is accessible only to the kernel.
+
+Being a CPU register, pkes are inherently thread-local, potentially giving
+each thread an independent set of protections from every other thread.
 
 There are two new instructions (RDPKRU/WRPKRU) for reading and writing
 to the new register.  The feature is only available in 64-bit mode,
@@ -30,8 +38,11 @@  even though there is theoretically space in the PAE PTEs.  These
 permissions are enforced on data access only and have no effect on
 instruction fetches.
 
-Syscalls
-========
+For kernel space rdmsr/wrmsr are used to access the kernel MSRs.
+
+
+Syscalls for user space keys
+============================
 
 There are 3 system calls which directly interact with pkeys::
 
@@ -98,3 +109,37 @@  with a read()::
 The kernel will send a SIGSEGV in both cases, but si_code will be set
 to SEGV_PKERR when violating protection keys versus SEGV_ACCERR when
 the plain mprotect() permissions are violated.
+
+
+Kernel API for PKS support
+==========================
+
+PKS is intended to harden against unwanted access to kernel pages.  But it does
+not completely restrict access under all conditions.  For example the MSR
+setting is not saved/restored during irqs.  Thus the use of PKS is a mitigation
+strategy rather than a form of strict security.
+
+The following calls are used to allocate, use, and deallocate a pkey which
+defines a 'protection domain' within the kernel.  Setting a pkey value in a
+supervisor mapping adds that mapping to the protection domain.  Then calls can be
+used to enable/disable read and/or write access to all of the pages mapped with
+that key:
+
+        int pks_key_alloc(const char * const pkey_user);
+        #define PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY(pkey)
+        #define _PAGE_KEY(pkey)
+        int pks_update_protection(int pkey, unsigned long protection);
+        void pks_key_free(int pkey);
+
+In-kernel users must be prepared to set PAGE_KERNEL_PKEY() permission in the
+page table entries for the mappings they want to ptorect.
+
+WARNING: It is imperative that callers check for errors from pks_key_alloc()
+because pkeys are a limited resource and so callers should be prepared to work
+without PKS support.
+
+For admins a debugfs interface provides a list of the current keys in use at:
+
+        /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pks_keys_allocated
+
+Some example code can be found in lib/pks/pks_test.c