[v2,4/5] LSM: Define SELinux function to measure security state
diff mbox series

Message ID 20200716174351.20128-5-nramas@linux.microsoft.com
State New
Headers show
Series
  • LSM: Measure security module state
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Commit Message

Lakshmi Ramasubramanian July 16, 2020, 5:43 p.m. UTC
SELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this
security module that needs to be measured. To enable this measurement
SELinux needs to implement the interface function,
security_measure_data(), that the LSM can call.

Define the security_state() function in SELinux to measure SELinux
configuration and policy. Call this function to measure SELinux data
when there is a change in the security module's state.

Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy:

10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state 656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574706565723d313b6f70656e7065726d3d313b657874736f636b636c6173733d313b616c776179736e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75707365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e706e6f737569647472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66737365636c6162656c73796d6c696e6b3d303b
10 f4a7...9408 ima-buf sha256:4941...68fc selinux-policy-hash 8d1d...1834

The data for selinux-state in the above measurement is:
enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;

The data for selinux-policy-hash in the above measurement is
the SHA256 hash of the SELinux policy.

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
---
 security/selinux/Makefile           |   2 +
 security/selinux/hooks.c            |   4 +
 security/selinux/include/security.h |  26 +++++
 security/selinux/measure.c          | 158 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        |   1 +
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |  66 ++++++++++--
 6 files changed, 248 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c

Comments

Stephen Smalley July 16, 2020, 6:54 p.m. UTC | #1
On Thu, Jul 16, 2020 at 1:44 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
<nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>
> SELinux configuration and policy are some of the critical data for this
> security module that needs to be measured. To enable this measurement
> SELinux needs to implement the interface function,
> security_measure_data(), that the LSM can call.
>
> Define the security_state() function in SELinux to measure SELinux
> configuration and policy. Call this function to measure SELinux data
> when there is a change in the security module's state.
>
> Sample measurement of SELinux state and hash of the policy:
>
> 10 e32e...5ac3 ima-buf sha256:86e8...4594 selinux-state 656e61626c65643d313b656e666f7263696e673d303b636865636b72657170726f743d313b6e6574706565723d313b6f70656e7065726d3d313b657874736f636b636c6173733d313b616c776179736e6574776f726b3d303b6367726f75707365636c6162656c3d313b6e6e706e6f737569647472616e736974696f6e3d313b67656e66737365636c6162656c73796d6c696e6b3d303b
> 10 f4a7...9408 ima-buf sha256:4941...68fc selinux-policy-hash 8d1d...1834
>
> The data for selinux-state in the above measurement is:
> enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;
>
> The data for selinux-policy-hash in the above measurement is
> the SHA256 hash of the SELinux policy.

Can you show an example of how to verify that the above measurement
matches a given state and policy, e.g. the sha256sum commands and
inputs to reproduce the same from an expected state and policy?

>
> Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
> Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
> ---

> diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..27cbb309e926
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/selinux/measure.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
> +/*
> + * Measure SELinux state using IMA subsystem.
> + */
> +#include <linux/ima.h>
> +#include "security.h"
> +
> +/* Pre-allocated buffer used for measuring state */
> +static char *selinux_state_string;
> +static size_t selinux_state_string_len;
> +static char *selinux_state_string_fmt =
> +       "%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;";
> +
> +void __init selinux_init_measurement(void)
> +{
> +       selinux_state_string_len =
> +       snprintf(NULL, 0, selinux_state_string_fmt,
> +       "enabled", 0,
> +       "enforcing", 0,
> +       "checkreqprot", 0,
> +       selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER], 0,
> +       selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM], 0,
> +       selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS], 0,
> +       selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK], 0,
> +       selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL], 0,
> +       selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION], 0,
> +       selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS],
> +       0);

I was thinking you'd dynamically construct the format string with a
for loop from 0 to POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
and likewise for the values so that we wouldn't have to patch this
code every time we add a new one.

> +
> +       if (selinux_state_string_len < 0)
> +               return;

How can this happen legitimately (i.e. as a result of something other
than a kernel bug)?

> +
> +       ++selinux_state_string_len;
> +
> +       selinux_state_string = kzalloc(selinux_state_string_len, GFP_KERNEL);
> +       if (!selinux_state_string)
> +               selinux_state_string_len = 0;
> +}

Not sure about this error handling approach (silent, proceeding as if
the length was zero and then later failing with ENOMEM on every
attempt?). I'd be more inclined to panic/BUG here but I know Linus
doesn't like that.

> +       if (ret)
> +               pr_err("%s: error %d\n", __func__, ret);

This doesn't seem terribly useful as an error message; I'd be inclined
to drop it.
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian July 16, 2020, 7:13 p.m. UTC | #2
On 7/16/20 11:54 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:

>> The data for selinux-state in the above measurement is:
>> enabled=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;
>>
>> The data for selinux-policy-hash in the above measurement is
>> the SHA256 hash of the SELinux policy.
> 
> Can you show an example of how to verify that the above measurement
> matches a given state and policy, e.g. the sha256sum commands and
> inputs to reproduce the same from an expected state and policy?
Sure - I'll provide an example.

>> +/* Pre-allocated buffer used for measuring state */
>> +static char *selinux_state_string;
>> +static size_t selinux_state_string_len;
>> +static char *selinux_state_string_fmt =
>> +       "%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;";
>> +
>> +void __init selinux_init_measurement(void)
>> +{
>> +       selinux_state_string_len =
>> +       snprintf(NULL, 0, selinux_state_string_fmt,
>> +       "enabled", 0,
>> +       "enforcing", 0,
>> +       "checkreqprot", 0,
>> +       selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER], 0,
>> +       selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM], 0,
>> +       selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS], 0,
>> +       selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK], 0,
>> +       selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL], 0,
>> +       selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION], 0,
>> +       selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS],
>> +       0);
> 
> I was thinking you'd dynamically construct the format string with a
> for loop from 0 to POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
> and likewise for the values so that we wouldn't have to patch this
> code every time we add a new one.
That's a good point - will do.

> 
>> +
>> +       if (selinux_state_string_len < 0)
>> +               return;
> 
> How can this happen legitimately (i.e. as a result of something other
> than a kernel bug)?
Since snprintf can return an error I wanted to handle that. But I agree 
this should not happen for the input data to snprintf used here.

> 
>> +
>> +       ++selinux_state_string_len;
>> +
>> +       selinux_state_string = kzalloc(selinux_state_string_len, GFP_KERNEL);
>> +       if (!selinux_state_string)
>> +               selinux_state_string_len = 0;
>> +}
> 
> Not sure about this error handling approach (silent, proceeding as if
> the length was zero and then later failing with ENOMEM on every
> attempt?). I'd be more inclined to panic/BUG here but I know Linus
> doesn't like that.
I am not sure if failing (kernel panic/BUG) to "measure" LSM data under 
memory pressure conditions is the right thing. But I am open to treating 
this error as a fatal error. Please let me know.

> 
>> +       if (ret)
>> +               pr_err("%s: error %d\n", __func__, ret);
> 
> This doesn't seem terribly useful as an error message; I'd be inclined
> to drop it.
> 
Will do.

thanks,
  -lakshmi
Stephen Smalley July 16, 2020, 7:45 p.m. UTC | #3
On Thu, Jul 16, 2020 at 3:13 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
<nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>
> On 7/16/20 11:54 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > Not sure about this error handling approach (silent, proceeding as if
> > the length was zero and then later failing with ENOMEM on every
> > attempt?). I'd be more inclined to panic/BUG here but I know Linus
> > doesn't like that.
> I am not sure if failing (kernel panic/BUG) to "measure" LSM data under
> memory pressure conditions is the right thing. But I am open to treating
> this error as a fatal error. Please let me know.

Let's at least log an error message since it otherwise silently
disables all measuring of security state.
Also not sure why we bother returning errors from
selinux_measure_data() since nothing appears to check or use the
result.
Don't know if integrity/IMA has any equivalent to the audit
subsystem's concept of audit_failure settings to control whether
errors that prevent auditing (measuring) are handled silently, with a
log message, or via a panic.  If not, I guess that can be explored
separately.
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian July 16, 2020, 10:03 p.m. UTC | #4
On 7/16/20 12:45 PM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 16, 2020 at 3:13 PM Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
> <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 7/16/20 11:54 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
>>> Not sure about this error handling approach (silent, proceeding as if
>>> the length was zero and then later failing with ENOMEM on every
>>> attempt?). I'd be more inclined to panic/BUG here but I know Linus
>>> doesn't like that.
>> I am not sure if failing (kernel panic/BUG) to "measure" LSM data under
>> memory pressure conditions is the right thing. But I am open to treating
>> this error as a fatal error. Please let me know.
> 
> Let's at least log an error message since it otherwise silently
> disables all measuring of security state.
Agree - will log error messages as appropriate.

> Also not sure why we bother returning errors from
> selinux_measure_data() since nothing appears to check or use the
> result.
Maybe SELinux can log audit messages on failures, but I guess it may be 
better to do that closer to where the error occurs.

Will change selinux_measure_data() to void function.

> Don't know if integrity/IMA has any equivalent to the audit
> subsystem's concept of audit_failure settings to control whether
> errors that prevent auditing (measuring) are handled silently, with a
> log message, or via a panic.  If not, I guess that can be explored
> separately.
> 

Yes - integrity subsystem logs audit messages for errors\failures.

  -lakshmi

Patch
diff mbox series

diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index 4d8e0e8adf0b..83d512116341 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@  selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o
 
 selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o
 
+selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += measure.o
+
 ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include
 
 $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index efa6108b1ce9..cda1d328339f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7259,6 +7259,8 @@  static __init int selinux_init(void)
 
 	fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
 
+	selinux_init_measurement();
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -7284,6 +7286,7 @@  DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
 	.enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
 	.blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
 	.init = selinux_init,
+	.security_measure_data = selinux_measure_data,
 };
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
@@ -7394,6 +7397,7 @@  int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
 	}
 
 	selinux_mark_disabled(state);
+	selinux_measure_state(state);
 
 	pr_info("SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index b0e02cfe3ce1..628062ff9bba 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -222,16 +222,42 @@  static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)
 	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS];
 }
 
+static inline bool selinux_checkreqprot(const struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(state->checkreqprot);
+}
+
 int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state);
 int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
 			 void *data, size_t len);
 int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
 			 void **data, size_t *len);
+int security_read_policy_kernel(struct selinux_state *state,
+				void **data, size_t *len);
 size_t security_policydb_len(struct selinux_state *state);
 
 int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state,
 				 unsigned int req_cap);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+extern void __init selinux_init_measurement(void);
+extern int selinux_measure_data(void);
+extern int selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state);
+#else
+static inline void __init selinux_init_measurement(void) {}
+
+static inline int selinux_measure_data(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_measure_state(
+	struct selinux_state *selinux_state)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 #define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
 struct av_decision {
 	u32 allowed;
diff --git a/security/selinux/measure.c b/security/selinux/measure.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..27cbb309e926
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/measure.c
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ 
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Measure SELinux state using IMA subsystem.
+ */
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include "security.h"
+
+/* Pre-allocated buffer used for measuring state */
+static char *selinux_state_string;
+static size_t selinux_state_string_len;
+static char *selinux_state_string_fmt =
+	"%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;%s=%d;";
+
+void __init selinux_init_measurement(void)
+{
+	selinux_state_string_len =
+	snprintf(NULL, 0, selinux_state_string_fmt,
+	"enabled", 0,
+	"enforcing", 0,
+	"checkreqprot", 0,
+	selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER], 0,
+	selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM], 0,
+	selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS], 0,
+	selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK], 0,
+	selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL], 0,
+	selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION], 0,
+	selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS],
+	0);
+
+	if (selinux_state_string_len < 0)
+		return;
+
+	++selinux_state_string_len;
+
+	selinux_state_string = kzalloc(selinux_state_string_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!selinux_state_string)
+		selinux_state_string_len = 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_hash_policy(const char *hash_alg_name,
+			       void *policy, size_t policy_len,
+			       void **policy_hash, int *policy_hash_len)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	struct shash_desc *desc = NULL;
+	void *digest = NULL;
+	int desc_size;
+	int digest_size;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg_name, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+	desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
+	digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+	digest = kmalloc(digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!digest) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!desc) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	desc->tfm = tfm;
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, policy, policy_len, digest);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto error;
+
+	*policy_hash_len = digest_size;
+	*policy_hash = digest;
+	digest = NULL;
+
+error:
+	kfree(desc);
+	kfree(digest);
+
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+
+	if (ret)
+		pr_err("%s: error %d\n", __func__, ret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int selinux_measure_state(struct selinux_state *selinux_state)
+{
+	void *policy = NULL;
+	void *policy_hash = NULL;
+	int count;
+	size_t buflen;
+	int policy_hash_len;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!selinux_initialized(selinux_state))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (!selinux_state_string)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	count =
+	snprintf(
+	selinux_state_string, selinux_state_string_len,
+	selinux_state_string_fmt,
+	"enabled", !selinux_disabled(selinux_state),
+	"enforcing", enforcing_enabled(selinux_state),
+	"checkreqprot", selinux_checkreqprot(selinux_state),
+	selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER],
+	selinux_state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER],
+	selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM],
+	selinux_state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM],
+	selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS],
+	selinux_state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS],
+	selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK],
+	selinux_state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK],
+	selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL],
+	selinux_state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL],
+	selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION],
+	selinux_state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION],
+	selinux_policycap_names[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS],
+	selinux_state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]);
+
+	if (count >= 0 && count < selinux_state_string_len)
+		ima_lsm_state("selinux-state", selinux_state_string, count);
+	else {
+		pr_err("selinux state error: %d\n", count);
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	rc = security_read_policy_kernel(selinux_state, &policy, &buflen);
+	if (!rc)
+		rc = selinux_hash_policy("sha256", policy, buflen,
+					 &policy_hash, &policy_hash_len);
+	if (!rc)
+		ima_lsm_state("selinux-policy-hash", policy_hash,
+			      policy_hash_len);
+
+out:
+	vfree(policy);
+	kfree(policy_hash);
+
+	if (rc)
+		pr_err("%s: error %d\n", __func__, rc);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+int selinux_measure_data(void)
+{
+	return selinux_measure_state(&selinux_state);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 4781314c2510..b1f70739d709 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@  static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
 			audit_get_sessionid(current));
 		enforcing_set(state, new_value);
+		selinux_measure_state(&selinux_state);
 		if (new_value)
 			avc_ss_reset(state->avc, 0);
 		selnl_notify_setenforce(new_value);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index ef0afd878bfc..79a6b462f1fe 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3720,14 +3720,22 @@  int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
 
+static int security_read_policy_len(struct selinux_state *state, size_t *len)
+{
+	if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	*len = security_policydb_len(state);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * security_read_policy - read the policy.
  * @data: binary policy data
  * @len: length of data in bytes
- *
  */
-int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
-			 void **data, size_t *len)
+int security_read_selinux_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 void **data, size_t *len)
 {
 	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	int rc;
@@ -3736,12 +3744,6 @@  int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
 	if (!selinux_initialized(state))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	*len = security_policydb_len(state);
-
-	*data = vmalloc_user(*len);
-	if (!*data)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
 	fp.data = *data;
 	fp.len = *len;
 
@@ -3754,5 +3756,51 @@  int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
 
 	*len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data;
 	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_read_policy - read the policy.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ */
+int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 void **data, size_t *len)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = security_read_policy_len(state, len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	*data = vmalloc_user(*len);
+	if (!*data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return security_read_selinux_policy(state, data, len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_read_policy_kernel - read the policy.
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ * Allocates kernel memory for reading SELinux policy.
+ * This function is for internal use only and should not
+ * be used for returning data to user space
+ */
+int security_read_policy_kernel(struct selinux_state *state,
+				void **data, size_t *len)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = security_read_policy_len(state, len);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	*data = vmalloc(*len);
+	if (!*data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	return security_read_selinux_policy(state, data, len);
 }