From patchwork Fri Jul 24 20:32:15 2020 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: Casey Schaufler X-Patchwork-Id: 11684287 Return-Path: Received: from mail.kernel.org (pdx-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.123]) by pdx-korg-patchwork-2.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A6D6913A4 for ; Fri, 24 Jul 2020 20:46:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7C3E02070E for ; Fri, 24 Jul 2020 20:46:06 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=yahoo.com header.i=@yahoo.com header.b="qNjim3EO" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727051AbgGXUqF (ORCPT ); Fri, 24 Jul 2020 16:46:05 -0400 Received: from sonic311-22.consmr.mail.bf2.yahoo.com ([74.6.131.196]:37364 "EHLO sonic311-22.consmr.mail.bf2.yahoo.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727040AbgGXUqC (ORCPT ); Fri, 24 Jul 2020 16:46:02 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=yahoo.com; s=s2048; t=1595623559; bh=b7wuN8afpWNgMv8kzGzPK3VJGEaAT6lmwVX6V51b30s=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From:Subject; b=qNjim3EOaIyIfvQxNtQ99BQYYa2NKH9gS3iS4p5TCje19sI/fY44wVO+AFN2Ztnuk6s/1Umkaua6bE6TXY2Qc47x6ezKbC7fGBBbMSk32dxw0golqk+LIThnTxwzxzb+w5E7/L9pRnmE1XVnWjLIswXRK0ICdoehHNml6wop4IcrR3vB7cCZZEC1Aioq8adIuP/tyQ5gIEU7BDZ2wjmbXCbh5KEAjDKPgXWa+Dg8AxPCOauXeUE5AVPm7+Pg5u5d0vQ18Qt4DWjVfDb6lE+UgCEPJr74EFYNi2CgEoUYjAux6/lr7Bjtt8RyR+rewlRyl0uDVg++JY2njibv7TI2sg== X-YMail-OSG: 5a6jXtIVM1n2.ErlHez_NHwoGr10NjqnTD3fF5tqv2nqAqGfHsaKqt_egRsBQ.j M7UB1lpcAch9boOR.83bRBzxTMMj7LdwbGFjhUwea7hclvinfDdHDLoqX8iwCrBddsmw.adyr6WJ ZweAnMeSmrWsqxh2CR4So4xEvmL0Y49HzOXAHen7YmkKvglnmX6_VTgr1JbjtcQTzEuTiO5deZUu jHMmiAyaunpUM0IFTmEkkKUfp.QfOdjm5uWE.AZ4e_mcSXMSIgF8Bm0wNnQqDRxRjdt1dBv2Cs5E Kerf19zO2qGhE7O3qghOHr0jhwREKWne7x1mUaYjlbxHJTEcuZHqqm1NuF4_wsBUY9fV6Evr.2jc 50WljIc3SpsCrRYrlNzqsfnqKHrye3E.AUdjBDc.7ETvqfq8oUPHtQvKi0HO0xSr_JgiDFfsQ0.0 CopXfZWcd.gZ3sjvteiPNv.UTXpaP_wdWWWZcQKiySxKLxSO9dxgLOeJvf0GWDRDYY00SH9pMVsT hTpyL_h0bDLhOR4nTYM5LhapeOlUYEb09k_mZovrsjvDsUBR.ZLOxrzV1V9mrQJc9ajkOcYAs8tn dAtZHXfgwgvPxDkqdGE9KxEHa7xm0shoI1hYeHpfW4ff4yQJiuNHChszteoyGJU7QHpTjCPUOZtn 53d1ninvCzAkVl3BLHpGrKowNiMsEvgoH3mhdx1Ll7iXvRT96CCJjk4egQaZy.ht3ZokCgCYcUxJ rKS.HcUv8kzpsUlom7tfTUXlDecQuRob8sFpIabkUsNs6SAT1A_b6LkGSYapqVTsA2KQ4Psr9EYC 7QWvQsd6osMmYV__8pBMtCfNfiwxYQsdvJYpd6YUxzqrtqrQEgKbVzwZW0bJ9e6GhvxrXRHDUj5V LfoQ.sUcobpqDayzeo1DrQV5yFKsQoGN56E2cRlbCNCGYRsbfNY90uJ3PW573wMYdC.XLxL1f5ot l2AFaM.mB3BL0fQSw2C1p2NR97FS2xF.cZfp3a48WPxOC8MzIn2n.zXQD9WxjeJ69th6OaubyxgQ GBs8kCbmziOrWFg0MICJjNWC3TfJCwmPBqzeYd39ynWWRhaLjwFckVujRnjgXY_YlrOQmGamT69f 3SmlPZpVJEH78j1C8glg5SdSnSbJFvpmlyP9z0R2oKa5Fppn8qieL7KmKPHpouD041hxMDCzfU.F Kr_9ekjVuc2Y1dTeJn2E__bh9NcGSESWECOhy78zjnKEpDYdtT3dKBFs_1F_41cefmrqEE0OFXfS yxwW1uTiDMsOsji2.Q3Ct8PMlV67CNy4dWOw8HPJf9DVYCOBMkE3.y7VQ9zirCBcDSs_qM6o10FP YpcerRH3qvngZRV7c1_3wPITh3dzXGF1sinltKVRRWyHFQ1DeZsaeoLek0PoAQQC2Wa6IKlPHz8e N5X_Bm_1QJ25WQK8pwg40mCKNC8MKBDXwtQ-- Received: from sonic.gate.mail.ne1.yahoo.com by sonic311.consmr.mail.bf2.yahoo.com with HTTP; Fri, 24 Jul 2020 20:45:59 +0000 Received: by smtp429.mail.ne1.yahoo.com (VZM Hermes SMTP Server) with ESMTPA ID cac514323d65cabcf7715e3da7c14d39; Fri, 24 Jul 2020 20:45:55 +0000 (UTC) From: Casey Schaufler To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v19 12/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2020 13:32:15 -0700 Message-Id: <20200724203226.16374-13-casey@schaufler-ca.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.24.1 In-Reply-To: <20200724203226.16374-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> References: <20200724203226.16374-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: selinux-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org The IMA interfaces ima_get_action() and ima_match_policy() call LSM functions that use lsmblobs. Change the IMA functions to pass the lsmblob to be compatible with the LSM functions. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: John Johansen Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 11 +++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 10 ++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 ++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 35 +++++++++++---------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 +++++------ 5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index d72af93f8d6f..0c4787c71162 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -236,9 +236,9 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {} #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS */ /* LIM API function definitions */ -int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, - int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, - struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, + struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, + int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *keyring); int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, @@ -264,8 +264,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry); const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename); /* IMA policy related functions */ -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, - enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, + struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, + int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *keyring); void ima_init_policy(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index bf22de8b7ce0..ea78825e0033 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy. * @inode: pointer to inode to measure * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate - * @secid: secid of the task being validated + * @blob: LSM data of the task being validated * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC, * MAY_APPEND) * @func: caller identifier @@ -183,16 +183,16 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask. * */ -int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, - int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, - struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, +int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, + struct lsmblob *blob, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, + int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *keyring) { int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH; flags &= ima_policy_flag; - return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr, + return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, blob, func, mask, flags, pcr, template_desc, keyring); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 3dfb573c7171..bf66e3e6f398 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -54,10 +54,8 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) return 0; security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding the .secid[0] */ - return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], func, - mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, - NULL); + return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), &blob, func, mask, + IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL); } static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index e70d8626208c..5093f9b4db8b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -188,8 +188,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) } static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, - u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func) + struct lsmblob *blob, char *buf, loff_t size, + int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. */ - action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr, + action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, blob, mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL); violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) && (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE)); @@ -386,8 +386,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */ - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); } @@ -426,8 +425,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); - /* scaffolding */ - action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], 0, + action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), &blob, 0, MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0); /* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */ @@ -466,16 +464,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct lsmblob blob; security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ - ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], - NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); + ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0, + MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) return ret; security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &blob); - /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ - return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0], - NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); + return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &blob, NULL, 0, + MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); } /** @@ -493,8 +489,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) struct lsmblob blob; security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0, + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } @@ -675,9 +670,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf, - size, MAY_READ, func); + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &blob, buf, size, + MAY_READ, func); } /** @@ -773,9 +767,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, */ if (func) { security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); - /* scaffolding */ - action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], 0, - func, &pcr, &template, keyring); + action = ima_get_action(NULL, current_cred(), &blob, 0, func, + &pcr, &template, keyring); if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE)) return; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 8f9c66a0a612..6a8f347001fd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, * @rule: a pointer to a rule * @inode: a pointer to an inode * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation - * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated + * @blob: the lsm data of the task to be validated * @func: LIM hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @keyring: keyring name to check in policy for KEY_CHECK func @@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, * Returns true on rule match, false on failure. */ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, - const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, + const struct cred *cred, struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, const char *keyring) { @@ -500,7 +500,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - lsmblob_init(&lsmdata, secid); rc = security_filter_rule_match(&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, @@ -544,7 +543,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is * being made - * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated + * @blob: LSM data of the task to be validated * @func: IMA hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @pcr: set the pcr to extend @@ -559,8 +558,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) * list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ -int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, - enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, +int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, + struct lsmblob *blob, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, + int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, const char *keyring) { @@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, if (!(entry->action & actmask)) continue; - if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask, + if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, blob, func, mask, keyring)) continue;