| Message ID | 1437732285-11524-6-git-send-email-l.pawelczyk@samsung.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 12:04:39PM +0200, Lukasz Pawelczyk wrote: > This patch extends smack capability functions to a full list to those > equivalent in the kernel > > has_ns_capability -> smack_has_ns_privilege > has_capability -> smack_has_privilege > ns_capable -> smack_ns_privileged > capable -> smack_privileged > > It also puts the smack related part to a common function: > smack_capability_allowed() > > Those functions will be needed for capability checks in the upcoming > Smack namespace patches. > > Additionally there were 2 smack capability checks that used generic > capability functions instead of specific Smack ones effectively ignoring > the onlycap rule. This has been fixed now with the introduction of those > new functions. > > This has implications on the Smack namespace as well as the additional > Smack checks in smack_capability_allowed() will be extended beyond the > onlycap rule. Not using Smack specific checks in those 2 places could > mean breaking the Smack label namespace separation. > > Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com> > Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> > --- > security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++++ > security/smack/smack_access.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +-- > 3 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h > index 69ab9eb..e11cc13 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack.h > +++ b/security/smack/smack.h > @@ -272,6 +272,11 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int, char *, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *, int); > struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int); > void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp); > struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *); > +int smack_has_ns_privilege(struct task_struct *task, > + struct user_namespace *user_ns, > + int cap); > +int smack_has_privilege(struct task_struct *task, int cap); > +int smack_ns_privileged(struct user_namespace *user_ns, int cap); > int smack_privileged(int cap); > > /* > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c > index 00f6b38..188b354 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c > @@ -629,17 +629,19 @@ LIST_HEAD(smack_onlycap_list); > DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock); > > /* > - * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged > - * by the onlycap rule. > + * Internal smack capability check complimentary to the > + * set of kernel capable() and has_capability() functions > * > - * Returns 1 if the task is allowed to be privileged, 0 if it's not. > + * For a capability in smack related checks to be effective it needs to: > + * - be allowed to be privileged by the onlycap rule. > + * - be in the initial user ns > */ > -int smack_privileged(int cap) > +static int smack_capability_allowed(struct smack_known *skp, > + struct user_namespace *user_ns) > { > - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); > struct smack_onlycap *sop; > > - if (!capable(cap)) > + if (user_ns != &init_user_ns) > return 0; > > rcu_read_lock(); > @@ -658,3 +660,53 @@ int smack_privileged(int cap) > > return 0; > } > + > +/* > + * Is the task privileged in a namespace and allowed to be privileged > + * by additional smack rules. > + */ > +int smack_has_ns_privilege(struct task_struct *task, > + struct user_namespace *user_ns, > + int cap) > +{ > + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(task); > + > + if (!has_ns_capability(task, user_ns, cap)) > + return 0; > + if (smack_capability_allowed(skp, user_ns)) > + return 1; > + return 0; > +} > + > +/* > + * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged > + * by additional smack rules. > + */ > +int smack_has_privilege(struct task_struct *task, int cap) > +{ > + return smack_has_ns_privilege(task, &init_user_ns, cap); > +} > + > +/* > + * Is the current task privileged in a namespace and allowed to be privileged > + * by additional smack rules. > + */ > +int smack_ns_privileged(struct user_namespace *user_ns, int cap) > +{ > + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); > + > + if (!ns_capable(user_ns, cap)) > + return 0; > + if (smack_capability_allowed(skp, user_ns)) > + return 1; > + return 0; > +} > + > +/* > + * Is the current task privileged and allowed to be privileged > + * by additional smack rules. > + */ > +int smack_privileged(int cap) > +{ > + return smack_ns_privileged(&init_user_ns, cap); > +} > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index cdcabf4..6098518 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, > rc = 0; > else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN) > rc = -EACCES; > - else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) > + else if (smack_has_privilege(tracer, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) > rc = 0; > else > rc = -EACCES; > @@ -1805,7 +1805,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, > skp = file->f_security; > rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, NULL); > rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, rc); > - if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) > + if (rc != 0 && smack_has_privilege(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) > rc = 0; > > smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); > -- > 2.4.3 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 69ab9eb..e11cc13 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -272,6 +272,11 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int, char *, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *, int); struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int); void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp); struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *); +int smack_has_ns_privilege(struct task_struct *task, + struct user_namespace *user_ns, + int cap); +int smack_has_privilege(struct task_struct *task, int cap); +int smack_ns_privileged(struct user_namespace *user_ns, int cap); int smack_privileged(int cap); /* diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index 00f6b38..188b354 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -629,17 +629,19 @@ LIST_HEAD(smack_onlycap_list); DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock); /* - * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged - * by the onlycap rule. + * Internal smack capability check complimentary to the + * set of kernel capable() and has_capability() functions * - * Returns 1 if the task is allowed to be privileged, 0 if it's not. + * For a capability in smack related checks to be effective it needs to: + * - be allowed to be privileged by the onlycap rule. + * - be in the initial user ns */ -int smack_privileged(int cap) +static int smack_capability_allowed(struct smack_known *skp, + struct user_namespace *user_ns) { - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); struct smack_onlycap *sop; - if (!capable(cap)) + if (user_ns != &init_user_ns) return 0; rcu_read_lock(); @@ -658,3 +660,53 @@ int smack_privileged(int cap) return 0; } + +/* + * Is the task privileged in a namespace and allowed to be privileged + * by additional smack rules. + */ +int smack_has_ns_privilege(struct task_struct *task, + struct user_namespace *user_ns, + int cap) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(task); + + if (!has_ns_capability(task, user_ns, cap)) + return 0; + if (smack_capability_allowed(skp, user_ns)) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged + * by additional smack rules. + */ +int smack_has_privilege(struct task_struct *task, int cap) +{ + return smack_has_ns_privilege(task, &init_user_ns, cap); +} + +/* + * Is the current task privileged in a namespace and allowed to be privileged + * by additional smack rules. + */ +int smack_ns_privileged(struct user_namespace *user_ns, int cap) +{ + struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); + + if (!ns_capable(user_ns, cap)) + return 0; + if (smack_capability_allowed(skp, user_ns)) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Is the current task privileged and allowed to be privileged + * by additional smack rules. + */ +int smack_privileged(int cap) +{ + return smack_ns_privileged(&init_user_ns, cap); +} diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index cdcabf4..6098518 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, rc = 0; else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN) rc = -EACCES; - else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + else if (smack_has_privilege(tracer, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) rc = 0; else rc = -EACCES; @@ -1805,7 +1805,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, skp = file->f_security; rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, NULL); rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, rc); - if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (rc != 0 && smack_has_privilege(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) rc = 0; smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);