[v3,7/7] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts
diff mbox

Message ID 1447778351-118699-8-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com
State Not Applicable
Headers show

Commit Message

Seth Forshee Nov. 17, 2015, 4:39 p.m. UTC
The SMACK64, SMACK64EXEC, and SMACK64MMAP labels are all handled
differently in untrusted mounts. This is confusing and
potentically problematic. Change this to handle them all the same
way that SMACK64 is currently handled; that is, read the label
from disk and check it at use time. For SMACK64 and SMACK64MMAP
access is denied if the label does not match smk_root. To be
consistent with suid, a SMACK64EXEC label which does not match
smk_root will still allow execution of the file but will not run
with the label supplied in the xattr.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
---
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

Comments

Casey Schaufler Nov. 17, 2015, 6:24 p.m. UTC | #1
On 11/17/2015 8:39 AM, Seth Forshee wrote:
> The SMACK64, SMACK64EXEC, and SMACK64MMAP labels are all handled
> differently in untrusted mounts. This is confusing and
> potentically problematic. Change this to handle them all the same
> way that SMACK64 is currently handled; that is, read the label
> from disk and check it at use time. For SMACK64 and SMACK64MMAP
> access is denied if the label does not match smk_root. To be
> consistent with suid, a SMACK64EXEC label which does not match
> smk_root will still allow execution of the file but will not run
> with the label supplied in the xattr.
>
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>

Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

> ---
>   security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++----------
>   1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 621200f86b56..9b7ff781df9a 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -891,6 +891,7 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>   	struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
>   	struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
>   	struct inode_smack *isp;
> +	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
>   	int rc;
>   
>   	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
> @@ -900,6 +901,11 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>   	if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
>   		return 0;
>   
> +	sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
> +	if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
> +	    isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
> +		return 0;
> +
>   	if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
>   		struct task_struct *tracer;
>   		rc = 0;
> @@ -1703,6 +1709,7 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
>   	struct task_smack *tsp;
>   	struct smack_known *okp;
>   	struct inode_smack *isp;
> +	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
>   	int may;
>   	int mmay;
>   	int tmay;
> @@ -1714,6 +1721,10 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
>   	isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
>   	if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
>   		return 0;
> +	sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
> +	if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
> +	    isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
> +		return -EACCES;
>   	mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
>   
>   	tsp = current_security();
> @@ -3492,16 +3503,14 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
>   			if (rc >= 0)
>   				transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
>   		}
> -		if (!(sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED)) {
> -			/*
> -			 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
> -			 */
> -			skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
> -			if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
> -			    skp == &smack_known_web)
> -				skp = NULL;
> -			isp->smk_task = skp;
> -		}
> +		/*
> +		 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
> +		 */
> +		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
> +		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
> +		    skp == &smack_known_web)
> +			skp = NULL;
> +		isp->smk_task = skp;
>   
>   		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
>   		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
James Morris Nov. 18, 2015, 12:12 a.m. UTC | #2
On Tue, 17 Nov 2015, Seth Forshee wrote:

> +	sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
> +	if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&

Where is SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED defined?

I can't see it in this patch series, mainline or security next.
Seth Forshee Nov. 18, 2015, 12:50 a.m. UTC | #3
On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 11:12:51AM +1100, James Morris wrote:
> On Tue, 17 Nov 2015, Seth Forshee wrote:
> 
> > +	sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
> > +	if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
> 
> Where is SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED defined?
> 
> I can't see it in this patch series, mainline or security next.

Eric's already applied a few of my patches to a branch in his tree,
including the one that defines this. See the for-testing branch of
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git,
specifically
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git/commit/?id=36979551f2345d4e20714c1fc53d6a15c87f8b64.

Thanks,
Seth

Patch
diff mbox

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 621200f86b56..9b7ff781df9a 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -891,6 +891,7 @@  static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
 	struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
 	int rc;
 
 	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
@@ -900,6 +901,11 @@  static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
 		return 0;
 
+	sbsp = inode->i_sb->s_security;
+	if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
+	    isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
+		return 0;
+
 	if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
 		struct task_struct *tracer;
 		rc = 0;
@@ -1703,6 +1709,7 @@  static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 	struct task_smack *tsp;
 	struct smack_known *okp;
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
 	int may;
 	int mmay;
 	int tmay;
@@ -1714,6 +1721,10 @@  static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 	isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
 	if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
 		return 0;
+	sbsp = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_security;
+	if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
+	    isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
+		return -EACCES;
 	mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
 
 	tsp = current_security();
@@ -3492,16 +3503,14 @@  static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 			if (rc >= 0)
 				transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
 		}
-		if (!(sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED)) {
-			/*
-			 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
-			 */
-			skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
-			if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
-			    skp == &smack_known_web)
-				skp = NULL;
-			isp->smk_task = skp;
-		}
+		/*
+		 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
+		 */
+		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
+		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
+		    skp == &smack_known_web)
+			skp = NULL;
+		isp->smk_task = skp;
 
 		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
 		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||