[GIT,PULL,SECURITY] Yama locking fix
diff mbox

Message ID alpine.LRH.2.20.1605261009340.28084@namei.org
State New
Headers show

Pull-request

git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git for-linus

Commit Message

James Morris May 26, 2016, 12:10 a.m. UTC
Please pull this fix for the Yama LSM.

The following changes since commit ecc5fbd5ef472a4c659dc56a5739b3f041c0530c:

  Merge tag 'pwm/for-4.7-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/thierry.reding/linux-pwm (2016-05-25 10:40:15 -0700)

are available in the git repository at:

  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git for-linus

Jann Horn (1):
      Yama: fix double-spinlock and user access in atomic context

 security/yama/yama_lsm.c |   69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

---

commit dca6b4149181baaa363b9a7ce7c550840bb3bc83
Author: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Date:   Sun May 22 06:01:34 2016 +0200

    Yama: fix double-spinlock and user access in atomic context
    
    Commit 8a56038c2aef ("Yama: consolidate error reporting") causes lockups
    when someone hits a Yama denial. Call chain:
    
    process_vm_readv -> process_vm_rw -> process_vm_rw_core -> mm_access
    -> ptrace_may_access
    task_lock(...) is taken
    __ptrace_may_access -> security_ptrace_access_check
    -> yama_ptrace_access_check -> report_access -> kstrdup_quotable_cmdline
    -> get_cmdline -> access_process_vm -> get_task_mm
    task_lock(...) is taken again
    
    task_lock(p) just calls spin_lock(&p->alloc_lock), so at this point,
    spin_lock() is called on a lock that is already held by the current
    process.
    
    Also: Since the alloc_lock is a spinlock, sleeping inside
    security_ptrace_access_check hooks is probably not allowed at all? So it's
    not even possible to print the cmdline from in there because that might
    involve paging in userspace memory.
    
    It would be tempting to rewrite ptrace_may_access() to drop the alloc_lock
    before calling the LSM, but even then, ptrace_may_access() itself might be
    called from various contexts in which you're not allowed to sleep; for
    example, as far as I understand, to be able to hold a reference to another
    task, usually an RCU read lock will be taken (see e.g. kcmp() and
    get_robust_list()), so that also prohibits sleeping. (And using e.g. FUSE,
    a user can cause pagefault handling to take arbitrary amounts of time -
    see https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=808.)
    
    Therefore, AFAIK, in order to print the name of a process below
    security_ptrace_access_check(), you'd have to either grab a reference to
    the mm_struct and defer the access violation reporting or just use the
    "comm" value that's stored in kernelspace and accessible without big
    complications. (Or you could try to use some kind of atomic remote VM
    access that fails if the memory isn't paged in, similar to
    copy_from_user_inatomic(), and if necessary fall back to comm, but
    that'd be kind of ugly because the comm/cmdline choice would look
    pretty random to the user.)
    
    Fix it by deferring reporting of the access violation until current
    exits kernelspace the next time.
    
    v2: Don't oops on PTRACE_TRACEME, call report_access under
    task_lock(current). Also fix nonsensical comment. And don't use
    GPF_ATOMIC for memory allocation with no locks held.
    This patch is tested both for ptrace attach and ptrace traceme.
    
    Fixes: 8a56038c2aef ("Yama: consolidate error reporting")
    Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
    Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

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Patch
diff mbox

diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 9b756b1..0309f21 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ 
 #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/string_helpers.h>
+#include <linux/task_work.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
 
 #define YAMA_SCOPE_DISABLED	0
 #define YAMA_SCOPE_RELATIONAL	1
@@ -42,20 +45,71 @@  static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ptracer_relations_lock);
 static void yama_relation_cleanup(struct work_struct *work);
 static DECLARE_WORK(yama_relation_work, yama_relation_cleanup);
 
-static void report_access(const char *access, struct task_struct *target,
-			  struct task_struct *agent)
+struct access_report_info {
+	struct callback_head work;
+	const char *access;
+	struct task_struct *target;
+	struct task_struct *agent;
+};
+
+static void __report_access(struct callback_head *work)
 {
+	struct access_report_info *info =
+		container_of(work, struct access_report_info, work);
 	char *target_cmd, *agent_cmd;
 
-	target_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(target, GFP_ATOMIC);
-	agent_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(agent, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	target_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(info->target, GFP_KERNEL);
+	agent_cmd = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(info->agent, GFP_KERNEL);
 
 	pr_notice_ratelimited(
 		"ptrace %s of \"%s\"[%d] was attempted by \"%s\"[%d]\n",
-		access, target_cmd, target->pid, agent_cmd, agent->pid);
+		info->access, target_cmd, info->target->pid, agent_cmd,
+		info->agent->pid);
 
 	kfree(agent_cmd);
 	kfree(target_cmd);
+
+	put_task_struct(info->agent);
+	put_task_struct(info->target);
+	kfree(info);
+}
+
+/* defers execution because cmdline access can sleep */
+static void report_access(const char *access, struct task_struct *target,
+				struct task_struct *agent)
+{
+	struct access_report_info *info;
+	char agent_comm[sizeof(agent->comm)];
+
+	assert_spin_locked(&target->alloc_lock); /* for target->comm */
+
+	if (current->flags & PF_KTHREAD) {
+		/* I don't think kthreads call task_work_run() before exiting.
+		 * Imagine angry ranting about procfs here.
+		 */
+		pr_notice_ratelimited(
+		    "ptrace %s of \"%s\"[%d] was attempted by \"%s\"[%d]\n",
+		    access, target->comm, target->pid,
+		    get_task_comm(agent_comm, agent), agent->pid);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	info = kmalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!info)
+		return;
+	init_task_work(&info->work, __report_access);
+	get_task_struct(target);
+	get_task_struct(agent);
+	info->access = access;
+	info->target = target;
+	info->agent = agent;
+	if (task_work_add(current, &info->work, true) == 0)
+		return; /* success */
+
+	WARN(1, "report_access called from exiting task");
+	put_task_struct(target);
+	put_task_struct(agent);
+	kfree(info);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -351,8 +405,11 @@  int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 		break;
 	}
 
-	if (rc)
+	if (rc) {
+		task_lock(current);
 		report_access("traceme", current, parent);
+		task_unlock(current);
+	}
 
 	return rc;
 }