From patchwork Mon Oct 3 06:41:21 2016 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Reshetova, Elena" X-Patchwork-Id: 9360067 Return-Path: Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org [172.30.200.125]) by pdx-korg-patchwork.web.codeaurora.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9B756607D8 for ; Mon, 3 Oct 2016 06:43:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8CF7D2885D for ; Mon, 3 Oct 2016 06:43:24 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix, from userid 486) id 8048428897; Mon, 3 Oct 2016 06:43:24 +0000 (UTC) X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on pdx-wl-mail.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=2.0 tests=BAYES_00, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 Received: from mother.openwall.net (mother.openwall.net [195.42.179.200]) by mail.wl.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with SMTP id 9D9852885D for ; Mon, 3 Oct 2016 06:43:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 23558 invoked by uid 550); 3 Oct 2016 06:42:32 -0000 Mailing-List: contact kernel-hardening-help@lists.openwall.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: Reply-To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Delivered-To: mailing list kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Received: (qmail 21930 invoked from network); 3 Oct 2016 06:42:22 -0000 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.31,288,1473145200"; d="scan'208";a="1048760026" From: Elena Reshetova To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org, David Windsor , Hans Liljestrand , Elena Reshetova Date: Mon, 3 Oct 2016 09:41:21 +0300 Message-Id: <1475476886-26232-9-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1475476886-26232-1-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com> References: <1475476886-26232-1-git-send-email-elena.reshetova@intel.com> Subject: [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 08/13] security: identify wrapping atomic usage X-Virus-Scanned: ClamAV using ClamSMTP From: David Windsor In some cases atomic is not used for reference counting and therefore should be allowed to overflow. Identify such cases and make a switch to non-hardened atomic version. Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova Signed-off-by: David Windsor --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 2 +- security/selinux/avc.c | 7 ++++--- 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index eb0f4dd..0ffb025 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -158,8 +158,8 @@ static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) extern spinlock_t ima_queue_lock; struct ima_h_table { - atomic_long_t len; /* number of stored measurements in the list */ - atomic_long_t violations; + atomic_long_wrap_t len; /* number of stored measurements in the list */ + atomic_long_wrap_t violations; struct hlist_head queue[IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE]; }; extern struct ima_h_table ima_htable; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 9df26a2..097bd47 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, int result; /* can overflow, only indicator */ - atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations); + atomic_long_inc_wrap(&ima_htable.violations); result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry); if (result < 0) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 2bcad99..d7a6c02 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -41,12 +41,12 @@ __setup("ima_canonical_fmt", default_canonical_fmt_setup); static int valid_policy = 1; #define TMPBUFLEN 12 static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(char __user *buf, size_t count, - loff_t *ppos, atomic_long_t *val) + loff_t *ppos, atomic_long_wrap_t *val) { char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN]; ssize_t len; - len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val)); + len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%li\n", atomic_long_read_wrap(val)); return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c index 3a3cc2a..d634253 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int flags) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&qe->later); list_add_tail_rcu(&qe->later, &ima_measurements); - atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.len); + atomic_long_inc_wrap(&ima_htable.len); if (flags) { key = ima_hash_key(entry->digest); hlist_add_head_rcu(&qe->hnext, &ima_htable.queue[key]); diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index e60c79d..6fa5ace 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ struct avc_xperms_node { struct avc_cache { struct hlist_head slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list */ spinlock_t slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */ - atomic_t lru_hint; /* LRU hint for reclaim scan */ + atomic_wrap_t lru_hint; /* LRU hint for reclaim scan */ atomic_t active_nodes; u32 latest_notif; /* latest revocation notification */ }; @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ void __init avc_init(void) spin_lock_init(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i]); } atomic_set(&avc_cache.active_nodes, 0); - atomic_set(&avc_cache.lru_hint, 0); + atomic_set_wrap(&avc_cache.lru_hint, 0); avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node), 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); @@ -521,7 +521,8 @@ static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void) spinlock_t *lock; for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) { - hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.lru_hint) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1); + hvalue = atomic_inc_return_wrap(&avc_cache.lru_hint) & + (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1); head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue]; lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];