| Message ID | 1475749646-10844-2-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
(CC'ing other potentially interested randomness folks) On Thu, 06 Oct, at 11:27:25AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > Specify a Linux specific UEFI configuration table that carries some > random bits, and use the contents during early boot to seed the kernel's > random number generator. This allows much strong random numbers to be > generated early on. > > The entropy is fed to the kernel using add_device_randomness(), which is > documented as being appropriate for being called very early. > > Note that the config table could be generated by the EFI stub or by any > other UEFI driver or application (e.g., GRUB), but the random seed table > GUID and the associated functionality should be considered an internal > kernel interface (unless it is promoted to ABI later on) > > Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> > --- > drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++ > include/linux/efi.h | 8 ++++++ > 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+) This series looks fine to me. I'm leaving the patch below for the benefit of the Ted and Kees. > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c > index 1ac199cd75e7..c8ae40f9b674 100644 > --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c > +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c > @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ > #include <linux/of_fdt.h> > #include <linux/io.h> > #include <linux/platform_device.h> > +#include <linux/random.h> > #include <linux/slab.h> > #include <linux/acpi.h> > #include <linux/ucs2_string.h> > @@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ struct efi __read_mostly efi = { > .esrt = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, > .properties_table = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, > .mem_attr_table = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, > + .rng_seed = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, > }; > EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi); > > @@ -438,6 +440,7 @@ static __initdata efi_config_table_type_t common_tables[] = { > {EFI_SYSTEM_RESOURCE_TABLE_GUID, "ESRT", &efi.esrt}, > {EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE_GUID, "PROP", &efi.properties_table}, > {EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE_GUID, "MEMATTR", &efi.mem_attr_table}, > + {LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID, "RNG", &efi.rng_seed}, > {NULL_GUID, NULL, NULL}, > }; > > @@ -499,6 +502,29 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz, > pr_cont("\n"); > set_bit(EFI_CONFIG_TABLES, &efi.flags); > > + if (efi.rng_seed != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) { > + struct linux_efi_random_seed *seed; > + u32 size = 0; > + > + seed = early_memremap(efi.rng_seed, sizeof(*seed)); > + if (seed != NULL) { > + size = seed->size; > + early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed)); > + } else { > + pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n"); > + } > + if (size > 0) { > + seed = early_memremap(efi.rng_seed, > + sizeof(*seed) + size); > + if (seed != NULL) { > + add_device_randomness(seed->bits, seed->size); > + early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed) + size); > + } else { > + pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n"); > + } > + } > + } > + > /* Parse the EFI Properties table if it exists */ > if (efi.properties_table != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) { > efi_properties_table_t *tbl; > diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h > index 2d089487d2da..85e28b138cdd 100644 > --- a/include/linux/efi.h > +++ b/include/linux/efi.h > @@ -599,6 +599,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void); > */ > #define LINUX_EFI_ARM_SCREEN_INFO_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xe03fc20a, 0x85dc, 0x406e, 0xb9, 0x0e, 0x4a, 0xb5, 0x02, 0x37, 0x1d, 0x95) > #define LINUX_EFI_LOADER_ENTRY_GUID EFI_GUID(0x4a67b082, 0x0a4c, 0x41cf, 0xb6, 0xc7, 0x44, 0x0b, 0x29, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x4f) > +#define LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x1ce1e5bc, 0x7ceb, 0x42f2, 0x81, 0xe5, 0x8a, 0xad, 0xf1, 0x80, 0xf5, 0x7b) > > typedef struct { > efi_guid_t guid; > @@ -872,6 +873,7 @@ extern struct efi { > unsigned long esrt; /* ESRT table */ > unsigned long properties_table; /* properties table */ > unsigned long mem_attr_table; /* memory attributes table */ > + unsigned long rng_seed; /* UEFI firmware random seed */ > efi_get_time_t *get_time; > efi_set_time_t *set_time; > efi_get_wakeup_time_t *get_wakeup_time; > @@ -1493,4 +1495,10 @@ efi_status_t efi_exit_boot_services(efi_system_table_t *sys_table, > struct efi_boot_memmap *map, > void *priv, > efi_exit_boot_map_processing priv_func); > + > +struct linux_efi_random_seed { > + u32 size; > + u8 bits[]; > +}; > + > #endif /* _LINUX_EFI_H */ > -- > 2.7.4 >
Hi Ard, On Thu, Oct 06, 2016 at 11:27:25AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > Specify a Linux specific UEFI configuration table that carries some > random bits, and use the contents during early boot to seed the kernel's > random number generator. This allows much strong random numbers to be > generated early on. > > The entropy is fed to the kernel using add_device_randomness(), which is > documented as being appropriate for being called very early. > > Note that the config table could be generated by the EFI stub or by any > other UEFI driver or application (e.g., GRUB), but the random seed table > GUID and the associated functionality should be considered an internal > kernel interface (unless it is promoted to ABI later on) What does this mean for kexec? Won't each successive kernel look for the table and find the same seed? I think to some extent this mush be treated as an ABI, given cases like kexec. Thanks, Mark. > Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> > --- > drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++ > include/linux/efi.h | 8 ++++++ > 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c > index 1ac199cd75e7..c8ae40f9b674 100644 > --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c > +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c > @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ > #include <linux/of_fdt.h> > #include <linux/io.h> > #include <linux/platform_device.h> > +#include <linux/random.h> > #include <linux/slab.h> > #include <linux/acpi.h> > #include <linux/ucs2_string.h> > @@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ struct efi __read_mostly efi = { > .esrt = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, > .properties_table = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, > .mem_attr_table = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, > + .rng_seed = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, > }; > EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi); > > @@ -438,6 +440,7 @@ static __initdata efi_config_table_type_t common_tables[] = { > {EFI_SYSTEM_RESOURCE_TABLE_GUID, "ESRT", &efi.esrt}, > {EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE_GUID, "PROP", &efi.properties_table}, > {EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE_GUID, "MEMATTR", &efi.mem_attr_table}, > + {LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID, "RNG", &efi.rng_seed}, > {NULL_GUID, NULL, NULL}, > }; > > @@ -499,6 +502,29 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz, > pr_cont("\n"); > set_bit(EFI_CONFIG_TABLES, &efi.flags); > > + if (efi.rng_seed != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) { > + struct linux_efi_random_seed *seed; > + u32 size = 0; > + > + seed = early_memremap(efi.rng_seed, sizeof(*seed)); > + if (seed != NULL) { > + size = seed->size; > + early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed)); > + } else { > + pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n"); > + } > + if (size > 0) { > + seed = early_memremap(efi.rng_seed, > + sizeof(*seed) + size); > + if (seed != NULL) { > + add_device_randomness(seed->bits, seed->size); > + early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed) + size); > + } else { > + pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n"); > + } > + } > + } > + > /* Parse the EFI Properties table if it exists */ > if (efi.properties_table != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) { > efi_properties_table_t *tbl; > diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h > index 2d089487d2da..85e28b138cdd 100644 > --- a/include/linux/efi.h > +++ b/include/linux/efi.h > @@ -599,6 +599,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void); > */ > #define LINUX_EFI_ARM_SCREEN_INFO_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xe03fc20a, 0x85dc, 0x406e, 0xb9, 0x0e, 0x4a, 0xb5, 0x02, 0x37, 0x1d, 0x95) > #define LINUX_EFI_LOADER_ENTRY_GUID EFI_GUID(0x4a67b082, 0x0a4c, 0x41cf, 0xb6, 0xc7, 0x44, 0x0b, 0x29, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x4f) > +#define LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x1ce1e5bc, 0x7ceb, 0x42f2, 0x81, 0xe5, 0x8a, 0xad, 0xf1, 0x80, 0xf5, 0x7b) > > typedef struct { > efi_guid_t guid; > @@ -872,6 +873,7 @@ extern struct efi { > unsigned long esrt; /* ESRT table */ > unsigned long properties_table; /* properties table */ > unsigned long mem_attr_table; /* memory attributes table */ > + unsigned long rng_seed; /* UEFI firmware random seed */ > efi_get_time_t *get_time; > efi_set_time_t *set_time; > efi_get_wakeup_time_t *get_wakeup_time; > @@ -1493,4 +1495,10 @@ efi_status_t efi_exit_boot_services(efi_system_table_t *sys_table, > struct efi_boot_memmap *map, > void *priv, > efi_exit_boot_map_processing priv_func); > + > +struct linux_efi_random_seed { > + u32 size; > + u8 bits[]; > +}; > + > #endif /* _LINUX_EFI_H */ > -- > 2.7.4 > > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-efi" in > the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html >
On 19 October 2016 at 12:09, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote: > Hi Ard, > > On Thu, Oct 06, 2016 at 11:27:25AM +0100, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >> Specify a Linux specific UEFI configuration table that carries some >> random bits, and use the contents during early boot to seed the kernel's >> random number generator. This allows much strong random numbers to be >> generated early on. >> >> The entropy is fed to the kernel using add_device_randomness(), which is >> documented as being appropriate for being called very early. >> >> Note that the config table could be generated by the EFI stub or by any >> other UEFI driver or application (e.g., GRUB), but the random seed table >> GUID and the associated functionality should be considered an internal >> kernel interface (unless it is promoted to ABI later on) > > What does this mean for kexec? Won't each successive kernel look for the > table and find the same seed? > Yes. Whether this is a problem or not is context dependent: for things like kdump, I don't think anyone cares. For other cases, having some seed may still be better than having no seed at all. It does mean, however, that we have to preserve the memory this table points to for kexec boots. > I think to some extent this mush be treated as an ABI, given cases like > kexec. > Perhaps, yes. That would also allow GRUB or other EFI aware bootloaders to generate the seed.
On Wed, 19 Oct, at 12:13:55PM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > On 19 October 2016 at 12:09, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote: > > > I think to some extent this mush be treated as an ABI, given cases like > > kexec. > > > > Perhaps, yes. That would also allow GRUB or other EFI aware > bootloaders to generate the seed. If we're going to go down this route, we should try and get the GUID into the UEFI spec.
On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 4:22 AM, Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> wrote: > On Wed, 19 Oct, at 12:13:55PM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >> On 19 October 2016 at 12:09, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote: >> >> > I think to some extent this mush be treated as an ABI, given cases like >> > kexec. >> > >> >> Perhaps, yes. That would also allow GRUB or other EFI aware >> bootloaders to generate the seed. > > If we're going to go down this route, we should try and get the GUID > into the UEFI spec. It seems like maybe under UEFI, both this table (which sounds like it'll not be rotated regularly) could be mixed with calls to EFI_PROTOCOL_RNG by the kernel? (Similar to how kaslr is seeded?) -Kees
On 19 October 2016 at 21:14, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 4:22 AM, Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> wrote: >> On Wed, 19 Oct, at 12:13:55PM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >>> On 19 October 2016 at 12:09, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote: >>> >>> > I think to some extent this mush be treated as an ABI, given cases like >>> > kexec. >>> > >>> >>> Perhaps, yes. That would also allow GRUB or other EFI aware >>> bootloaders to generate the seed. >> >> If we're going to go down this route, we should try and get the GUID >> into the UEFI spec. > > It seems like maybe under UEFI, both this table (which sounds like > it'll not be rotated regularly) What do you mean 'rotated'? It is generated at boot. My 2/2 patch generates it from the stub using the EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL on ARM/arm64 > could be mixed with calls to > EFI_PROTOCOL_RNG by the kernel? (Similar to how kaslr is seeded?) > That is kind of the point. KASLR is different because we need the entropy before even jumping to C code, but for all other uses of early entropy, this seemed like a useful approach
On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 1:18 PM, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote: > On 19 October 2016 at 21:14, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >> On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 4:22 AM, Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> wrote: >>> On Wed, 19 Oct, at 12:13:55PM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >>>> On 19 October 2016 at 12:09, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> > I think to some extent this mush be treated as an ABI, given cases like >>>> > kexec. >>>> > >>>> >>>> Perhaps, yes. That would also allow GRUB or other EFI aware >>>> bootloaders to generate the seed. >>> >>> If we're going to go down this route, we should try and get the GUID >>> into the UEFI spec. >> >> It seems like maybe under UEFI, both this table (which sounds like >> it'll not be rotated regularly) > > What do you mean 'rotated'? It is generated at boot. My 2/2 patch > generates it from the stub using the EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL on ARM/arm64 Oh! I entirely misunderstood. I thought doing regular writes to EFI variables was discouraged (since they may be stored in NVRAM that would "wear out"). >> could be mixed with calls to >> EFI_PROTOCOL_RNG by the kernel? (Similar to how kaslr is seeded?) >> > > That is kind of the point. KASLR is different because we need the > entropy before even jumping to C code, but for all other uses of early > entropy, this seemed like a useful approach Yup, cool. If the table changes per boot, yeah, my suggestion is pointless. :) -Kees
> On 19 Oct 2016, at 21:20, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > > On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 1:18 PM, Ard Biesheuvel > <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> wrote: >> On 19 October 2016 at 21:14, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >>>> On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 4:22 AM, Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> wrote: >>>>> On Wed, 19 Oct, at 12:13:55PM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: >>>>>> On 19 October 2016 at 12:09, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I think to some extent this mush be treated as an ABI, given cases like >>>>>> kexec. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Perhaps, yes. That would also allow GRUB or other EFI aware >>>>> bootloaders to generate the seed. >>>> >>>> If we're going to go down this route, we should try and get the GUID >>>> into the UEFI spec. >>> >>> It seems like maybe under UEFI, both this table (which sounds like >>> it'll not be rotated regularly) >> >> What do you mean 'rotated'? It is generated at boot. My 2/2 patch >> generates it from the stub using the EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL on ARM/arm64 > > Oh! I entirely misunderstood. I thought doing regular writes to EFI > variables was discouraged (since they may be stored in NVRAM that > would "wear out") Uefi config tables only live in memory. They are used to provide the os with data that the firmware generates at boot, e.g., smbios and acpi tables etc >>> could be mixed with calls to >>> EFI_PROTOCOL_RNG by the kernel? (Similar to how kaslr is seeded?) >>> >> >> That is kind of the point. KASLR is different because we need the >> entropy before even jumping to C code, but for all other uses of early >> entropy, this seemed like a useful approach > > Yup, cool. If the table changes per boot, yeah, my suggestion is pointless. :) > Yes, but as Mark pointed out, we need to decide how to handle kexec, which does not go through the stub
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c index 1ac199cd75e7..c8ae40f9b674 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include <linux/of_fdt.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/platform_device.h> +#include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/acpi.h> #include <linux/ucs2_string.h> @@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ struct efi __read_mostly efi = { .esrt = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, .properties_table = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, .mem_attr_table = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, + .rng_seed = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR, }; EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi); @@ -438,6 +440,7 @@ static __initdata efi_config_table_type_t common_tables[] = { {EFI_SYSTEM_RESOURCE_TABLE_GUID, "ESRT", &efi.esrt}, {EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE_GUID, "PROP", &efi.properties_table}, {EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE_GUID, "MEMATTR", &efi.mem_attr_table}, + {LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID, "RNG", &efi.rng_seed}, {NULL_GUID, NULL, NULL}, }; @@ -499,6 +502,29 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(void *config_tables, int count, int sz, pr_cont("\n"); set_bit(EFI_CONFIG_TABLES, &efi.flags); + if (efi.rng_seed != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) { + struct linux_efi_random_seed *seed; + u32 size = 0; + + seed = early_memremap(efi.rng_seed, sizeof(*seed)); + if (seed != NULL) { + size = seed->size; + early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed)); + } else { + pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n"); + } + if (size > 0) { + seed = early_memremap(efi.rng_seed, + sizeof(*seed) + size); + if (seed != NULL) { + add_device_randomness(seed->bits, seed->size); + early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed) + size); + } else { + pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n"); + } + } + } + /* Parse the EFI Properties table if it exists */ if (efi.properties_table != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) { efi_properties_table_t *tbl; diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h index 2d089487d2da..85e28b138cdd 100644 --- a/include/linux/efi.h +++ b/include/linux/efi.h @@ -599,6 +599,7 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void); */ #define LINUX_EFI_ARM_SCREEN_INFO_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xe03fc20a, 0x85dc, 0x406e, 0xb9, 0x0e, 0x4a, 0xb5, 0x02, 0x37, 0x1d, 0x95) #define LINUX_EFI_LOADER_ENTRY_GUID EFI_GUID(0x4a67b082, 0x0a4c, 0x41cf, 0xb6, 0xc7, 0x44, 0x0b, 0x29, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x4f) +#define LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID EFI_GUID(0x1ce1e5bc, 0x7ceb, 0x42f2, 0x81, 0xe5, 0x8a, 0xad, 0xf1, 0x80, 0xf5, 0x7b) typedef struct { efi_guid_t guid; @@ -872,6 +873,7 @@ extern struct efi { unsigned long esrt; /* ESRT table */ unsigned long properties_table; /* properties table */ unsigned long mem_attr_table; /* memory attributes table */ + unsigned long rng_seed; /* UEFI firmware random seed */ efi_get_time_t *get_time; efi_set_time_t *set_time; efi_get_wakeup_time_t *get_wakeup_time; @@ -1493,4 +1495,10 @@ efi_status_t efi_exit_boot_services(efi_system_table_t *sys_table, struct efi_boot_memmap *map, void *priv, efi_exit_boot_map_processing priv_func); + +struct linux_efi_random_seed { + u32 size; + u8 bits[]; +}; + #endif /* _LINUX_EFI_H */
Specify a Linux specific UEFI configuration table that carries some random bits, and use the contents during early boot to seed the kernel's random number generator. This allows much strong random numbers to be generated early on. The entropy is fed to the kernel using add_device_randomness(), which is documented as being appropriate for being called very early. Note that the config table could be generated by the EFI stub or by any other UEFI driver or application (e.g., GRUB), but the random seed table GUID and the associated functionality should be considered an internal kernel interface (unless it is promoted to ABI later on) Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> --- drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/efi.h | 8 ++++++ 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+)