[PATCHv3,4/4] arm64: dump: Add checking for writable and exectuable pages
diff mbox

Message ID 1476828091-17802-5-git-send-email-labbott@redhat.com
State New
Headers show

Commit Message

Laura Abbott Oct. 18, 2016, 10:01 p.m. UTC
Page mappings with full RWX permissions are a security risk. x86
has an option to walk the page tables and dump any bad pages.
(See e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings")). Add a similar
implementation for arm64.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
---
v3: Rebased for header guard fixup, whitespace fixes
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug        | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/ptdump.h |  8 +++++++
 arch/arm64/mm/dump.c            | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c             |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 91 insertions(+)

Comments

Ard Biesheuvel Oct. 20, 2016, 10:32 a.m. UTC | #1
On 18 October 2016 at 23:01, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Page mappings with full RWX permissions are a security risk. x86
> has an option to walk the page tables and dump any bad pages.
> (See e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings")). Add a similar
> implementation for arm64.
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
> ---
> v3: Rebased for header guard fixup, whitespace fixes
> ---
>  arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug        | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/ptdump.h |  8 +++++++
>  arch/arm64/mm/dump.c            | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c             |  2 ++
>  4 files changed, 91 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
> index 21a5b74..d1ebd46 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
> @@ -42,6 +42,35 @@ config ARM64_RANDOMIZE_TEXT_OFFSET
>           of TEXT_OFFSET and platforms must not require a specific
>           value.
>
> +config DEBUG_WX
> +       bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot"
> +       select ARM64_PTDUMP_CORE
> +       ---help---
> +         Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot.
> +
> +         This is useful for discovering cases where the kernel is leaving
> +         W+X mappings after applying NX, as such mappings are a security risk.
> +         This check also includes UXN, which should be set on all kernel
> +         mappings.
> +
> +         Look for a message in dmesg output like this:
> +
> +           arm64/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found.
> +
> +         or like this, if the check failed:
> +
> +           arm64/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, <N> W+X pages found.
> +
> +         Note that even if the check fails, your kernel is possibly
> +         still fine, as W+X mappings are not a security hole in
> +         themselves, what they do is that they make the exploitation
> +         of other unfixed kernel bugs easier.
> +
> +         There is no runtime or memory usage effect of this option
> +         once the kernel has booted up - it's a one time check.
> +
> +         If in doubt, say "Y".
> +
>  config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
>         bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
>         depends on MODULES
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptdump.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptdump.h
> index f72ee69..6afd847 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptdump.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptdump.h
> @@ -42,5 +42,13 @@ static inline int ptdump_debugfs_register(struct ptdump_info *info,
>         return 0;
>  }
>  #endif
> +void ptdump_check_wx(void);
>  #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTDUMP_CORE */
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_WX
> +#define debug_checkwx()        ptdump_check_wx()
> +#else
> +#define debug_checkwx()        do { } while (0)
> +#endif
> +
>  #endif /* __ASM_PTDUMP_H */
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/dump.c b/arch/arm64/mm/dump.c
> index bb36649..4913af5 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/dump.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/dump.c
> @@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ struct pg_state {
>         unsigned long start_address;
>         unsigned level;
>         u64 current_prot;
> +       bool check_wx;
> +       unsigned long wx_pages;
>  };
>
>  struct prot_bits {
> @@ -202,6 +204,35 @@ static void dump_prot(struct pg_state *st, const struct prot_bits *bits,
>         }
>  }
>
> +static void note_prot_uxn(struct pg_state *st, unsigned long addr)
> +{
> +       if (!st->check_wx)
> +               return;
> +
> +       if ((st->current_prot & PTE_UXN) == PTE_UXN)
> +               return;
> +
> +       WARN_ONCE(1, "arm64/mm: Found non-UXN mapping at address %p/%pS\n",
> +                 (void *)st->start_address, (void *)st->start_address);
> +
> +       st->wx_pages += (addr - st->start_address) / PAGE_SIZE;
> +}
> +
> +static void note_prot_wx(struct pg_state *st, unsigned long addr)
> +{
> +       if (!st->check_wx)
> +               return;
> +       if ((st->current_prot & PTE_RDONLY) == PTE_RDONLY)
> +               return;
> +       if ((st->current_prot & PTE_PXN) == PTE_PXN)
> +               return;
> +
> +       WARN_ONCE(1, "arm64/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address %p/%pS\n",
> +                 (void *)st->start_address, (void *)st->start_address);
> +
> +       st->wx_pages += (addr - st->start_address) / PAGE_SIZE;
> +}
> +

Why are these separate functions, and why is wx_pages increased twice,
potentially?

Given how rare non-UXN kernel mappings should be, could we not just add

       if ((st->current_prot & PTE_UXN) == 0)
               WARN(xxx)

(without the _ONCE) to note_prot_wx(), and drop note_prot_uxn() entirely?


>  static void note_page(struct pg_state *st, unsigned long addr, unsigned level,
>                                 u64 val)
>  {
> @@ -219,6 +250,8 @@ static void note_page(struct pg_state *st, unsigned long addr, unsigned level,
>                 unsigned long delta;
>
>                 if (st->current_prot) {
> +                       note_prot_uxn(st, addr);
> +                       note_prot_wx(st, addr);
>                         pt_dump_seq_printf(st->seq, "0x%016lx-0x%016lx   ",
>                                    st->start_address, addr);
>
> @@ -344,6 +377,25 @@ static struct ptdump_info kernel_ptdump_info = {
>         .base_addr      = VA_START,
>  };
>
> +void ptdump_check_wx(void)
> +{
> +       struct pg_state st = {
> +               .seq = NULL,
> +               .marker = (struct addr_marker[]) {
> +                       { -1, NULL},
> +               },
> +               .check_wx = true,
> +       };
> +
> +       walk_pgd(&st, &init_mm, 0);
> +       note_page(&st, 0, 0, 0);
> +       if (st.wx_pages)
> +               pr_info("Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, %lu W+X pages found\n",
> +                       st.wx_pages);

Could we upgrade this to pr_warn?

> +       else
> +               pr_info("Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found\n");
> +}
> +
>  static int ptdump_init(void)
>  {
>         ptdump_initialize();
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
> index 05615a3..2cbe2fe 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
> @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
>  #include <asm/tlb.h>
>  #include <asm/memblock.h>
>  #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
> +#include <asm/ptdump.h>
>
>  u64 idmap_t0sz = TCR_T0SZ(VA_BITS);
>
> @@ -396,6 +397,7 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
>         section_size = (unsigned long)__init_begin - (unsigned long)__start_rodata;
>         create_mapping_late(__pa(__start_rodata), (unsigned long)__start_rodata,
>                             section_size, PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
> +       debug_checkwx();
>  }
>
>  static void __init map_kernel_segment(pgd_t *pgd, void *va_start, void *va_end,
> --
> 2.7.4
>
Laura Abbott Oct. 20, 2016, 1:01 p.m. UTC | #2
On 10/20/2016 03:32 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 18 October 2016 at 23:01, Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> wrote:
>>
>> Page mappings with full RWX permissions are a security risk. x86
>> has an option to walk the page tables and dump any bad pages.
>> (See e1a58320a38d ("x86/mm: Warn on W^X mappings")). Add a similar
>> implementation for arm64.
>>
>> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
>> Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
>> ---
>> v3: Rebased for header guard fixup, whitespace fixes
>> ---
>>  arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug        | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  arch/arm64/include/asm/ptdump.h |  8 +++++++
>>  arch/arm64/mm/dump.c            | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c             |  2 ++
>>  4 files changed, 91 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
>> index 21a5b74..d1ebd46 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
>> @@ -42,6 +42,35 @@ config ARM64_RANDOMIZE_TEXT_OFFSET
>>           of TEXT_OFFSET and platforms must not require a specific
>>           value.
>>
>> +config DEBUG_WX
>> +       bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot"
>> +       select ARM64_PTDUMP_CORE
>> +       ---help---
>> +         Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot.
>> +
>> +         This is useful for discovering cases where the kernel is leaving
>> +         W+X mappings after applying NX, as such mappings are a security risk.
>> +         This check also includes UXN, which should be set on all kernel
>> +         mappings.
>> +
>> +         Look for a message in dmesg output like this:
>> +
>> +           arm64/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found.
>> +
>> +         or like this, if the check failed:
>> +
>> +           arm64/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, <N> W+X pages found.
>> +
>> +         Note that even if the check fails, your kernel is possibly
>> +         still fine, as W+X mappings are not a security hole in
>> +         themselves, what they do is that they make the exploitation
>> +         of other unfixed kernel bugs easier.
>> +
>> +         There is no runtime or memory usage effect of this option
>> +         once the kernel has booted up - it's a one time check.
>> +
>> +         If in doubt, say "Y".
>> +
>>  config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
>>         bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
>>         depends on MODULES
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptdump.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptdump.h
>> index f72ee69..6afd847 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptdump.h
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptdump.h
>> @@ -42,5 +42,13 @@ static inline int ptdump_debugfs_register(struct ptdump_info *info,
>>         return 0;
>>  }
>>  #endif
>> +void ptdump_check_wx(void);
>>  #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTDUMP_CORE */
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_WX
>> +#define debug_checkwx()        ptdump_check_wx()
>> +#else
>> +#define debug_checkwx()        do { } while (0)
>> +#endif
>> +
>>  #endif /* __ASM_PTDUMP_H */
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/dump.c b/arch/arm64/mm/dump.c
>> index bb36649..4913af5 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/dump.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/dump.c
>> @@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ struct pg_state {
>>         unsigned long start_address;
>>         unsigned level;
>>         u64 current_prot;
>> +       bool check_wx;
>> +       unsigned long wx_pages;
>>  };
>>
>>  struct prot_bits {
>> @@ -202,6 +204,35 @@ static void dump_prot(struct pg_state *st, const struct prot_bits *bits,
>>         }
>>  }
>>
>> +static void note_prot_uxn(struct pg_state *st, unsigned long addr)
>> +{
>> +       if (!st->check_wx)
>> +               return;
>> +
>> +       if ((st->current_prot & PTE_UXN) == PTE_UXN)
>> +               return;
>> +
>> +       WARN_ONCE(1, "arm64/mm: Found non-UXN mapping at address %p/%pS\n",
>> +                 (void *)st->start_address, (void *)st->start_address);
>> +
>> +       st->wx_pages += (addr - st->start_address) / PAGE_SIZE;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void note_prot_wx(struct pg_state *st, unsigned long addr)
>> +{
>> +       if (!st->check_wx)
>> +               return;
>> +       if ((st->current_prot & PTE_RDONLY) == PTE_RDONLY)
>> +               return;
>> +       if ((st->current_prot & PTE_PXN) == PTE_PXN)
>> +               return;
>> +
>> +       WARN_ONCE(1, "arm64/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address %p/%pS\n",
>> +                 (void *)st->start_address, (void *)st->start_address);
>> +
>> +       st->wx_pages += (addr - st->start_address) / PAGE_SIZE;
>> +}
>> +
>
> Why are these separate functions, and why is wx_pages increased twice,
> potentially?
>
> Given how rare non-UXN kernel mappings should be, could we not just add
>
>        if ((st->current_prot & PTE_UXN) == 0)
>                WARN(xxx)
>
> (without the _ONCE) to note_prot_wx(), and drop note_prot_uxn() entirely?
>
>

UXN is a separate bit from PTE_PXN/PTE_RDONLY and both pairs need to
be checked. The current return == 0 logic means that one set or the
other may not get checked. Rather than complicate the logic, it seemed
better to have separate functions. I see your point about the wx_pages
double counting so I can fix that.

>>  static void note_page(struct pg_state *st, unsigned long addr, unsigned level,
>>                                 u64 val)
>>  {
>> @@ -219,6 +250,8 @@ static void note_page(struct pg_state *st, unsigned long addr, unsigned level,
>>                 unsigned long delta;
>>
>>                 if (st->current_prot) {
>> +                       note_prot_uxn(st, addr);
>> +                       note_prot_wx(st, addr);
>>                         pt_dump_seq_printf(st->seq, "0x%016lx-0x%016lx   ",
>>                                    st->start_address, addr);
>>
>> @@ -344,6 +377,25 @@ static struct ptdump_info kernel_ptdump_info = {
>>         .base_addr      = VA_START,
>>  };
>>
>> +void ptdump_check_wx(void)
>> +{
>> +       struct pg_state st = {
>> +               .seq = NULL,
>> +               .marker = (struct addr_marker[]) {
>> +                       { -1, NULL},
>> +               },
>> +               .check_wx = true,
>> +       };
>> +
>> +       walk_pgd(&st, &init_mm, 0);
>> +       note_page(&st, 0, 0, 0);
>> +       if (st.wx_pages)
>> +               pr_info("Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, %lu W+X pages found\n",
>> +                       st.wx_pages);
>
> Could we upgrade this to pr_warn?
>

Sure

>> +       else
>> +               pr_info("Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found\n");
>> +}
>> +
>>  static int ptdump_init(void)
>>  {
>>         ptdump_initialize();
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
>> index 05615a3..2cbe2fe 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
>> @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
>>  #include <asm/tlb.h>
>>  #include <asm/memblock.h>
>>  #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
>> +#include <asm/ptdump.h>
>>
>>  u64 idmap_t0sz = TCR_T0SZ(VA_BITS);
>>
>> @@ -396,6 +397,7 @@ void mark_rodata_ro(void)
>>         section_size = (unsigned long)__init_begin - (unsigned long)__start_rodata;
>>         create_mapping_late(__pa(__start_rodata), (unsigned long)__start_rodata,
>>                             section_size, PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
>> +       debug_checkwx();
>>  }
>>
>>  static void __init map_kernel_segment(pgd_t *pgd, void *va_start, void *va_end,
>> --
>> 2.7.4
>>

Patch
diff mbox

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
index 21a5b74..d1ebd46 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
@@ -42,6 +42,35 @@  config ARM64_RANDOMIZE_TEXT_OFFSET
 	  of TEXT_OFFSET and platforms must not require a specific
 	  value.
 
+config DEBUG_WX
+	bool "Warn on W+X mappings at boot"
+	select ARM64_PTDUMP_CORE
+	---help---
+	  Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot.
+
+	  This is useful for discovering cases where the kernel is leaving
+	  W+X mappings after applying NX, as such mappings are a security risk.
+	  This check also includes UXN, which should be set on all kernel
+	  mappings.
+
+	  Look for a message in dmesg output like this:
+
+	    arm64/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found.
+
+	  or like this, if the check failed:
+
+	    arm64/mm: Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, <N> W+X pages found.
+
+	  Note that even if the check fails, your kernel is possibly
+	  still fine, as W+X mappings are not a security hole in
+	  themselves, what they do is that they make the exploitation
+	  of other unfixed kernel bugs easier.
+
+	  There is no runtime or memory usage effect of this option
+	  once the kernel has booted up - it's a one time check.
+
+	  If in doubt, say "Y".
+
 config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
 	bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
 	depends on MODULES
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptdump.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptdump.h
index f72ee69..6afd847 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptdump.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/ptdump.h
@@ -42,5 +42,13 @@  static inline int ptdump_debugfs_register(struct ptdump_info *info,
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif
+void ptdump_check_wx(void);
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_PTDUMP_CORE */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_WX
+#define debug_checkwx()	ptdump_check_wx()
+#else
+#define debug_checkwx()	do { } while (0)
+#endif
+
 #endif /* __ASM_PTDUMP_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/dump.c b/arch/arm64/mm/dump.c
index bb36649..4913af5 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/dump.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/dump.c
@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@  struct pg_state {
 	unsigned long start_address;
 	unsigned level;
 	u64 current_prot;
+	bool check_wx;
+	unsigned long wx_pages;
 };
 
 struct prot_bits {
@@ -202,6 +204,35 @@  static void dump_prot(struct pg_state *st, const struct prot_bits *bits,
 	}
 }
 
+static void note_prot_uxn(struct pg_state *st, unsigned long addr)
+{
+	if (!st->check_wx)
+		return;
+
+	if ((st->current_prot & PTE_UXN) == PTE_UXN)
+		return;
+
+	WARN_ONCE(1, "arm64/mm: Found non-UXN mapping at address %p/%pS\n",
+		  (void *)st->start_address, (void *)st->start_address);
+
+	st->wx_pages += (addr - st->start_address) / PAGE_SIZE;
+}
+
+static void note_prot_wx(struct pg_state *st, unsigned long addr)
+{
+	if (!st->check_wx)
+		return;
+	if ((st->current_prot & PTE_RDONLY) == PTE_RDONLY)
+		return;
+	if ((st->current_prot & PTE_PXN) == PTE_PXN)
+		return;
+
+	WARN_ONCE(1, "arm64/mm: Found insecure W+X mapping at address %p/%pS\n",
+		  (void *)st->start_address, (void *)st->start_address);
+
+	st->wx_pages += (addr - st->start_address) / PAGE_SIZE;
+}
+
 static void note_page(struct pg_state *st, unsigned long addr, unsigned level,
 				u64 val)
 {
@@ -219,6 +250,8 @@  static void note_page(struct pg_state *st, unsigned long addr, unsigned level,
 		unsigned long delta;
 
 		if (st->current_prot) {
+			note_prot_uxn(st, addr);
+			note_prot_wx(st, addr);
 			pt_dump_seq_printf(st->seq, "0x%016lx-0x%016lx   ",
 				   st->start_address, addr);
 
@@ -344,6 +377,25 @@  static struct ptdump_info kernel_ptdump_info = {
 	.base_addr	= VA_START,
 };
 
+void ptdump_check_wx(void)
+{
+	struct pg_state st = {
+		.seq = NULL,
+		.marker = (struct addr_marker[]) {
+			{ -1, NULL},
+		},
+		.check_wx = true,
+	};
+
+	walk_pgd(&st, &init_mm, 0);
+	note_page(&st, 0, 0, 0);
+	if (st.wx_pages)
+		pr_info("Checked W+X mappings: FAILED, %lu W+X pages found\n",
+			st.wx_pages);
+	else
+		pr_info("Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found\n");
+}
+
 static int ptdump_init(void)
 {
 	ptdump_initialize();
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
index 05615a3..2cbe2fe 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ 
 #include <asm/tlb.h>
 #include <asm/memblock.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+#include <asm/ptdump.h>
 
 u64 idmap_t0sz = TCR_T0SZ(VA_BITS);
 
@@ -396,6 +397,7 @@  void mark_rodata_ro(void)
 	section_size = (unsigned long)__init_begin - (unsigned long)__start_rodata;
 	create_mapping_late(__pa(__start_rodata), (unsigned long)__start_rodata,
 			    section_size, PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+	debug_checkwx();
 }
 
 static void __init map_kernel_segment(pgd_t *pgd, void *va_start, void *va_end,