| Message ID | 1479068614-5952-1-git-send-email-agruenba@redhat.com (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On 11/13/2016 12:23 PM, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote: > Al, > > here is a fix for a regression introduced in commit 6c6ef9f2 (which is > contained in v4.9-rc1). The fix was originally posted on November 3 [*], with > no reaction: > > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9410885/ > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9411123/ > > So may I again ask you to have a look, preferably before we slip yet another -rc? This is a critical regression fix for Smack. Without the fix it is impossible to properly configure certain system services. > > Thanks, > Andreas > > -- > > The IOP_XATTR flag is set on sockfs because sockfs supports getting the > "system.sockprotoname" xattr. Since commit 6c6ef9f2, this flag is checked for > setxattr support as well. This is wrong on sockfs because security xattr > support there is supposed to be provided by security_inode_setsecurity. The > smack security module relies on socket labels (xattrs). > > Fix this by adding a security xattr handler on sockfs that returns > -EAGAIN, and by checking for -EAGAIN in setxattr. > > We cannot simply check for -EOPNOTSUPP in setxattr because there are > filesystems that neither have direct security xattr support nor support > via security_inode_setsecurity. A more proper fix might be to move the > call to security_inode_setsecurity into sockfs, but it's not clear to me > if that is safe: we would end up calling security_inode_post_setxattr after > that as well. > > Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> > --- > fs/xattr.c | 22 ++++++++++++++-------- > net/socket.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c > index 3368659..2d13b4e 100644 > --- a/fs/xattr.c > +++ b/fs/xattr.c > @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, > const void *value, size_t size, int flags) > { > struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; > - int error = -EOPNOTSUPP; > + int error = -EAGAIN; > int issec = !strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, > XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN); > > @@ -183,15 +183,21 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, > security_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, > size, flags); > } > - } else if (issec) { > - const char *suffix = name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN; > - > + } else { > if (unlikely(is_bad_inode(inode))) > return -EIO; > - error = security_inode_setsecurity(inode, suffix, value, > - size, flags); > - if (!error) > - fsnotify_xattr(dentry); > + } > + if (error == -EAGAIN) { > + error = -EOPNOTSUPP; > + > + if (issec) { > + const char *suffix = name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN; > + > + error = security_inode_setsecurity(inode, suffix, value, > + size, flags); > + if (!error) > + fsnotify_xattr(dentry); > + } > } > > return error; > diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c > index 5a9bf5e..9820725 100644 > --- a/net/socket.c > +++ b/net/socket.c > @@ -341,8 +341,23 @@ static const struct xattr_handler sockfs_xattr_handler = { > .get = sockfs_xattr_get, > }; > > +static int sockfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, > + struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, > + const char *suffix, const void *value, > + size_t size, int flags) > +{ > + /* Handled by LSM. */ > + return -EAGAIN; > +} > + > +static const struct xattr_handler sockfs_security_xattr_handler = { > + .prefix = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, > + .set = sockfs_security_xattr_set, > +}; > + > static const struct xattr_handler *sockfs_xattr_handlers[] = { > &sockfs_xattr_handler, > + &sockfs_security_xattr_handler, > NULL > }; > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c index 3368659..2d13b4e 100644 --- a/fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/xattr.c @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; - int error = -EOPNOTSUPP; + int error = -EAGAIN; int issec = !strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN); @@ -183,15 +183,21 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, security_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); } - } else if (issec) { - const char *suffix = name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN; - + } else { if (unlikely(is_bad_inode(inode))) return -EIO; - error = security_inode_setsecurity(inode, suffix, value, - size, flags); - if (!error) - fsnotify_xattr(dentry); + } + if (error == -EAGAIN) { + error = -EOPNOTSUPP; + + if (issec) { + const char *suffix = name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN; + + error = security_inode_setsecurity(inode, suffix, value, + size, flags); + if (!error) + fsnotify_xattr(dentry); + } } return error; diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c index 5a9bf5e..9820725 100644 --- a/net/socket.c +++ b/net/socket.c @@ -341,8 +341,23 @@ static const struct xattr_handler sockfs_xattr_handler = { .get = sockfs_xattr_get, }; +static int sockfs_security_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler, + struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, + const char *suffix, const void *value, + size_t size, int flags) +{ + /* Handled by LSM. */ + return -EAGAIN; +} + +static const struct xattr_handler sockfs_security_xattr_handler = { + .prefix = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, + .set = sockfs_security_xattr_set, +}; + static const struct xattr_handler *sockfs_xattr_handlers[] = { &sockfs_xattr_handler, + &sockfs_security_xattr_handler, NULL };
Al, here is a fix for a regression introduced in commit 6c6ef9f2 (which is contained in v4.9-rc1). The fix was originally posted on November 3 [*], with no reaction: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9410885/ https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/9411123/ So may I again ask you to have a look, preferably before we slip yet another -rc? Thanks, Andreas -- The IOP_XATTR flag is set on sockfs because sockfs supports getting the "system.sockprotoname" xattr. Since commit 6c6ef9f2, this flag is checked for setxattr support as well. This is wrong on sockfs because security xattr support there is supposed to be provided by security_inode_setsecurity. The smack security module relies on socket labels (xattrs). Fix this by adding a security xattr handler on sockfs that returns -EAGAIN, and by checking for -EAGAIN in setxattr. We cannot simply check for -EOPNOTSUPP in setxattr because there are filesystems that neither have direct security xattr support nor support via security_inode_setsecurity. A more proper fix might be to move the call to security_inode_setsecurity into sockfs, but it's not clear to me if that is safe: we would end up calling security_inode_post_setxattr after that as well. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> --- fs/xattr.c | 22 ++++++++++++++-------- net/socket.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)