| Message ID | 1484069312-26653-1-git-send-email-sds@tycho.nsa.gov (mailing list archive) |
|---|---|
| State | New, archived |
| Headers | show |
On 1/10/2017 9:28 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: > As reported by yangshukui, a permission denial from security_task_wait() > can lead to a soft lockup in zap_pid_ns_processes() since it only expects > sys_wait4() to return 0 or -ECHILD. Further, security_task_wait() can > in general lead to zombies; in the absence of some way to automatically > reparent a child process upon a denial, the hook is not useful. Remove > the security hook and its implementations in SELinux and Smack. Smack > already removed its check from its hook. > > Reported-by: yangshukui <yangshukui@huawei.com> > Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > --- > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 ------- > include/linux/security.h | 6 ------ > kernel/exit.c | 19 ++----------------- > security/security.c | 6 ------ > security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 ------- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 20 -------------------- > 6 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > index 0dde959..6fe7a5c 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > @@ -666,11 +666,6 @@ > * @sig contains the signal value. > * @secid contains the sid of the process where the signal originated > * Return 0 if permission is granted. > - * @task_wait: > - * Check permission before allowing a process to reap a child process @p > - * and collect its status information. > - * @p contains the task_struct for process. > - * Return 0 if permission is granted. > * @task_prctl: > * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the > * current process. > @@ -1507,7 +1502,6 @@ union security_list_options { > int (*task_movememory)(struct task_struct *p); > int (*task_kill)(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, > int sig, u32 secid); > - int (*task_wait)(struct task_struct *p); > int (*task_prctl)(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, > unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); > void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); > @@ -1767,7 +1761,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads { > struct list_head task_getscheduler; > struct list_head task_movememory; > struct list_head task_kill; > - struct list_head task_wait; > struct list_head task_prctl; > struct list_head task_to_inode; > struct list_head ipc_permission; > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index f4ebac1..d3868f2 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -332,7 +332,6 @@ int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p); > int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p); > int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, > int sig, u32 secid); > -int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p); > int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, > unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); > void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); > @@ -980,11 +979,6 @@ static inline int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, > return 0; > } > > -static inline int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) > -{ > - return 0; > -} > - > static inline int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, > unsigned long arg3, > unsigned long arg4, > diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c > index 8f14b86..60f2451 100644 > --- a/kernel/exit.c > +++ b/kernel/exit.c > @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ > #include <linux/tty.h> > #include <linux/iocontext.h> > #include <linux/key.h> > -#include <linux/security.h> > #include <linux/cpu.h> > #include <linux/acct.h> > #include <linux/tsacct_kern.h> > @@ -1360,7 +1359,7 @@ static int wait_task_continued(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *p) > * Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock. > * Returns zero if the search for a child should continue; > * then ->notask_error is 0 if @p is an eligible child, > - * or another error from security_task_wait(), or still -ECHILD. > + * or still -ECHILD. > */ > static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace, > struct task_struct *p) > @@ -1380,20 +1379,6 @@ static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace, > if (!ret) > return ret; > > - ret = security_task_wait(p); > - if (unlikely(ret < 0)) { > - /* > - * If we have not yet seen any eligible child, > - * then let this error code replace -ECHILD. > - * A permission error will give the user a clue > - * to look for security policy problems, rather > - * than for mysterious wait bugs. > - */ > - if (wo->notask_error) > - wo->notask_error = ret; > - return 0; > - } > - > if (unlikely(exit_state == EXIT_TRACE)) { > /* > * ptrace == 0 means we are the natural parent. In this case > @@ -1486,7 +1471,7 @@ static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace, > * Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock. > * Returns zero if the search for a child should continue; then > * ->notask_error is 0 if there were any eligible children, > - * or another error from security_task_wait(), or still -ECHILD. > + * or still -ECHILD. > */ > static int do_wait_thread(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *tsk) > { > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 32052f5..8c9fee5 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -1025,11 +1025,6 @@ int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, > return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, secid); > } > > -int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) > -{ > - return call_int_hook(task_wait, 0, p); > -} > - > int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, > unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) > { > @@ -1769,7 +1764,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = { > .task_movememory = > LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_movememory), > .task_kill = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_kill), > - .task_wait = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_wait), > .task_prctl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_prctl), > .task_to_inode = > LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_to_inode), > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index bada3cd..720dbd0 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -3969,12 +3969,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, > return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); > } > > -static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) > -{ > - return avc_has_perm(task_sid(p), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS, > - PROCESS__SIGCHLD, NULL); > -} > - > static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, > struct inode *inode) > { > @@ -6217,7 +6211,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill), > - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, selinux_task_wait), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode), > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission), > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 8da4a6b..2166373 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -2272,25 +2272,6 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, > } > > /** > - * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting > - * @p: task to wait for > - * > - * Returns 0 > - */ > -static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) > -{ > - /* > - * Allow the operation to succeed. > - * Zombies are bad. > - * In userless environments (e.g. phones) programs > - * get marked with SMACK64EXEC and even if the parent > - * and child shouldn't be talking the parent still > - * may expect to know when the child exits. > - */ > - return 0; > -} > - > -/** > * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob > * @p: task to copy from > * @inode: inode to copy to > @@ -4658,7 +4639,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill), > - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, smack_task_wait), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode), > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission), -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On 01/10, Stephen Smalley wrote: > > As reported by yangshukui, a permission denial from security_task_wait() > can lead to a soft lockup in zap_pid_ns_processes() since it only expects > sys_wait4() to return 0 or -ECHILD. Further, security_task_wait() can > in general lead to zombies; in the absence of some way to automatically > reparent a child process upon a denial, the hook is not useful. Remove > the security hook and its implementations in SELinux and Smack. Smack > already removed its check from its hook. > > Reported-by: yangshukui <yangshukui@huawei.com> > Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Great ;) Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 12:28 PM, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: > As reported by yangshukui, a permission denial from security_task_wait() > can lead to a soft lockup in zap_pid_ns_processes() since it only expects > sys_wait4() to return 0 or -ECHILD. Further, security_task_wait() can > in general lead to zombies; in the absence of some way to automatically > reparent a child process upon a denial, the hook is not useful. Remove > the security hook and its implementations in SELinux and Smack. Smack > already removed its check from its hook. > > Reported-by: yangshukui <yangshukui@huawei.com> > Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > --- > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 ------- > include/linux/security.h | 6 ------ > kernel/exit.c | 19 ++----------------- > security/security.c | 6 ------ > security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 ------- > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 20 -------------------- > 6 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) Looks good to me and I'm not seeing any objections so I'll go ahead and merge this into the selinux/next branch today unless Casey already merged this into the Smack tree - Casey? > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > index 0dde959..6fe7a5c 100644 > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > @@ -666,11 +666,6 @@ > * @sig contains the signal value. > * @secid contains the sid of the process where the signal originated > * Return 0 if permission is granted. > - * @task_wait: > - * Check permission before allowing a process to reap a child process @p > - * and collect its status information. > - * @p contains the task_struct for process. > - * Return 0 if permission is granted. > * @task_prctl: > * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the > * current process. > @@ -1507,7 +1502,6 @@ union security_list_options { > int (*task_movememory)(struct task_struct *p); > int (*task_kill)(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, > int sig, u32 secid); > - int (*task_wait)(struct task_struct *p); > int (*task_prctl)(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, > unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); > void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); > @@ -1767,7 +1761,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads { > struct list_head task_getscheduler; > struct list_head task_movememory; > struct list_head task_kill; > - struct list_head task_wait; > struct list_head task_prctl; > struct list_head task_to_inode; > struct list_head ipc_permission; > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > index f4ebac1..d3868f2 100644 > --- a/include/linux/security.h > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > @@ -332,7 +332,6 @@ int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p); > int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p); > int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, > int sig, u32 secid); > -int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p); > int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, > unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); > void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); > @@ -980,11 +979,6 @@ static inline int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, > return 0; > } > > -static inline int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) > -{ > - return 0; > -} > - > static inline int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, > unsigned long arg3, > unsigned long arg4, > diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c > index 8f14b86..60f2451 100644 > --- a/kernel/exit.c > +++ b/kernel/exit.c > @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ > #include <linux/tty.h> > #include <linux/iocontext.h> > #include <linux/key.h> > -#include <linux/security.h> > #include <linux/cpu.h> > #include <linux/acct.h> > #include <linux/tsacct_kern.h> > @@ -1360,7 +1359,7 @@ static int wait_task_continued(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *p) > * Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock. > * Returns zero if the search for a child should continue; > * then ->notask_error is 0 if @p is an eligible child, > - * or another error from security_task_wait(), or still -ECHILD. > + * or still -ECHILD. > */ > static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace, > struct task_struct *p) > @@ -1380,20 +1379,6 @@ static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace, > if (!ret) > return ret; > > - ret = security_task_wait(p); > - if (unlikely(ret < 0)) { > - /* > - * If we have not yet seen any eligible child, > - * then let this error code replace -ECHILD. > - * A permission error will give the user a clue > - * to look for security policy problems, rather > - * than for mysterious wait bugs. > - */ > - if (wo->notask_error) > - wo->notask_error = ret; > - return 0; > - } > - > if (unlikely(exit_state == EXIT_TRACE)) { > /* > * ptrace == 0 means we are the natural parent. In this case > @@ -1486,7 +1471,7 @@ static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace, > * Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock. > * Returns zero if the search for a child should continue; then > * ->notask_error is 0 if there were any eligible children, > - * or another error from security_task_wait(), or still -ECHILD. > + * or still -ECHILD. > */ > static int do_wait_thread(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *tsk) > { > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c > index 32052f5..8c9fee5 100644 > --- a/security/security.c > +++ b/security/security.c > @@ -1025,11 +1025,6 @@ int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, > return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, secid); > } > > -int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) > -{ > - return call_int_hook(task_wait, 0, p); > -} > - > int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, > unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) > { > @@ -1769,7 +1764,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = { > .task_movememory = > LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_movememory), > .task_kill = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_kill), > - .task_wait = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_wait), > .task_prctl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_prctl), > .task_to_inode = > LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_to_inode), > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index bada3cd..720dbd0 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -3969,12 +3969,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, > return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); > } > > -static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) > -{ > - return avc_has_perm(task_sid(p), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS, > - PROCESS__SIGCHLD, NULL); > -} > - > static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, > struct inode *inode) > { > @@ -6217,7 +6211,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill), > - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, selinux_task_wait), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode), > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission), > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > index 8da4a6b..2166373 100644 > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c > @@ -2272,25 +2272,6 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, > } > > /** > - * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting > - * @p: task to wait for > - * > - * Returns 0 > - */ > -static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) > -{ > - /* > - * Allow the operation to succeed. > - * Zombies are bad. > - * In userless environments (e.g. phones) programs > - * get marked with SMACK64EXEC and even if the parent > - * and child shouldn't be talking the parent still > - * may expect to know when the child exits. > - */ > - return 0; > -} > - > -/** > * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob > * @p: task to copy from > * @inode: inode to copy to > @@ -4658,7 +4639,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = { > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill), > - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, smack_task_wait), > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode), > > LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission), > -- > 2.7.4 >
On 1/12/2017 8:03 AM, Paul Moore wrote: > On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 12:28 PM, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: >> As reported by yangshukui, a permission denial from security_task_wait() >> can lead to a soft lockup in zap_pid_ns_processes() since it only expects >> sys_wait4() to return 0 or -ECHILD. Further, security_task_wait() can >> in general lead to zombies; in the absence of some way to automatically >> reparent a child process upon a denial, the hook is not useful. Remove >> the security hook and its implementations in SELinux and Smack. Smack >> already removed its check from its hook. >> >> Reported-by: yangshukui <yangshukui@huawei.com> >> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> In case you miss my earlier Ack. >> --- >> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 ------- >> include/linux/security.h | 6 ------ >> kernel/exit.c | 19 ++----------------- >> security/security.c | 6 ------ >> security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 ------- >> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 20 -------------------- >> 6 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) > Looks good to me and I'm not seeing any objections so I'll go ahead > and merge this into the selinux/next branch today unless Casey already > merged this into the Smack tree - Casey? Please go ahead and merge into the SELinux tree. It makes sense to do this atomically. Thank you. > >> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h >> index 0dde959..6fe7a5c 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h >> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h >> @@ -666,11 +666,6 @@ >> * @sig contains the signal value. >> * @secid contains the sid of the process where the signal originated >> * Return 0 if permission is granted. >> - * @task_wait: >> - * Check permission before allowing a process to reap a child process @p >> - * and collect its status information. >> - * @p contains the task_struct for process. >> - * Return 0 if permission is granted. >> * @task_prctl: >> * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the >> * current process. >> @@ -1507,7 +1502,6 @@ union security_list_options { >> int (*task_movememory)(struct task_struct *p); >> int (*task_kill)(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, >> int sig, u32 secid); >> - int (*task_wait)(struct task_struct *p); >> int (*task_prctl)(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, >> unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); >> void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); >> @@ -1767,7 +1761,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads { >> struct list_head task_getscheduler; >> struct list_head task_movememory; >> struct list_head task_kill; >> - struct list_head task_wait; >> struct list_head task_prctl; >> struct list_head task_to_inode; >> struct list_head ipc_permission; >> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h >> index f4ebac1..d3868f2 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/security.h >> +++ b/include/linux/security.h >> @@ -332,7 +332,6 @@ int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p); >> int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p); >> int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, >> int sig, u32 secid); >> -int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p); >> int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, >> unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); >> void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); >> @@ -980,11 +979,6 @@ static inline int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, >> return 0; >> } >> >> -static inline int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) >> -{ >> - return 0; >> -} >> - >> static inline int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, >> unsigned long arg3, >> unsigned long arg4, >> diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c >> index 8f14b86..60f2451 100644 >> --- a/kernel/exit.c >> +++ b/kernel/exit.c >> @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ >> #include <linux/tty.h> >> #include <linux/iocontext.h> >> #include <linux/key.h> >> -#include <linux/security.h> >> #include <linux/cpu.h> >> #include <linux/acct.h> >> #include <linux/tsacct_kern.h> >> @@ -1360,7 +1359,7 @@ static int wait_task_continued(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *p) >> * Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock. >> * Returns zero if the search for a child should continue; >> * then ->notask_error is 0 if @p is an eligible child, >> - * or another error from security_task_wait(), or still -ECHILD. >> + * or still -ECHILD. >> */ >> static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace, >> struct task_struct *p) >> @@ -1380,20 +1379,6 @@ static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace, >> if (!ret) >> return ret; >> >> - ret = security_task_wait(p); >> - if (unlikely(ret < 0)) { >> - /* >> - * If we have not yet seen any eligible child, >> - * then let this error code replace -ECHILD. >> - * A permission error will give the user a clue >> - * to look for security policy problems, rather >> - * than for mysterious wait bugs. >> - */ >> - if (wo->notask_error) >> - wo->notask_error = ret; >> - return 0; >> - } >> - >> if (unlikely(exit_state == EXIT_TRACE)) { >> /* >> * ptrace == 0 means we are the natural parent. In this case >> @@ -1486,7 +1471,7 @@ static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace, >> * Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock. >> * Returns zero if the search for a child should continue; then >> * ->notask_error is 0 if there were any eligible children, >> - * or another error from security_task_wait(), or still -ECHILD. >> + * or still -ECHILD. >> */ >> static int do_wait_thread(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *tsk) >> { >> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c >> index 32052f5..8c9fee5 100644 >> --- a/security/security.c >> +++ b/security/security.c >> @@ -1025,11 +1025,6 @@ int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, >> return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, secid); >> } >> >> -int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) >> -{ >> - return call_int_hook(task_wait, 0, p); >> -} >> - >> int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, >> unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) >> { >> @@ -1769,7 +1764,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = { >> .task_movememory = >> LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_movememory), >> .task_kill = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_kill), >> - .task_wait = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_wait), >> .task_prctl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_prctl), >> .task_to_inode = >> LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_to_inode), >> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c >> index bada3cd..720dbd0 100644 >> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c >> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c >> @@ -3969,12 +3969,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, >> return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); >> } >> >> -static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) >> -{ >> - return avc_has_perm(task_sid(p), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS, >> - PROCESS__SIGCHLD, NULL); >> -} >> - >> static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, >> struct inode *inode) >> { >> @@ -6217,7 +6211,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = { >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler), >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory), >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill), >> - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, selinux_task_wait), >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode), >> >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission), >> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c >> index 8da4a6b..2166373 100644 >> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c >> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c >> @@ -2272,25 +2272,6 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, >> } >> >> /** >> - * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting >> - * @p: task to wait for >> - * >> - * Returns 0 >> - */ >> -static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) >> -{ >> - /* >> - * Allow the operation to succeed. >> - * Zombies are bad. >> - * In userless environments (e.g. phones) programs >> - * get marked with SMACK64EXEC and even if the parent >> - * and child shouldn't be talking the parent still >> - * may expect to know when the child exits. >> - */ >> - return 0; >> -} >> - >> -/** >> * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob >> * @p: task to copy from >> * @inode: inode to copy to >> @@ -4658,7 +4639,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = { >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler), >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory), >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill), >> - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, smack_task_wait), >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode), >> >> LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission), >> -- >> 2.7.4 >> > > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
On Thu, Jan 12, 2017 at 11:49 AM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote: > On 1/12/2017 8:03 AM, Paul Moore wrote: >> On Tue, Jan 10, 2017 at 12:28 PM, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: >>> As reported by yangshukui, a permission denial from security_task_wait() >>> can lead to a soft lockup in zap_pid_ns_processes() since it only expects >>> sys_wait4() to return 0 or -ECHILD. Further, security_task_wait() can >>> in general lead to zombies; in the absence of some way to automatically >>> reparent a child process upon a denial, the hook is not useful. Remove >>> the security hook and its implementations in SELinux and Smack. Smack >>> already removed its check from its hook. >>> >>> Reported-by: yangshukui <yangshukui@huawei.com> >>> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> > > Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> > > In case you miss my earlier Ack. Yep, already go it. I just wanted to try and avoid the situation where both of us push this patch up to James for the next merge window. >>> --- >>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 ------- >>> include/linux/security.h | 6 ------ >>> kernel/exit.c | 19 ++----------------- >>> security/security.c | 6 ------ >>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 ------- >>> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 20 -------------------- >>> 6 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) >> Looks good to me and I'm not seeing any objections so I'll go ahead >> and merge this into the selinux/next branch today unless Casey already >> merged this into the Smack tree - Casey? > > Please go ahead and merge into the SELinux tree. > It makes sense to do this atomically. > Thank you. Agreed. It should be in selinux/next now if you want to play.
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 0dde959..6fe7a5c 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -666,11 +666,6 @@ * @sig contains the signal value. * @secid contains the sid of the process where the signal originated * Return 0 if permission is granted. - * @task_wait: - * Check permission before allowing a process to reap a child process @p - * and collect its status information. - * @p contains the task_struct for process. - * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @task_prctl: * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the * current process. @@ -1507,7 +1502,6 @@ union security_list_options { int (*task_movememory)(struct task_struct *p); int (*task_kill)(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid); - int (*task_wait)(struct task_struct *p); int (*task_prctl)(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); @@ -1767,7 +1761,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads { struct list_head task_getscheduler; struct list_head task_movememory; struct list_head task_kill; - struct list_head task_wait; struct list_head task_prctl; struct list_head task_to_inode; struct list_head ipc_permission; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index f4ebac1..d3868f2 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -332,7 +332,6 @@ int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p); int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p); int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid); -int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p); int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); @@ -980,11 +979,6 @@ static inline int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, return 0; } -static inline int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) -{ - return 0; -} - static inline int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c index 8f14b86..60f2451 100644 --- a/kernel/exit.c +++ b/kernel/exit.c @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ #include <linux/tty.h> #include <linux/iocontext.h> #include <linux/key.h> -#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/acct.h> #include <linux/tsacct_kern.h> @@ -1360,7 +1359,7 @@ static int wait_task_continued(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *p) * Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock. * Returns zero if the search for a child should continue; * then ->notask_error is 0 if @p is an eligible child, - * or another error from security_task_wait(), or still -ECHILD. + * or still -ECHILD. */ static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace, struct task_struct *p) @@ -1380,20 +1379,6 @@ static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace, if (!ret) return ret; - ret = security_task_wait(p); - if (unlikely(ret < 0)) { - /* - * If we have not yet seen any eligible child, - * then let this error code replace -ECHILD. - * A permission error will give the user a clue - * to look for security policy problems, rather - * than for mysterious wait bugs. - */ - if (wo->notask_error) - wo->notask_error = ret; - return 0; - } - if (unlikely(exit_state == EXIT_TRACE)) { /* * ptrace == 0 means we are the natural parent. In this case @@ -1486,7 +1471,7 @@ static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace, * Returns nonzero for a final return, when we have unlocked tasklist_lock. * Returns zero if the search for a child should continue; then * ->notask_error is 0 if there were any eligible children, - * or another error from security_task_wait(), or still -ECHILD. + * or still -ECHILD. */ static int do_wait_thread(struct wait_opts *wo, struct task_struct *tsk) { diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 32052f5..8c9fee5 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1025,11 +1025,6 @@ int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, secid); } -int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) -{ - return call_int_hook(task_wait, 0, p); -} - int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) { @@ -1769,7 +1764,6 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = { .task_movememory = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_movememory), .task_kill = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_kill), - .task_wait = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_wait), .task_prctl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_prctl), .task_to_inode = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_to_inode), diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index bada3cd..720dbd0 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3969,12 +3969,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); } -static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) -{ - return avc_has_perm(task_sid(p), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS, - PROCESS__SIGCHLD, NULL); -} - static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) { @@ -6217,7 +6211,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, selinux_task_wait), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission), diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 8da4a6b..2166373 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2272,25 +2272,6 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, } /** - * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting - * @p: task to wait for - * - * Returns 0 - */ -static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) -{ - /* - * Allow the operation to succeed. - * Zombies are bad. - * In userless environments (e.g. phones) programs - * get marked with SMACK64EXEC and even if the parent - * and child shouldn't be talking the parent still - * may expect to know when the child exits. - */ - return 0; -} - -/** * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob * @p: task to copy from * @inode: inode to copy to @@ -4658,7 +4639,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, smack_task_wait), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
As reported by yangshukui, a permission denial from security_task_wait() can lead to a soft lockup in zap_pid_ns_processes() since it only expects sys_wait4() to return 0 or -ECHILD. Further, security_task_wait() can in general lead to zombies; in the absence of some way to automatically reparent a child process upon a denial, the hook is not useful. Remove the security hook and its implementations in SELinux and Smack. Smack already removed its check from its hook. Reported-by: yangshukui <yangshukui@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> --- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 7 ------- include/linux/security.h | 6 ------ kernel/exit.c | 19 ++----------------- security/security.c | 6 ------ security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 ------- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 20 -------------------- 6 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)