diff mbox

[2/2] security: Change name of CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX

Message ID 1484789346-21012-3-git-send-email-labbott@redhat.com (mailing list archive)
State New, archived
Headers show

Commit Message

Laura Abbott Jan. 19, 2017, 1:29 a.m. UTC
Despite the word 'debug' in CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, this kernel
option provides key security features that are to be expected on a
modern system. Change the name to CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS which
more accurately describes what this option is intended to do.

Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
---
 Documentation/security/self-protection.txt |  2 +-
 arch/arm/Kconfig                           |  1 +
 arch/arm/Kconfig.debug                     | 11 -----------
 arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g4_defconfig       |  2 +-
 arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g5_defconfig       |  2 +-
 arch/arm/kernel/patch.c                    |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                         |  1 +
 arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug                   | 11 -----------
 arch/arm64/kernel/insn.c                   |  2 +-
 arch/s390/Kconfig                          |  1 +
 arch/s390/Kconfig.debug                    |  3 ---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                           |  1 +
 arch/x86/Kconfig.debug                     | 11 -----------
 include/linux/filter.h                     |  4 ++--
 include/linux/init.h                       |  2 +-
 include/linux/module.h                     |  2 +-
 init/main.c                                |  2 +-
 kernel/module.c                            |  6 +++---
 security/Kconfig                           | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 19 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)

Comments

Mark Rutland Jan. 19, 2017, 11:11 a.m. UTC | #1
Hi,

On Wed, Jan 18, 2017 at 05:29:06PM -0800, Laura Abbott wrote:
> 
> Despite the word 'debug' in CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, this kernel
> option provides key security features that are to be expected on a
> modern system. Change the name to CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS which
> more accurately describes what this option is intended to do.

This looks good; my naming comments from the DEBUG_RODATA also apply
here -- the proposed name is fine.

> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> index 06fed56..2fe0e98 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config ARM64
>  	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
>  	select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
>  	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
> +	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
>  	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
>  	select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
>  	select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
> index a26d27f..1eebe1f 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
> @@ -71,17 +71,6 @@ config DEBUG_WX
>  
>  	  If in doubt, say "Y".
>  
> -config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
> -	bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
> -	depends on MODULES
> -	default y
> -	help
> -	  Is this is set, kernel module text and rodata will be made read-only.
> -	  This is to help catch accidental or malicious attempts to change the
> -	  kernel's executable code.
> -
> -	  If in doubt, say Y.
> -

> +config ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
> +	def_bool n
> +
> +config HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
> +	bool "Mark module mappings with stricter permissions (RO/W^X)"
> +	default y
> +	depends on ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
> +	help
> +	  If this is set, module text and rodata memory will be made read-only,
> +	  and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides
> +	  protection against certain security vulnerabilities (e.g. modifying
> +	  code)
> +
> +	  Unless your system has known restrictions or performance issues, it
> +	  is recommended to say Y here.
> +

I was hoping that we'd make this mandatory, as we'd already done for
DEBUG_RODATA.

Takahiro-san did a bit of work towards that in commit 39290b389ea2654f
("module: extend 'rodata=off' boot cmdline parameter to module
mappings").

It would be good to know if there's any reason we can't do that.

Otherwise, this looks fine.

Thanks,
Mark.
Heiko Carstens Jan. 19, 2017, 11:34 a.m. UTC | #2
On Thu, Jan 19, 2017 at 11:11:18AM +0000, Mark Rutland wrote:
> > +config HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
> > +	bool "Mark module mappings with stricter permissions (RO/W^X)"
> > +	default y
> > +	depends on ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
> > +	help
> > +	  If this is set, module text and rodata memory will be made read-only,
> > +	  and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides
> > +	  protection against certain security vulnerabilities (e.g. modifying
> > +	  code)
> > +
> > +	  Unless your system has known restrictions or performance issues, it
> > +	  is recommended to say Y here.
> > +
> 
> I was hoping that we'd make this mandatory, as we'd already done for
> DEBUG_RODATA.

Same for s390: would be good to make this mandatory.
Robin Murphy Jan. 19, 2017, 11:43 a.m. UTC | #3
Hi Laura,

On 19/01/17 01:29, Laura Abbott wrote:
> 
> Despite the word 'debug' in CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, this kernel
> option provides key security features that are to be expected on a
> modern system. Change the name to CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS which
> more accurately describes what this option is intended to do.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
> ---

[...]

> diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
> index 09aff28..ef852e4 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ config ARM
>  	select ARCH_HAVE_CUSTOM_GPIO_H
>  	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
>  	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS if MMU && !XIP_KERNEL
> +	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS if MMU
>  	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT
>  	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
>  	select ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP
> diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
> index d83f7c3..426d271 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
> +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
> @@ -1738,17 +1738,6 @@ config PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR
>  	  additional instructions during context switch. Say Y here only if you
>  	  are planning to use hardware trace tools with this kernel.
>  
> -config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
> -	bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
> -	depends on MODULES && MMU
> -	---help---
> -	  This option helps catch unintended modifications to loadable
> -	  kernel module's text and read-only data. It also prevents execution
> -	  of module data. Such protection may interfere with run-time code
> -	  patching and dynamic kernel tracing - and they might also protect
> -	  against certain classes of kernel exploits.
> -	  If in doubt, say "N".
> -
>  source "drivers/hwtracing/coresight/Kconfig"
>  
>  endmenu

[...]

> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config ARM64
>  	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
>  	select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
>  	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
> +	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
>  	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
>  	select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
>  	select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
> index a26d27f..1eebe1f 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
> @@ -71,17 +71,6 @@ config DEBUG_WX
>  
>  	  If in doubt, say "Y".
>  
> -config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
> -	bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
> -	depends on MODULES
> -	default y
> -	help
> -	  Is this is set, kernel module text and rodata will be made read-only.
> -	  This is to help catch accidental or malicious attempts to change the
> -	  kernel's executable code.
> -
> -	  If in doubt, say Y.
> -
>  config DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA
>  	depends on ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
>  	bool "Align linker sections up to SECTION_SIZE"

[...]

> --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
> @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ config S390
>  	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
>  	select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
>  	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
> +	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
>  	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
>  	select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
>  	select ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
> diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig.debug b/arch/s390/Kconfig.debug
> index 26c5d5be..57f8ea9 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig.debug
> +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig.debug
> @@ -17,7 +17,4 @@ config S390_PTDUMP
>  	  kernel.
>  	  If in doubt, say "N"
>  
> -config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
> -	def_bool y
> -	depends on MODULES
>  endmenu
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index 9d80cd8..38ce850 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ config X86
>  	select ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER
>  	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
>  	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
> +	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
>  	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV			if X86_64
>  	select ARCH_HAS_MMIO_FLUSH
>  	select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API		if X86_64
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
> index 67eec55..69cdd0b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
> @@ -109,17 +109,6 @@ config DEBUG_WX
>  
>  	  If in doubt, say "Y".
>  
> -config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
> -	bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
> -	depends on MODULES
> -	---help---
> -	  This option helps catch unintended modifications to loadable
> -	  kernel module's text and read-only data. It also prevents execution
> -	  of module data. Such protection may interfere with run-time code
> -	  patching and dynamic kernel tracing - and they might also protect
> -	  against certain classes of kernel exploits.
> -	  If in doubt, say "N".
> -
>  config DEBUG_NX_TEST
>  	tristate "Testcase for the NX non-executable stack feature"
>  	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && m

[...]

> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -174,6 +174,22 @@ config HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
>  	  Unless your system has known restrictions or performance issues, it
>  	  is recommended to say Y here.
>  
> +config ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
> +	def_bool n
> +
> +config HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
> +	bool "Mark module mappings with stricter permissions (RO/W^X)"
> +	default y
> +	depends on ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS

It would seem that this ends up losing the previous dependency on
MODULES - is that intentional?

Robin.

> +	help
> +	  If this is set, module text and rodata memory will be made read-only,
> +	  and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides
> +	  protection against certain security vulnerabilities (e.g. modifying
> +	  code)
> +
> +	  Unless your system has known restrictions or performance issues, it
> +	  is recommended to say Y here.
> +
>  source security/selinux/Kconfig
>  source security/smack/Kconfig
>  source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
>
kernel test robot Jan. 20, 2017, 5:46 a.m. UTC | #4
Hi Laura,

[auto build test ERROR on linus/master]
[also build test ERROR on v4.10-rc4]
[cannot apply to next-20170119]
[if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system]

url:    https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Laura-Abbott/Better-hardening-names/20170119-200343
config: i386-randconfig-c0-01201130 (attached as .config)
compiler: gcc-4.9 (Debian 4.9.4-2) 4.9.4
reproduce:
        # save the attached .config to linux build tree
        make ARCH=i386 

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

   arch/x86/built-in.o: In function `ftrace_arch_code_modify_prepare':
>> (.text+0x3fcb7): undefined reference to `set_all_modules_text_rw'
   arch/x86/built-in.o: In function `ftrace_arch_code_modify_post_process':
>> (.text+0x3fcc3): undefined reference to `set_all_modules_text_ro'

---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructure                Open Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all                   Intel Corporation
Laura Abbott Jan. 25, 2017, 11:44 a.m. UTC | #5
On 01/19/2017 12:43 PM, Robin Murphy wrote:
> Hi Laura,
>
> On 19/01/17 01:29, Laura Abbott wrote:
>>
>> Despite the word 'debug' in CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, this kernel
>> option provides key security features that are to be expected on a
>> modern system. Change the name to CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS which
>> more accurately describes what this option is intended to do.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
>> ---
>
> [...]
>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
>> index 09aff28..ef852e4 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
>> +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
>> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ config ARM
>>  	select ARCH_HAVE_CUSTOM_GPIO_H
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS if MMU && !XIP_KERNEL
>> +	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS if MMU
>>  	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT
>>  	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
>>  	select ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP
>> diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
>> index d83f7c3..426d271 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
>> +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
>> @@ -1738,17 +1738,6 @@ config PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR
>>  	  additional instructions during context switch. Say Y here only if you
>>  	  are planning to use hardware trace tools with this kernel.
>>
>> -config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
>> -	bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
>> -	depends on MODULES && MMU
>> -	---help---
>> -	  This option helps catch unintended modifications to loadable
>> -	  kernel module's text and read-only data. It also prevents execution
>> -	  of module data. Such protection may interfere with run-time code
>> -	  patching and dynamic kernel tracing - and they might also protect
>> -	  against certain classes of kernel exploits.
>> -	  If in doubt, say "N".
>> -
>>  source "drivers/hwtracing/coresight/Kconfig"
>>
>>  endmenu
>
> [...]
>
>> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
>> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config ARM64
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
>> +	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
>> index a26d27f..1eebe1f 100644
>> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
>> @@ -71,17 +71,6 @@ config DEBUG_WX
>>
>>  	  If in doubt, say "Y".
>>
>> -config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
>> -	bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
>> -	depends on MODULES
>> -	default y
>> -	help
>> -	  Is this is set, kernel module text and rodata will be made read-only.
>> -	  This is to help catch accidental or malicious attempts to change the
>> -	  kernel's executable code.
>> -
>> -	  If in doubt, say Y.
>> -
>>  config DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA
>>  	depends on ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
>>  	bool "Align linker sections up to SECTION_SIZE"
>
> [...]
>
>> --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
>> +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
>> @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ config S390
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
>> +	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
>> diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig.debug b/arch/s390/Kconfig.debug
>> index 26c5d5be..57f8ea9 100644
>> --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig.debug
>> +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig.debug
>> @@ -17,7 +17,4 @@ config S390_PTDUMP
>>  	  kernel.
>>  	  If in doubt, say "N"
>>
>> -config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
>> -	def_bool y
>> -	depends on MODULES
>>  endmenu
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
>> index 9d80cd8..38ce850 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
>> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
>> @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ config X86
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
>> +	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV			if X86_64
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_MMIO_FLUSH
>>  	select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API		if X86_64
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
>> index 67eec55..69cdd0b 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
>> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
>> @@ -109,17 +109,6 @@ config DEBUG_WX
>>
>>  	  If in doubt, say "Y".
>>
>> -config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
>> -	bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
>> -	depends on MODULES
>> -	---help---
>> -	  This option helps catch unintended modifications to loadable
>> -	  kernel module's text and read-only data. It also prevents execution
>> -	  of module data. Such protection may interfere with run-time code
>> -	  patching and dynamic kernel tracing - and they might also protect
>> -	  against certain classes of kernel exploits.
>> -	  If in doubt, say "N".
>> -
>>  config DEBUG_NX_TEST
>>  	tristate "Testcase for the NX non-executable stack feature"
>>  	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && m
>
> [...]
>
>> --- a/security/Kconfig
>> +++ b/security/Kconfig
>> @@ -174,6 +174,22 @@ config HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
>>  	  Unless your system has known restrictions or performance issues, it
>>  	  is recommended to say Y here.
>>
>> +config ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
>> +	def_bool n
>> +
>> +config HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
>> +	bool "Mark module mappings with stricter permissions (RO/W^X)"
>> +	default y
>> +	depends on ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
>
> It would seem that this ends up losing the previous dependency on
> MODULES - is that intentional?
>
> Robin.
>

(Apologies, my SMTP was set up incorrectly so this didn't actually
get sent out when I thought it did)

No, good catch. I missed re-adding that when doing the refactoring.

Thanks,
Laura

>>
>
diff mbox

Patch

diff --git a/Documentation/security/self-protection.txt b/Documentation/security/self-protection.txt
index da8cb36..eb018a1 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/self-protection.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/self-protection.txt
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@  made writable during the update, and then returned to the original
 permissions.)
 
 In support of this are CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS and
-CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, which seek to make sure that code is not
+CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS, which seek to make sure that code is not
 writable, data is not executable, and read-only data is neither writable
 nor executable.
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index 09aff28..ef852e4 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@  config ARM
 	select ARCH_HAVE_CUSTOM_GPIO_H
 	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
 	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS if MMU && !XIP_KERNEL
+	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS if MMU
 	select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
 	select ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
index d83f7c3..426d271 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
@@ -1738,17 +1738,6 @@  config PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR
 	  additional instructions during context switch. Say Y here only if you
 	  are planning to use hardware trace tools with this kernel.
 
-config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
-	bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
-	depends on MODULES && MMU
-	---help---
-	  This option helps catch unintended modifications to loadable
-	  kernel module's text and read-only data. It also prevents execution
-	  of module data. Such protection may interfere with run-time code
-	  patching and dynamic kernel tracing - and they might also protect
-	  against certain classes of kernel exploits.
-	  If in doubt, say "N".
-
 source "drivers/hwtracing/coresight/Kconfig"
 
 endmenu
diff --git a/arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g4_defconfig b/arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g4_defconfig
index 8ccc216..ffe2656 100644
--- a/arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g4_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g4_defconfig
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@  CONFIG_DEBUG_LL_UART_8250=y
 CONFIG_DEBUG_UART_PHYS=0x1e784000
 CONFIG_DEBUG_UART_VIRT=0xe8784000
 CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK=y
-CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX=y
+CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS=y
 # CONFIG_XZ_DEC_X86 is not set
 # CONFIG_XZ_DEC_POWERPC is not set
 # CONFIG_XZ_DEC_IA64 is not set
diff --git a/arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g5_defconfig b/arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g5_defconfig
index 90c5ce4..2ea444e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g5_defconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/configs/aspeed_g5_defconfig
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@  CONFIG_DEBUG_LL_UART_8250=y
 CONFIG_DEBUG_UART_PHYS=0x1e784000
 CONFIG_DEBUG_UART_VIRT=0xe8784000
 CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK=y
-CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX=y
+CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS=y
 # CONFIG_XZ_DEC_X86 is not set
 # CONFIG_XZ_DEC_POWERPC is not set
 # CONFIG_XZ_DEC_IA64 is not set
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/patch.c b/arch/arm/kernel/patch.c
index 9da1bf5..eb73a76 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/patch.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/patch.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@  static void __kprobes *patch_map(void *addr, int fixmap, unsigned long *flags)
 	bool module = !core_kernel_text(uintaddr);
 	struct page *page;
 
-	if (module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX))
+	if (module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS))
 		page = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
 	else if (!module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS))
 		page = virt_to_page(addr);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index 06fed56..2fe0e98 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@  config ARM64
 	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
 	select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
 	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
+	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
 	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
 	select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
 	select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
index a26d27f..1eebe1f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
@@ -71,17 +71,6 @@  config DEBUG_WX
 
 	  If in doubt, say "Y".
 
-config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
-	bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
-	depends on MODULES
-	default y
-	help
-	  Is this is set, kernel module text and rodata will be made read-only.
-	  This is to help catch accidental or malicious attempts to change the
-	  kernel's executable code.
-
-	  If in doubt, say Y.
-
 config DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA
 	depends on ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
 	bool "Align linker sections up to SECTION_SIZE"
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/insn.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/insn.c
index 94b62c1..31bd53f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/insn.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/insn.c
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@  static void __kprobes *patch_map(void *addr, int fixmap)
 	bool module = !core_kernel_text(uintaddr);
 	struct page *page;
 
-	if (module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX))
+	if (module && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS))
 		page = vmalloc_to_page(addr);
 	else if (!module)
 		page = pfn_to_page(PHYS_PFN(__pa(addr)));
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index 8e70ae5..b1e6ed5 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@  config S390
 	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
 	select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
 	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
+	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
 	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
 	select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
 	select ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig.debug b/arch/s390/Kconfig.debug
index 26c5d5be..57f8ea9 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig.debug
@@ -17,7 +17,4 @@  config S390_PTDUMP
 	  kernel.
 	  If in doubt, say "N"
 
-config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
-	def_bool y
-	depends on MODULES
 endmenu
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 9d80cd8..38ce850 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@  config X86
 	select ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER
 	select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
 	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
+	select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
 	select ARCH_HAS_KCOV			if X86_64
 	select ARCH_HAS_MMIO_FLUSH
 	select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API		if X86_64
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
index 67eec55..69cdd0b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
@@ -109,17 +109,6 @@  config DEBUG_WX
 
 	  If in doubt, say "Y".
 
-config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
-	bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
-	depends on MODULES
-	---help---
-	  This option helps catch unintended modifications to loadable
-	  kernel module's text and read-only data. It also prevents execution
-	  of module data. Such protection may interfere with run-time code
-	  patching and dynamic kernel tracing - and they might also protect
-	  against certain classes of kernel exploits.
-	  If in doubt, say "N".
-
 config DEBUG_NX_TEST
 	tristate "Testcase for the NX non-executable stack feature"
 	depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && m
diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
index e4eb254..5426940 100644
--- a/include/linux/filter.h
+++ b/include/linux/filter.h
@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@  static inline bool bpf_prog_was_classic(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
 
 #define bpf_classic_proglen(fprog) (fprog->len * sizeof(fprog->filter[0]))
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
 static inline void bpf_prog_lock_ro(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 {
 	set_memory_ro((unsigned long)fp, fp->pages);
@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@  static inline void bpf_prog_lock_ro(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 static inline void bpf_prog_unlock_ro(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 {
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX */
+#endif /* CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS */
 
 int sk_filter_trim_cap(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int cap);
 static inline int sk_filter(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
diff --git a/include/linux/init.h b/include/linux/init.h
index 9967bc9..5d6b0b2 100644
--- a/include/linux/init.h
+++ b/include/linux/init.h
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@  void prepare_namespace(void);
 void __init load_default_modules(void);
 int __init init_rootfs(void);
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX)
+#if defined(CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS) || defined(CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS)
 extern bool rodata_enabled;
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
index 7c84273..a4f6926 100644
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -764,7 +764,7 @@  extern int module_sysfs_initialized;
 
 #define __MODULE_STRING(x) __stringify(x)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
 extern void set_all_modules_text_rw(void);
 extern void set_all_modules_text_ro(void);
 extern void module_enable_ro(const struct module *mod, bool after_init);
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index 4b3bcc4..1545399 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -925,7 +925,7 @@  static int try_to_run_init_process(const char *init_filename)
 
 static noinline void __init kernel_init_freeable(void);
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS) || defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX)
+#if defined(CONFIG_HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS) || defined(CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS)
 bool rodata_enabled __ro_after_init = true;
 static int __init set_debug_rodata(char *str)
 {
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 38d4270..eb2f865 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -74,9 +74,9 @@ 
 /*
  * Modules' sections will be aligned on page boundaries
  * to ensure complete separation of code and data, but
- * only when CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX=y
+ * only when CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS=y
  */
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
 # define debug_align(X) ALIGN(X, PAGE_SIZE)
 #else
 # define debug_align(X) (X)
@@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@  static void mod_sysfs_teardown(struct module *mod)
 	mod_sysfs_fini(mod);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
 /*
  * LKM RO/NX protection: protect module's text/ro-data
  * from modification and any data from execution.
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index ad6ce82..0f98d6b 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -174,6 +174,22 @@  config HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
 	  Unless your system has known restrictions or performance issues, it
 	  is recommended to say Y here.
 
+config ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
+	def_bool n
+
+config HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
+	bool "Mark module mappings with stricter permissions (RO/W^X)"
+	default y
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
+	help
+	  If this is set, module text and rodata memory will be made read-only,
+	  and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides
+	  protection against certain security vulnerabilities (e.g. modifying
+	  code)
+
+	  Unless your system has known restrictions or performance issues, it
+	  is recommended to say Y here.
+
 source security/selinux/Kconfig
 source security/smack/Kconfig
 source security/tomoyo/Kconfig